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CLASS C, No. I
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GOVERNMENT ORIENTAL SERIES CLASS C, No. I
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Government Oriental Series—Class, © Wo. 1.
THE VEDANTA
THE BRAHMA-SUTRAS WITH THE BHASYAS of S’amkara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Madhva and Vallabha
BY move SSGHATE
M. A. (Bom. ), B. a. (Cantab ), Docteur de l’Universite de Paris, Late Professor of Sanskrit at the Elphinstone College, Bombay,
FIRST EDITION
Edited and seen through the press by V. G. PARANJPE.
SECOND EDITION Seen through the press by Cc. R. DEVADHAR
Director, Post-Graduate and Research Department, Bhandarkar O. R. Institute.
Revised Price Rs: 15-00
| PUBLISHED BY The Bhandavkac Oriental Besenceh Yuatitute, Poona, 1960 | |
Copies can be had direct from the Bhandarkar O. R. Institute, P. O. Deccan Gymkhana, Poona, India.
Price Rs, 5,50 np. per copy, exclusive of postage.
SECOND EDITION
1960
Printed by Shri, M. N, Chapekar, Aryasamskriti Press, Poona 2, and | Published by Dr. R. N. Dandekar, Secretary, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, POONA 4.
TABLE OF CONTENTS. jor
Preface by the Editor Author’s Preface Introduction
I. Generalities
If. The three periods of Sanskrit Philosophy _ The Vedic Period The Upanisadic Period The Post-Vedic Period ; III. The five Schools of the Vedanta The doctrine of Sarhkara The doctrine of Ramanuja The doctrine of Nimbarka The doctrine of Madhva The doctrine of Vallabha Résumé
Chapter I, General Outline
Chapter II, Analysis _... Adhyaya I, Pada 1
9 2» P. ie eon 4S 9 9 4 oe) If, 29 ] cy) 3 2 22 29 3 pe 2 4 Ho AEST Moin a 2? 99 ; 2 0 rs 4, ” IV, ” 99 29 2 a? 3? 3 2? -
99 Chapter III Conclusion
82 99 99-—105 105-109 109—123 1238131 131—132 133-137 137—144 144—150 150—155
156—170
‘PREFACE BY THE EDITOR
The literary career of the late Dr. Ghate was cut short by a premature death which belied all expectations. The present work was offered by him in 1918 as a thesis for the Doctorate of the Paris University. Being written in French, it was inaccessible to most Indian readers and therefore the authorities of the Bhandarkar Institute were very glad to accept the offer of the heirs and executors of the late Dr. Ghate to transfer to the Institute the copyright of what appeared to be a complete English translation of the work, I undertook most willingly to see the work through the press on behalf of the heirs of the late Dr. Ghate, whom I owed a debt of gratitude as his pupil at the Deccan College. On examination, however, I found that the copy entrusted to me was not a translation of the French work; but the original draft of it in English, which was changed occasionally while it was being translated. I had therefore to take some liberties with the text of Dr. Ghate’s manuscript, although I have tried to make them as few as possible consistently with the desire to give an unambiguous text, which was also in conformity with its French version. ‘There are a few inconsistencies that still remain and there must be typographical imperfections also in the present edition, for which I ought to take my full share of responsibility. I can only say that I have given it all my energy and vigilance, of which unfortunately I have not the full measure, and I:hope that the reader will accept this circumstance as some extenuation of all my faults.
VG PARANJPE
AUTHOR’S PREFACE
The problem as to what is the doctrine contained in the Brahmasitras of Badarayana or, in other words, which among the five well-known commentaries gives the most faithful interpretation of them has occupied my mind since long. I was therefore very glad to have the permission of the Faculty of Arts of the Univer- sity of Paris to offer to it in the form of a thesis the results of my study of the subject and my reflections on it. I leave it to the reader to decide if the conclusions at which I have arrived are or are not satisfactory. JI only hope that the method followed in the treatment of the subject would appear to be reasonable and in strict conformity with the rules of western criticism. If this venture of mine succeeds in arousing some interest in Sanskrit philosophy, and more particularly in removing the idea which is now current in Europe that the sum of the Vedanta is to be found in the system of Sarnkara, I shall consider that my labour will not have been in vain. |
I have to thank Dr. F. W. Thomas for the kindness which he has shown me in placing at my disposal books and manuscripts from the library of the India Office and in giving me his valuable advice whenever it was needed. The untiring co-operation of M. P. Masson-Oursel has likewise been of the greatest help to me, especially on account of his unrivalled knowledge of philosophic terminology, oriental as well as occidental.
The library of M. E. Senart has been of great use to me and
I insist on giving an expression here to my sense of gratitude to him.
But above all things, I owe a debt of gratitude to M. Sylvain Lévi and to M. A. Foucher. It is, thanks to their guidance and their encouragement, that this humble attempt has seen the light of day. I have not words with which to express all that I feel
[
(viii)
when I think of all the precious time that these savants havé spared for me and of the affectionate sympathy which they have shown for me during my stay in Paris. J need not say what a source of information and of inspiration has been to me their heart-to-heart talk, in the course of which they gave freely of their treasures of erudition and of the finesse of their critical mind. I shall ever carry with me an imperishable memory of the hours which it was my privilege to spend in their company.
INTRODUCTION. I.—GENERALITIES |
Maratha who was both a poet and a saint has said in a
very well known line, Wat aa ae ser att are ?—« Who is there, in this world, who is perfectly happy ?’. The reply is, of course, no one. Not only is no one perfectly happy, but no one, is happy even. For, as wesee, no happiness is unmixed. And even in the midst of the highest happiness, the thought or rather the fear of losing it half mars the enjoyment. Hence it. is that thinkers have always sought to find out something which would secure eternal happiness, something which you can never lose, that is to say, something which would ever remain with you. A slight consideration will show that nothing in this world can fulfil this test unless it forms part and parcel of you, or in other words, it is yourself; for whatever is outside you, can never remain eternally with you. It is yourself alone which you can depend upon as something that is never to leave you. Hence the search after eternal happiness led, in its turn, to the search after the self, to philosophy. ‘Who amI?’ (#1sé) is the chief question with which all philosophy is in the first place concerned. ‘ Whence do I come ?,’ ‘Where do I go?’ are questions which naturally follow in its train. It is these questions to which every school of philosophy attempts to furnish a reply ; and it is these questions which have always occupied the seers of ancient India, her prophets and teachers, her saints and poets; and if I may say so, it is not the search after truth - by itself, but the search after truth as actuated by the search after eternal beatitude, that is at the root of all Sanskrit philosophy, howsoever that beatitude may be called, by the name of ‘Moksa’ (deliverance ), or ananda ( jouissance ), or nirvana (complete extinction ), or any other name. And I believe that this is more natural, as it is more human, in accord- ance with the saying s4isaHatez4 a Aecista Gadd, ‘even a fool does net proceed without having some object in view. ’
? INTRODUCTION
The consideration of the main questions stated above can- not be satisfactorily carried on without at the same time taking note of many other side-questions, e.g. those about the means of knowledge. (pramanas ), the nature of heaven and hell, the nature of God, the practices to be observed in order to arrive at the right knowledge, the different paths leading to beatitude, etc. Thus there are more aspects or disciplines of philosophy than one, amongst which may be mentioned the following which are principal :—(1) Metaphysics, (2) Natural Philosophy, (3) Psycho- logy, to which may be added, (4) Eschatology.
(1) There are two ways of looking at the universe with all its manifestations,—one is to investigate the forms in which the universe appears to us, i. e. to our senses, which is the domain of the so- called science; the other is to consider the very essence of the phenomena, independently of how they affect our senses, leading thus to the science of Metaphysics. This latter sets before itself the task of knowing what is behind or beyond the universe which is both in us and around us. It endeavours to grasp the hidden springs that move the world, it longs to enter into the mysteries of ‘the great unknown’. Metaphysics thus inquires into the last or first cause, and is the science of the Really Existent. ‘Thus questions about Brahman, its nature, its relation to the universe,— all fall under the discipline of Metaphysics or the doctrine of the philosophical principle. Metaphysics becomes theology when the philosophical principle becomes less abstract and is endowed with personal attributes, so as to suit better the longings and the limited powers of the human mind, in other words, is turned into God. Thus Theology is the doctrine of God, or Metaphysics made concrete, whereas Metaphysics is Theology made abstract.
(2) On the other hand, when we deal with the phenomena themselves, their plurality, the order of creation and destruction of the different forms of existence that surround us, in brief, when ‘we concern ourselves with the Cosmos as opposed to the underlying principle of unity, we enter the domain of Natural Philosophy, better known in modern times by the name of Cosmology. ‘Thus, questions regarding the creation of the elements like ether, air, light etc., their order of creation and destruction, the classification of living beings etc., fall under the discipline of cosmology.
(3) Apart from the outer world, there is the inner world, which is in ourselves, the world of thoughts and emotions, wishes
INTRODUCTION 3
and cognitions, the subtle vital airs all having at their head the soul or the ego. An investigation into this inner world forms the subject of the third discipline, viz. Psychology. ‘Thus the theory of the subtle body and the gross body, the sense-organs as the means of cognition, internal and external, the vital airs,—all these belong to Psychology. Allied to this, or forming a sub-section of this, is Logic which deals with the more concrete instruments of thought and the laws of valid reasoning, which department has been the special pre-occupation of the Nyaya School of philosophy.
(4) To these we may add a fourth discipline, which is much less important and which is called Eschatology, dealing with things after death, with heaven and hell, the course followed by the jiva (life) after its departure from the body, the theory of manes etc.
These are the four chief parts which every philosophical system must contain. In the present place, however, we shall be mainly concerned with the first or metaphysical aspect and with the rest, only occasionally. |
II.—_THE THREE PERIODS OF SANSKRIT PHILOSOPHY.
Ancient Sanskrit Philosophy divides itself, broadly speaking, into three periods :—(1) the Vedic, (2) the Upanisadic and (3) the post-vedic, —which may be also called (1) the cosmological, (2) the metaphysical and (3) the systematic,—representing three stages in the gradual intellectual evolution of the Indian thought.
1. The Vedic Period.—By the Vedic, we mean the period of the sarmhitas and the Brahmanas, especially of the Reveda Samhita. The philosophy of the Veda is rather a loose term, inasmuch as there is no philosophy proper in the Veda. The first philosophy ofa people is its religion. And the Rgvedic religion is quite transparent, though developed, chiefly consisting of the personifica- tion of natural forces and natural phenomena. ‘The most striking features of the Vedic religion are :—
Firstly— It is practical and utilitarian in nature, in that the hymns, though highly poetic and inspired in character, are most of them at the same time incidental to the sacrifice. ‘ Give and take’ is the simple law which is applicable to the dealings between men and gods; and ‘reciprocity, frank unconditional reciprocity, becomes an accepted motive. **
Secondly—As a consequence, it is essentially a religion of priests, a hieratic religion.
Thirdly—It is a religion of the upper classes who are well- to-do, presupposing an established household of considerable extent, a wealthy and liberal householder, elaborate and expensive mate- rials, and many priests.
Fourthly—It is essentially optimistic. It is not immortality or heaven, but a long life for full hundred years, prosperity, warlike offspring, in short all the blessings of this life, that the worshipper or the householder asks for. It is a spirit of healthy joy in the life we live that dominates ; while such pessimistic ideas as that life is uncertain and unsubstantial, tha: death is nature while life is only an accident, are conspicuous by their absence.
* Bloomfield, Religion of the Veda, p. 184.
INTRODUCTION 5
Fifthly—It is characterised by what may be described as Arrested Personification. ‘The Vedic poets while personifying the power of nature into gods, never allow this nature worship to be stiffened into mere admiration, fear and adulation of personal gods, and never become forgetful of the origin from which sprang the
gods.
Sixthly—It shows a tendency to raise the particular god to whom the worshipper is addressing prayers for the time being, to the most exalted position, so that all other gods are subordinated to him for the moment,-a form of religion which has been called Kathenotheism.
Notwithstanding the religious character of the Vedic thought in general, there are frequently found references to ideas more abstract and philosophical, which may be regarded as the germs of the later Upanisad-thoughts. As in the Vedic religion the my- thological element prevailed, and the moral element,—the perso- nified natural forces being considered as the power that creates, maintains and controls what man feels in himself as constituting the moral law, opposed to the egoistic tendencies natural to man, —though present, was not sufficiently assertive and the way was gradually paved for doubt and contempt of gods, (see for instance Ke. T1..125,, TX, 112,- VII, 103, X. 119, etc.). Besides, the, mere technique of the sacrificial ritual, in the course of time, must have ceased to satisfy the minds both of the patron and the priest, so that more philosophic food was required, and questions and ans- wers regarding the origin of the world and similar topics must have been discussed, giving rise to what are called Brahmodyas, So also the old mythological gods in strong flesh tints must have begun to disconcert them and faith must have been gradually lost; so that abstract and symbolic embodiments of the divine idea then took the place of the gods of nature. And just as the Rsis thought that the several natural phenomena had some divine forces behind them which were personified into so many gods, in the same way they advanced one step further and came to think that all three were aspects of one and the same all-pervading divine force which manifested itself in the different phenomena. ‘Thus the thought gradually progressed from many gods to one being and from the simple give-and-take religion to abstruse speculation regarding the beginning and origin of all things.
Thus Rg. I. 164-46 declares, “They call it Indra, Mitra,
6 INTRODUCTION
Varuna, and Agni, or the heavenly bird Garutmat (the sun). The sages call the one being in many ways, they call it Agni, Yama, Matarisvan.” ‘This whole hymn (I. 164) consisting of 52 verses, is nothing but a collection of riddles to which no answers are given. ‘‘ The subjects of these riddles are cosmic, that is, per- taining to the nature-phenomena of the Universe; mythological, that is, referring to the accepted legends about gods; psychological, that is, pertaining to the human organs and sensations; or finally crude and tentative philosophy or theosophy. Heaven and Earth, Sun and Moon, air, clouds, and rain; the course of the sun, the year, the seasons, months, days and nights; human voice, self- consciousness, life and death, the origin of the first creature, and the originator of the universe;—such are the abrupt and bold themes.’ *
Thus already in certain hymns of the Reveda, there emerges the thought with which philosophy begins,—the conception of the unity of the world,—which later rose up to Monism, perceiving through the veil of the manifold, the unity which underlies it. In this connection may be particularly noticed the hymn X. 121, where the Hiranya-garbha is described as existing in the beginning of the creation, the sole lord of beings, supporting heaven and earth; X. 90 where the whole world is conceived as one being, the Viraf-purusa who having pervaded it from all sides, still remained over and above it; X. 82 where the waters are spoken of as being the first substance or prime cause; X 81, addressed to Visvakarman who combines in his person the characters of a primeval divine sacrificer and of a creator, in which the cosmolo- gical significance of the divine sacrifice finds particular expression, and questions like ‘What was the place whereon he took his station? what was it that supported him? How was it? ( Verse 2 ),’ are boldly asked; X. 125 where Vak is represented as the companion and upholder of the gods and as the foundation of all religious activity and its attendant boons; and X. 129, which is quite typical in character and remains unsurpassed in its noble simpli- city and in the loftiness of its philosophical vision, as it attempts to explain the presence of the world and its contents, beyond the point of mere individual experience or analysis through empirical knowledge, by putting forth a fundamental principle without personality.
* Bloomfield, Religion of the Veda, p. 218.
INTRODUCTION 7
A cursory glance at these hymns will show that the general trend of thought is principally cosmological rather than metaphy- sical in the proper sense of the word, and hence we may call this period cosmological. One thing to be noticed in connection with this early philosophy of the Vedas, however, is the absence of pessi- mism and metempsychosis, which are the distinguishing traits of later Indian philosophy. |
(2) The Upanisadic Periodi—The second period of Indian Philosophy, that of the Upanisads, is quite distinct in character from the first, though it is but the natural result of it. If the thought during the first period was mainly religious and cosmolo- gical, with only a trace here and there of philosophy proper, the second period was mainly philosophical, though not in the narrow sense of the word, i. e. having a cut-and-dry system of philosophy. The elaborate and mechanical system of worship that had grown up round the Vedic gods, and the speculations as regards the appro- priateness of the rules and modes of worship and their efficacy for man’s good in this world and the next, which prevailed in the Brahmanas, no longer satisfied the religious spirit of the people. The overdoing of the sacrificial cult brought on its own downfall; and people’s thoughts were naturally drawn to subjects of a more spiritual character, such as problems about God, man and the world, and a variety of solutions was arrived at. ‘ Knowledge and not mere ceremonial is the way to happiness,’—that is the key-note of the literature of this period. ‘The Upanisads, unsurpassed in their freedom and comprehensiveness and grandeur of thought, are simply marvellous, and nowhere else can we find such a_ simplicity and naivete’ of style combined with profundity and depth of idea, —a circumtance which makes them untranslatable.
On the question as to what the Upanisads teach (or in other words what is the nature of the philosophy of this period), there are, so to speak, two views, though one of them is gradually becom- ing the more prevalent one. Many eminent scholars, along with the orthodox people especially about Maharastra, hold that the Vedanta of Samkara represents the true teaching of the Upanisads; and that the other so-called orthodox systems as well as the other schools of Vedanta, while they lay claim to be based on the Upani- sads, are all so many developments by a kind of degeneration of the original doctrine (of the Upanisads ). ‘Thus, according to these people, the main idea of at least the oldest of the Upanisads (i. e. the Brhadaranyaka, the Chandogya, the Mundaka and the
8 INTRODUCTION
Katha) can be summed up in the equation, Brahman= Atman= the world, taken in the strictest and most literal sense, (see especially Brhad Upa. 1-4); from which it follows that the Atman is the only reality,* that it is the metaphysical unity which is manifested in all the empirical plurality, all plurality thus by implication reducing itself to Maya, that it is the knowing subject within us § and, as the knowing subject, is itself unknowable. + ‘Thus though the expression ‘ Maya,’ in the strict sense of ignorance, or Avidya or illusion, may be of a later date, still the doctrine that the universe is illusory was taught by the Upanisads, and the older the texts of the Upanisads are, the more uncompromisingly and expressly do they maintain this illusory character of the world of experience. ‘The exponents of this view further add that this bold and absolute idealism (as taught, for instance, in the so-called Yajnavalkya chapters of the Brahad. Upa. ) later degenerated first into pantheism, then into theism and last into materialism. For, the denial of the existence of the world as it appears to us, implied by the idealism of the old Upanisads, could not be maintained in the face of the reality of the world, which forced itself upon people’s minds. Thus the attempt to reconcile the two, i.e. the bold idealism and the reality of the world led to Pantheism, according to which the world is real and yet the Atman is the only reality, for the world is Atman (cf. Chand. 3,14). Thus the equation that the world is equal io Atman led to the theory of causality,—to cosmogonism, according to which, the Brahman itself entered into the creation as the individual soul. ‘This Pantheism has to be distinguished from Theism which is the characteristic feature of certain later Upanisads like the Svetasvatara. The absolute identity of Brahman and Atman, though perfectly true from the metaphysical stand- point, remains incomprehensible for the empirical view of things, which distinguishes a plurality of souls different from each other and from the Highest Spirit, the creative power of the Universe. This is theism. According to it there are three entities, a real world (acid), atman (cid) and Brahman of which the cid and
* Brhad. 2. 4. 5 “Atmano va are darsanena Sravanena matya vijiia- nenedam sarvam viditam bhavati.”
$ Brhad. 3. 8. 11-‘* Nanyadatosti drastr nanyadatosti srotr nanya- datosti mantr nanyadatosti vijnatr.”’
; Brhad. 3. 4.2-‘‘Na drster drastaram pasyer na sruteh Srotaram
ee _—
srnuya na mater mantaram manvitha na vijiater vijiiataram vijaniyah.’
INTRODUCTION 9.
acid forni the body. But in the course of time the necessity of Brahman apart from Atman ceased to be felt and its creative power was attributed to Prakrti, non-intelligent but at the same time in- dependent of any intelligent being, which led to the materialistic dualism of the Samkhya doctrine later on. .
An impartial consideration of the Upanisads taken as a whole will, however, show that. this view about the teaching of the Upanisads is not tenable ; nor is the order in the evolution of thought satisfactorily demonstrable. The Upanisads are nothing but free and bold attempts to find out the truth without the slight- est idea of a system; and to say that any one particular doctrine is taught in the Upanisads is unjustifiable in the face of the fact that in one and the same section of an Upanisad, we find passages one following the other, which are quite opposed in their purport. Bold realism, pantheism, theism, materialism are all scattered about here and there, and the chronological order of the Upanisads has not been sufficiently established on independent grounds, so as to justify us in claiming that one particular view predominating in a certain number of Upanisads ( granting that this is possible ) represents the teaching of the Upanisads. And to say that idealism represents the real teaching of the Upanisads because it is contained in a certain Upanisad which is relatively old and that the Upa- nisad is relatively old because it contains a view of things with which philosophy should commence, is nothing but a logical see- saw. It may be true that if one insists on drawing a system from the Upanisads, replete as they are with contradictions and diver- gences, Samkara has succeeded the best, because his distinction of esoteric and exoteric doctrines like a sword with two edges can easily reconcile all opposites such as unity and plurality, assertion of attributes and their negation, in connection with one and the same being ; but this is one thing and to say that the Upanisads taught Samkara’s doctrine is quite another thing.
As regards the relative order of doctrines in the march of philosophic thought, we may as well say that the first stage is re- presented by materialism, which is innate in us, which is persistently forced on us by our daily experience, and which very few can _ get rid of in practice, though there may be a few more who deny it in theory, Thus we start with plurality, and difference, ascend
Ghate, Vedanta 2
10 INTRODUCTION
through difference and non-difference and qualified unity until at last we reach the highest top i. e. absolute unity.
Thus the other view regarding the teaching of the Upanisads according to which the Upanisads teach not one but many systems of doctrines regarding the nature of God, man and the world and the relations between themis more reasonable and is being more and more accepted. The germs of all the later systems, whether orthodox or heterodox, can be found in them, as is evident from the fact that all the religio-philosophic systems of later times can quotea certain number of passages from them in their support. But when the expo- nents of these systems try to show that theirs is the only system taught by the Upanisads and attempt to explain passages, even when directly opposed in tenor to their doctrine, in a manner so as to favour their doctrine, the artificiality and the unsatisfactory character of the attempt is at once evident. For the Upnisads represent a large float- ing mass of speculations of old seers, clothed in words and handed orally—speculations depending, on the mood of the thinker and the point of view from which he looked at things.
In spite of this free and unfettered character of the Upnisads, however, it must be admitted that they are on the whole more favourable to the Uttara Mimamsa or Vedanta (taken in its larger sense) than to any other system, and that we find there some ideas which stand out more conspicuously than others,—such as for instance the immortality of the soul, its metempsychosis and transmigration, including the ‘way of the fathers’ for the performers of sacrifices and virtuous actions, the ‘way of the gods’ for the possessors of knowledge, and the third place for the doers of evil deeds, the superiority of knowledge and meditation to action as means of attaining liberation, above all, a constant striving after the reconcilation of unity and plurality, of idealism and realism.
Such is, in general, the character of the second or Upanisad period of Indian philosophy, which we have also called metaphy- sical to distinguish it from the first, since it concerned itself also with speculations about man and his inner soul, his inner activities and the processes of his thought and will, and not merely with questions about nature, cosmic matter etc. (as was the case with the first period ), in brief since it saw the beginnings of the psy- chological, ethical and metaphysical problems.
Next we come to the post-yvedic or systematic period, which saw the development of the so called six darsanas or orthodox
INTRODUCTION 1]
systems, as well as of the heterodox systems such as Buddhism, Jainism etc.. As said above, the germs of all these systems were already present in the Upanisads; and what these systems did was to take up particular parts of the Upanisads and deduce from them a cut-and-dry system, conniving at or explaining away in a far- fetched manner those parts which did not suit the particular sys- tem. This systematic period may be supposed to have begun with the collections of sitras which are regarded as the foundations of the several systems and the dates and authors of which have not yet been determined with precision and accuracy. ‘The interven- ing stage between the Vedas and the Upnisads, on the one hand,
and the siitras, on the other, is represented by the philosophical portions in the Mahabharata, as for instance, the Bhagavadgita,
the Sanatsujatiyaparvan, the Moksa-dharma etc., (portions of which have formed the common basis of Buddhism and Samkhya), which were, however, as far from containing a systematic doctrine as the Upanisads themselves: and terms like Samkhya and Yoga,
frequently to be met with there, do not signify the names of the later systems called by the those names, but mean merely ‘reflec- tion’ and ‘concentration,’ in which sense they are used also when they first occur in the Svet. Upa. 6,13.
As for what distinguishes the orthodox from the heteredox or Nastika schools, it is generally believed to be the want of belief — in God as the creator of the world; and in this sense the begin- nings of Indian atheism can be traced back to the Vedic period even. Inthe Rgveda, the God Indra is derided in IV. 24.10. X. 119; and in II. 12.5, VIII. 100-3, we read of people who ab- solutely denied his existence even in these early days. We have here the first traces of that naive atheism which is so far from in- dulging in any philosophic reflection that it simply refuses to believe what it cannot visualise, and which was later known as the Carvaka or Lokayatika system. As distinguished from it, there is. the philosophical atheism of the Bauddhas and the Jainas, according to whom there is no eternal, supreme God, creator and lord of all. things, and the so-called gods are only more highly organised and happier beings than men,—an atheism which can go hand in hand with a religious system and cannot prevent it from being one of the most influential religions in the world.
But if the distinction be due merely to the negation of God,. even the Samkhya will cease to be orthodox; the Mimarhsakas of the. school of Kumfrilabhatta also deny the existence of a supreme,
12 INTRODUCTION
God. Even in the Vaisesika and Nyaya systems, the theistic element, far from being a fundamental point in the doctrine, is nothing but a mere appendage. Buddhism and Jainism, moreover, though they deny God, raise the personalities of Buddha and Jina almost to the.eminence of a god, as the teacher of the sacred law and as the object of the highest reverence, while admitting no doubt that the world is without beginning or end, and not produc- ed by the god or ruled by one.
| It is the want of faith in lhe Vedas as Revelation and as the highest authority, of ‘ pramanya-bnddhirvedesu, which, from the Brahmanical point of view, placed the so-called atheistic schools outside the pale of orthodoxy: thus the Samkhya, the Vaisesika and the Mimathsa can call themselves orthodox or not un-atheistic, because they accepted the authority of the Vedas in theory, how- soever little they might use it in practice; at least they did not condemn it as did the Bauddhas and Jainas.
Of the six orthodox systems that developed during this third period, the Sarhkhya and the Vedanta are the only ones of strictly metaphysical importance. It is the Vedanta alone that has appropriated to itself the name ‘ Aupanisada’ doctrine, since it is the only system which seriously concerns itself with explaining and reconciling the various divergent metaphysical portions of the Upanisads and since it alone regards the Upanisads as the highest authority, not only in theory but in practice. The metaphysical importance and the ancient character of the Samkhya is proved by the fact that the Vedanta-siitras take special pains to refute it. The other systems, with only a nominal metaphysical grounding, have specialised in other departments of knowledge and thus are of still greater importance for philosophy proper. Thus the Yoga, which is a sequel of the Sarnkhya and which accepts the metaphy- sical doctrine of the Samkhya entirely, with the only difference that it regards the Isvara as a more important personality than the Samkhya does, mainly concerns itself with the theory and practice of Samadhi or concentration of mind and the various physical and mental gymnastics related to it, of course viewed as means of arriving at the knowledge of the essence of things, or, in other words, at the vision of the highest verity. The Vaisesika dealing with the categories of substance, quality, action, commonness, particularity, invariable concomitance, to which was later added: non-existence or negation, elaborates the doctrine of the atoms:
INTRODUCTION 13
and that of particularity or Visesa, from which it derives its name. Symmetry and consistency of division and precision of thought and expression characterised this School; and they were further carried to perfection and emphasised by its sequel, the Nyaya, which concerned itself solely with logic or the theory and art of valid reasoning. Thus nyaya or syllogism was its special occupation and consequently, in the place of the six or seven objective categories of the Vaisesika, which were concerned more with the products of thought, the Nyaya had sixteen logical categories, which referred to the modes of thought or the thoughts themselves and _ which are mainly related to controversial discussion or disputation, so neces- sary for the ascertainment of truth. They are;—proof (gam), object of knowledge ( 984), doubt (&2q), purpose (yaaa), in- stance ( Z3I-q ), demonstrated truth ( fagi-a), member of a syllo- gism ( 444 ), reasoning by reduction to absurdity (a), deter- mination or ascertainment ( fa%q ), discussion leading to truth (ara), wrangling ( seq), cavilling ( faavet), fallacy ( gama), perversion (3 ), futility (ata), and unfitness to be argued with ( fameeaa ). The Ptirva-mimamsa more generally called ( Mimarnsa only ) has for its special object the interpretation of the Vedas, or the deter- mination of the sense of the Revelation, and its whole scope is the ascertainment of duty or Dharma, which signifies the sacrifices and o‘her acts of religion, ordained by the Vedas. ‘Thus it is practical as relating to works (karma) or religious observances to be under- taken for specific ends; and it is accordingly called karma-mimamsa in contradiction to the Brahma-mimamsa, which is_ theological. ‘Thus this mimarmsa is not a philosophical system in the proper sense of the word. It touches upon philosophical topics only incidentally in the course of delivering canons of scriptural inter- pretation.
As regards the metaphysical part, the five systems, viz. Samkhya and Yoga, Vaisesika and Nyaya, and Purva-~mimamsa may be distinguished from the sixth, the Uttar-mimarhsa or Vedanta, by the fact that the former take their stand on duality; while the latter on unity (excepting, of course, the particular school of Vedanta represented by Madhva). As a matter of fact, the first five systems are impossible without a belief in duality or plurality as being real. Thus according to the Samkhya, there are two entities independent and distinct, the pradhana_ or prakrti, consisting of the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas, whichis the prime cause of the whole material world,
14 INTRODUCTION
and the purusas or souls that are infinite in number. The pradhana is eternal matter, indiscrete, undistinguishable as it is destitute of parts, inferrable from its effects, productive, without being itself a product. The Soul or Purusa is neither produced nor pro- ductive, multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, unalterable, immaterial. Besides these two, the Sarnkhya teaches twenty-three other principles (tattvani):—Intelligence (buddhi or mahat), egotism (ahamkara), the five subtle elements (tanmatras), the five organs of sense, the five organs of action, the internal organ (manas), and the five gross elements. The Purusa, absolutely inactive, is a witness of the active Prakrti. It is the union of these two that leads to creation and involves the purusa in the Sarhsara. *“The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one unborn (prakrti), which is red (activity or rajas), white (goodness or sattva), and black (darkness or tamas), and produces a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons her when once she has been enjoyed’ (.Svetasvatara IV, 5.). The non-intelligent Pradhana, even without any other intelligent superintendent like Isvara, acts for the good of the soul, just as the non-intelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf. And just as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Prakrti in the proximity of the unmoved soul. This union of Prakrti and Purusa is caused by mutual dependence. The lame man, mounted on the blind man’s back, and the blind man, following the path indicated by the lame man, both reach their goal, though either, by himself, is help- less; so is the creation effected by Prakrti and Purusa by their union. All this time the Purusa, though essentially udasina ( indif- frent or passive), comes under the shadow of Buddhi through not recognising himself as distinct from it, and suffers from the pain which really belongs to Buddhi, but which owing to its being reflected upon him due to its extreme proximity, is regarded by the Purusa as belonging to himself; and he can throw it off and obtain final bliss only when he gets rid of the error of confounding himself with the prakrti. Thus it is the knowledge of the distinction or duality between the Prakrti and the Purusa that leads to Moksa. The Samkhya is an exponent of the doctrine of Parinama or modification, or in other words, of the Satkaryavada as regards the relation between cause and effect. The effect always is present in the cause, and is only a modification of it, without any distinction of essence. ‘The Sarmkhya also lays great stress on
INTRODUCTION 115
the efficacy of reasoning. It is by inference or reasoning that
aquaintance with things transcending the senses is attained; and it
is only those truths which are neither to be directly perceived nor
to be inferred by reasoning that are to be deduced from revelation.
Thus here the scales are turned the opposite way, as compared with _ the Vedanta, where revelation comes first and reasoning second.
As regards the Yoga, there is nothing more to notice except the admission of an additional principle, the Isvara, who is a soul or spirit, distinct from other souls, untouched by affliction, action, fruit and fancies or passing thoughts, who, of his own will assuming a body in order to create, originated all secular or Vedic traditions, and who is gracious towards the living beings, scorched as they are by the fire of worldly existence, himself infinite and omniscient.
According to the atomic system of the Vaisesika and the diale- ctial system of the Nyaya, soul and matter are quite distinct enti- ties, both equally real, and it is the confounding of the one with the other which causes all the misery of the worldly existence. The soul is the receptacle of knowledge, distinct from body and the senses, different for each individual person, omni-present, eternal, perceived by the mental organ, and demonstrated by its peculiar attributes, which are knowledge, desire, aversion, pain, pleasure and effort or volition. The soul, though it animates the individual, cannot experience pain or pleasure in relation to itself, unless it is associated with a body. It is to be noted also that the soul is as much a substance as earth, water etc., being a substratum of qualities like them, and hence it is included in the list of the nine dravyas or substances. Besides these individual souls, which are infinite in number and are all equally omnipresent, there is the Supreme Soul ( Paramatman ) which is one, and the seat of eternal knowledge, and is known from valid proof as the maker of all things.
The material world is of four kinds, according as it is derived from the element of earth, water, light or air. All the gross products can be ultimately reduced to atoms, which are themselves incapable of further analysis, and hence, eternal and atomic in size. Itis by the will of the paramatman that a movement is
produced in these atoms which are thus brought together ; and in this way the creation takes place.
Freedom from Sathsara or absolute negation of all pain is the
16 INTRODUCTION
highest goal ; and the only means of attaining it is the right knowledge of the seven catagories according to Kanada or of the sixteen according to Gautama. A man is involved in Samsara thus :—First he has false notions such as mistaking the body etc., which are not the soul, for the soul; these lead to faults, 1. e. a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to it, though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable to the soul. Impelled by these faults, man does things which may be forbidden or laudable; both being however forms of activity, lead to a similar blamable or laudable birth or bodily manifestation; and while this birth lasts, there arises the impression of pain. Now this series beginning with false notions and ending with pain is continually going on and is what is called Samsara or mundane existence, getting on ceaselessly like a water-wheel. When, however,a man has obtained the right knowledge of the catagories, which enables him {o distinguish one thing from another, and the soul from the
body in particular, all false notions disappear; the faults thus pass
away, with them ceases activity, with activity ceases birth and.»
with cessation of birth comes the complete abolition of pain; and this absolute abolition of pain is the final bliss.
As opposed to the paringma and the satkarya doctrines of the Sarmhkhyas, the Vaisesika and the Nyaya are exponents of the Grambha and the asatkarya doctrines, which maintain a creation, absolute and new. Thus, according to them the effect is absolutely different from the cause, is never present in the cause, but is newly
created in it and stands in invariable concomitance ( samavaya )
with it. The same is true about the relation between a qualified substance and its quality or the active object and its activity, which cannot be absolutely different according to the Samkhya or the
Vedanta. Thus a jar is absolutely different from the clay, though
it cannot exist apart from the clay.
Thus both the Samkhya and the Nyaya-Vaisesika systems are essentially dualistic and, we may also say, materialistic. ‘They at the same time admit of the eternal existence of matter, apart from the intelligent principle and as quite independent of it.
The Ptirva-mimamsa being essentially ritualistic and practical in character, and concerning itself as it does with the determination of religious duty and the laying down of canons of interpretation of the sacred texts, need not detain us here, though the principles
a
INTRODUCTION 17 - of interpretation taught, by it, e. g. the relative importance of direct statement (rule), indicatory mark (linga ), context ( prakurane ) etc. in determining the sense of a word or a passage are accepted by all.
The Uttaramimarsa is so called to distinguish it from the Pirvamimamsa, since it is concerned with the interpretation of the portions of the Revelation relating to knowledge that come after Karman, while the other with that of the previous or old ( Purva) portions of the Revelation. This system, more popularly known as the Vedanta, is the only system of philosophy properly so called, which has exercised the greatest influence over Hindu thought; and even at the present day, ifit is possible to describe the philosophic thought of Hindus in general by one name, it is Vedanta. It is to be remembered, however, that the name Vedanta does not signify one system only, as is, for instance, the case with the other orthodox systems considered above. It comprehends several systems differing from each other essentially in points of metaphysical doctrine, ranging from absolute idealism down to dualism, at the same time having some important features which are common and which may be the reason of their being designat- ed by a common name, besides the fact of their professing to be based on the Vedanta or the Upanisadas. Of these we may notice here only the five systems which are attributed to Sarhkara, Rama- nuja, Nimbarka, Vallabha and Madhva, and which are known respectively by the names of Kevaladvaita ( absolute monism ), Visistadvaita (qualified monism), Dvaitadvaita ( dualism and monism ), Suddhadvaita (pure monism) and Dvaita (dualism ). All of these profess alike to be derived more or less from the same collection of stitras,—although it is impossible by the very nature of things, that the Stitrakara should have all these in view. It is however very probable that the germs of all the Vedanta systems existed long ago, although, as systems proper, attaining to a cer- tain importance in the estimation of the people, they may be said to date from the times of the respective philosophers to whom they are generally attributed. |
From this point of view, Sarhkara’s system may be called the oldest, since, by a general consent, Sarhkaracarya is now placed in the latter half of the 8th century (788 A. D. to 820 A. D.). Telang’s view putting Sathkara in the 7th century has been
Ghate, Vedanta 3
18 INTRODUCTION
conclusively disproved by Prof. Pathak.* Without going into details, I shall content myself with the following question }—‘‘ The date of the death of Bhartrhari, the Buddhistic author of the Vakyapadiya_ is fixed by .Prof. Pathak at 650 A.D., and in relation to him Kumiarila is assigned to the first half and Samkaiacarya and Sure- svaracarya to the latter half of the 8th century. Mr. Telang, however, contends that these last cannot be assigned to such a late date and he would place them in the 7th century. It may be men- tioned that Dharmekirti is identified with the author of the Nyaya- bindu, which is commefited upon by Dharmottaracarya, who belonged to the Satitrantika school of Buddhism. ‘The Dharma- kirti has been assigned by Prof. Pathak to the beginning of the 7th century, and it must be admitted, without opposition, that he was older than Samkaracarya, as the latter criticises his views.”
Thus Satnkaracarya appeared at a time when his presence was urgently required to put new life into Brahmanism and Hin- duism as well as to counteract the influence of Buddhism, Jainism and other heterodox systems on the one hand, and the mimarhsakas on the other. The Hinayana Buddhism had already made way for the Sanskrit mahayanism and against this last, controversies were carried on by the school of nyaya and by the mimamsakas, especially by Sabarasvamin and Kumarilabhatta. The latter maintained the efficacy of the sacrificial religion alone, and denied it even to the faith and practices of the Aupanisadas, whose doctrine, based as it was on the Upanisads, was in danger, when there appeared prominently on the scene, Gaudapadacarya and sometime after him the pupil of his pupil, Sarhkaracarya. These propounded the doctrine of illusion or Maya.
To overthrow this theory was the great object of the remain- ing four Vedantic Schools which preached bhakti or devotion, as against Jiana and Karman, as the means of deliverance and which insisted on the reality of the world, both intelligent and non- intelligent, basing their arguments on the same Upanisads on which Sarhkara and his school took their stand.
* For these two views regarding the date of Samkara, the reader may be referred to the JBRAS. Vol. XVII. P. 63, ff ; ‘ Purnavarma and Samkaracarya’; Vol. XVIII. p. 88 ff ; ‘ Dharmakirti and Samkaracarya’ p. 147 ff: ‘Subandhu and Kumarila’; p. 213 ff; Bhartrhari and Kumarila.
; JBRAS Centenary Memorial Volume, 1905 p. 51-52.
INTRODUCTION 19
The doctrine of Sathkara though of great merit from the metaphysical point of view, was rather too elevated and _ too impersonal for the ordinary people, who wanted something more definite and personal. No doubt Samkara in order to accommodate such people admitted of a personal God; and popular belief attributes to him the introduction of the worship of the Paficaya- tana or the five gods together, so as to displease no one. Buta god was after all of an illusory and second-rate importance in his system. :
Hence there arose Ramanuja and the other Vaisnavite leaders who introduced the cult of a personal God and devotion to him or adoration of him, which gained great favour with the people.
These preachers of bhakti thought it impossible that Maya and bhakti could go together, as the latter necessarily included love and as love can have place only if the lover and the beloved are real entities. Hence, Ramanuja, Vallabha and Madhva all direct their efforts to the refutation of the Maya doctrine and they sometimes go so far as to call Samkara a mere incarnation of the Madhyamika or a disguised Bauddha. |
But to account for bhakti, it is not always necessary to give up the doctrine of absolute unity and its sequel, the doctrine of Maya; for we see that the santas of Maharastra have always taught bhakti and at the same time held the doctrine of Samkara; the well-known commentary of Jfanesvara ( about 1290 A. D.) on the Gita is a striking illustration of this fact; and no one could have propounded the doctrine of Maya more vehemently and more successfully than Jiianesvara and at the same time, no one could have been a more staunch and popular representative of the bhakti cult. And this fact explains why the influence of Sarhkara’s doctrine still holds great sway in the popular mind, in spite of the attacks made against it by the other Vedanta Schools.
Of the teachers of these four Vedanta schools, the first in chro- nological order is Ramanuja born in Saka 938, corresponding to 1016 or 1017 A. D. Ramanuja in his youth lived in Kajfcipura or Conjeeveram and afterwards, when he became a successor of Yamunacarya, he lived at Srirangam near ‘Trichinopoli, where he did his life’s work. He is supposed to have died at the age of 120, in 137 AcD.
Next comes Nimbarka who is supposed to have lived a few
20 INTRODUCTION
years after Ramanuja. The date of his death is probably 1162 A. D.* A Tailanga brahmana by birth and thus a southerner, he however lived at Vrndavana near Mathura and his followers are scattered over the whole of northern India and exist in large numbers near Mathura and Bengal.
Madhva lived in the first three quarters of the 13th century ( 1197-1276 ), and his birth place is stated to be Kallianpur in the Udipi Taluka of the district of South Kanara—perhaps the same as the Rajatapitha of the Madhvavijaya. The followers of Madhva’s doctrine exist in pretty large numbers in the Kanarese Districts of the Bombay Presidency, in the state of Mysore and on the western coast from Goa to South Kanara; there are only a few adherents of this school in Northern India.
Last comes Vallabha who is supposed to have been born about 1417 A. D. He was the son of a Tailanga Brahmana, who lived at a village named Kankarava in the Telugu country. He was born while his parents were on the way to Benares on a pilgrimage. He lived at Vrndavana and at Mathura. Srikrsna and Gokula figure very prominently in his doctrine., His followers are found in. very large numbers in Gujarat and in Northern India.
All these four schools alike preached bhakti, which presupposes a personal God, and condemned the principle of maya with equal vehemence; the chief differnces in their doctrine relate to the meta- physical or the properly philosophic part of the doctrine, that is to say, they are with reference to the nature of the relation between the supreme spirit, the individual soul and the inanimate world.
We shall next indicate briefly the philosophical connections of these five schools of Vedanta,—which forms the main subject matter of the present essay.
* See Bhandarkar, Vaisnavism etc., p, 62,
III—THE FIVE SCHOOLS OF THE VEDANTA.
Tur Docrrine or SAMKARA :—Sarhkara’s doctrine, which is usually known by the name of Kevaladvaita or absolute monism, may be summed up in the four Sanskrit words: ‘aa aq anteqeat.’ It is only intelligence, without form, without qualities, without any limitations of time, space or causality, that is real; and the unity , which according to Sarkara is the substratum of all ephemeral and empirical plurality, is itself without the slightest touch of plurality; it is unity. absolute; and as such the highest thought of humanity cannot go any further. The greatest merit of Sarhkara’s system is his most successful attempt to reconcile the mutually contradictory texts of the Upanisads, in other words, to reconcile bold idealism, which is the result of introspection, with the realism which ruth- lessly insists on forcing itself upon us from outside. ‘This he does by the introduction of maya in his system; or his doctrine has always two aspects, esoteric and exoteric, be it in reference to theo- logy, or cosmology, or psychology. ‘The world around us consists of souls of limited knowledge or of non-sentient matter; and if we once admit the existence of a supreme spirit with unlimited powers and intelligence, omnipotent and omniscient ( as do all the schools of Vedanta and other orthodox schools also ), how can we explain the creation of souls of limited knowledge and of objects without intelligence, from this omniscient spirit, except as the result of igno- rance or nescience which puts limitation on the unlimited intelli- ence of this spirit? ‘That there exists such ignorance is a fact not only mentioned in the revealed texts, but is a matter of ordinary experience, as when one gives expression to one’s consciousness of one’s ignorance when one says ‘I am ignorant’. If this conscious- ness is true, well, it is a proof of ignoranc; if it is not true, so much the better proof it is of ignorance.
, Thus esoterically the Brahman or the supreme spirit is know- ledge or realisation itself, without qualification and without possi- bility of change; exoterically, it is qualified, possessed of an infinite number of auspicious attributes, capable of producing this world from itself and r2absorbing it in itself,—in brief, it is Ivara.
The exoteric cosmology, according to the natural but erroneous realism (avidya) in which we are born, considers the world as
22? INTRODUCTION
real and can express its entire dependence on Brahman only by the adoption of a myth, viz. creation of the world by Brahman, imply- ing thereby a temporal character for this creation. But this goes against the doctrine that the transmigration of souls is without a beginning. ‘To reconcile the two, Sarhkara teaches that the tem- poral character does not belong to the creation for ever; but that there are long periods for which the world is created and after which it is reabsorbed by Brahman, and that this succession of creation and reabsorption lasts for eternity; so that no creation may be regarded as the first. This never-ceasing creation is a moral necessity,—it is neither for God’s glorification nor for his particular amusement, nor, is it created out of his love of mankind. This explains the theory of Karman, and of the Sarhsadra, which goes on endlessly as the sprout grows from the seed, which in its own turn grows from an earlier sprout and so on. |
The esoteric cosmology, however, says that all this is a mere appearance of truth. The manifold world is only an illusion, maya, a mirage ( mrgatrsnika ), a dream; and the reality is to be attained not by reasoning (tarka), but by introspective realisation (anubhava). If you return from this variegated world to the inmost recesses of your soul (atman), you will be aware of a reality which can very properly be described as ‘ timeless, spaceless, changeless.? The same thing was said by Plato, according to whom this world is a world of shadows and not of realities; and the same thing has been said by Kant to whom the world is an appearance only, and not the thing in itself. What was arrived at by intuition by Samkara and Plato, Kant has demonstrated by an analysis of the human mind, showing that the three essential elements of the outside world, viz. space, time and causality, are not,—as we naturally be- lieve them to be and as the other orthodox schools of Vedanta also admit,—eternal fundamentals of an objective reality, but merely subjective, innate, perceptual forms of our own intellect.
According to the esoteric psychology, the Jiva is brahman itself in full and total possession of eternity, omnipresence, omni- science, etc., but these godly qualities lie concealed within it as the fire in the wood, and will appear only after the final deliverance. Exoterically, this concealment of the divine nature is due to the external adjuncts ( upadhis )—the mind ( manas ), the sense-organs (indriyani ), and the vital airs ( pranah )—which form the subtle body ( Stksma Sarira ). The whole psychological apparatus toge- ther with Karman accompanies the soul in all his migrations, without
INTRODUCTION 23
essentially infecting his godly nature. These Upadhis of course form part of maya and are due to the avidya which is innate in man.
But whence comes this avidya, this primeval cause of ignor- ance, sin and misery? No satisfactory answer has been given to this question; or rather the question itself must be regarded as inadmissible; for causality cannot go farther than the Sarmmsara and beyond it we know nothing.
From the conception of rewards in heaven and of punishments in the dark regions of hell, contained in the hymns of the Reveda, there arose the theory of Sarhsara teaching rewards and punish- ments in the form of a new birth on earth. The Vedanta thus exoterically admits of a threefold division of men ; those who perform good deeds, sacrifices &c. follow the path of the fathers ( pitr-yana ) and are born again ; those who worship the qualified Brahman follow the path of gods (deveyana ) and are on their way to final deliverance ; and lastly those who are evil-doers have a third place ( trtiya-sthana ) reserved for them. Esoterically, however, the only reality is Brahman and the knowledge of it is Moksa.
Sarhkara’s system (as opposed to the Parinama-doctrine ) maintains the Vivarta doctrine, according to which all effects are only superimposed upon the cause, which alone is real.
The well-known phrase ‘ tattvamasi’ cannot be taken literally as Vallabha does it, but must be understood by jahad-ajahat laksana. ‘Thus tat literally means the Brahman ‘with omniscience, omnipresence, absence of limitations; ¢vam literally means the jiva, with limited knowledge and powers and the copula ‘asi’ signifies the apposition or Samanadhikaranya of these two. Now this is not possible in the full literal sense ; what is incompatible in the connotations of the two terms is therefore to be rejected (jahat ) and what is compatible is to be retained (a-jahat); we arrive thus at the idea of ‘ intelligence’ pure and simple, indivi- sible and without attributes.
The philosophical part of Sarnkara’s doctrine may therefore be summed up as follows :—
(1) All plurality is false or unreal, and superimposed upon one pure and eternal Brahman which is all-pervading ; and it is maya which makes us see plurality where there is unity and which itself has no independent existence.
24 INTRODUCTION
(2) The individual soul is really nothing but Brahman.
(3) Knowledge (in the form of the actual realisation) of the identity of these two is the only means of moksa.
The practical part of the doctrine amounts to this :—Actions must be performed only to purify the mind so as to make it fit to acquire the knowledge of this identity of Brahman and jiva ; but afterwards they must be all given up, since without a complete abandonment (Sarhnyasa) of all actions, Moksa is impossible ; for, action (Karman) and knowledge ( Jfiana) are opposed to each other like darkness and light. ‘This is what is called Nivrtti-marga (the path of renunciation), or Jnana-nistha (taking our stand on knowledge ).
Tue Doctrine or RAMANUjA :—The main idea which disting- uishes the doctrine of Ramanuja from the rest of the Vedanta schools is that the individual souls and the inanimate world, essen- tially different in themselves, form at the same time the body and mode or attribute of the supreme spirit ; and, as such, they are in- capable of an existence independent of the supreme spirit. ‘This is what gives the doctrine its name of ‘ Visistadvaita’ ( ‘ non-duality qualified by duality’ or ‘the non-duality of the supreme spirit which is qualified by the individual souls and the inanimate world). Thus what the ordinary body is to the individual soul, so are the intelligent and the non-intelligent worlds to the supreme spirit; and just as the body can never be essentially the same as the soul, so the cit and acit can never be essentially the same as the Brahman. It is in this way that R&amanuja’s doctrine reconciles the various statements in the Upanisads, referring to unity and to plurarity.
The Brahman or supreme spirit is the cause, both material and efficient, of the universe, intelligent and non-intelligent; it is possessed of an infinite number of auspicious attributes; of which omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence and bliss are the most essential. Unconditioned existence, eternal, limitless and uniform knowledge, and an absence of all limitations of time, space and causality, distinguish it from the individual souls and the inanimate world as well. Brahman is at the same time, absolutely void of evil attributes and it is thus that Brahman is sometimes described as qualified and sometimes as non-qualifled (cf. stitra III. 2. 11 ff). The creation of the universe from Brahman is not a_ production of something new; it is only a change of attribute or condition. It is
INTRODUCTION 95
a mere modification of that which is subtle into that which is gross. Thus Brahman, having for its body and mode the cit and acit in their subtle condition, is the cause, while the same Brahman having for its body or mode the cit and acit in a gross form is the effect. Similarly, the destruction of the universe is nothing but the becom- ing subtle of that which is gross. | |
The individual soul is the subject of consciousness or knower and not mere consciousness itself. It is, however, often called con- sciousness, simply because consciousness is its essential attribute. Even in the state of dreamless sleep, though there is no conscious- ness of objects, still the sense of ‘1° ( ahamartha ) persists. . Know- ledge is intuitive by nature and does not necessarily depend upon the senses. Bliss is also another essential attribute of the individual soul. It has also the power to act ( kartrtva ) which, according to the samkhyas, belongs to prakrti and according to Samkara, to Buddhi. ‘The individual souls, in the state of their pristine purity, possess all the auspicious qualities ia common with Brahman (which is the reason why the jiva is often described as being identical with Brahman); but they differ from it in two points: (i) they have no power whatsoever on the movements of the world, whose creation and control belong exclusively to Brahman, and (11) they are atomic in size, while Brahman is all pervading. Being atomic in size the individual souls are infinitein number and different for different bodies. Owing to ignorance, the individual souls are conjoined to matter and thus in spite of their original resemblance to Brahman, suffer; right knowledge of the nature of Brahman, from which results devotion ( bhakti), brings the soul to liberation, when it is restored to its original.purity and bliss. But even then, it does not lose its individuality. Thus ‘ tut tvam asi’ does not mean that jiva is essentially and absolutely the same as Brahman, but the apposi- tion is to be understood metaphorically as when we say ‘ the jar is white ’, ‘ ghatah suklah’, where the quality and the qualified stand in apposition with each other. ‘Thus the jiva which is an attribute or mode of Brahman is Brahman in the sense that it is very similar to it in nature or is part and parcel of it.
The inanimate world, on the other hand, is also as real as the Brahman and the individual souls and is essentially distinct from both. At the same time, it forms an attribute of Brahman and so cannot exist independently of it.
Ghate, Vedanta 4
96 INTRODUCTION
Thus for Ramanuja, Brahman, cit and acit are three entities, individually distinct from each other, all equally real, at the same time all forming a unity, in the sense in which the self ang its body form a unity.
Ramanuja admits the parinama doctrine or the Satkaryavada which maintains that the effect is nothing but a modification of the form of the cause, in which it is already present.
So much for the philosophical part. The practical part may be summed up thus : The devotion to Vasudeva is the only means of obtaining moksa. ‘This bhakti is not knowledge, but the result of knowledge; it is not belief, which is at best a subsidiary prelimi- nary to bhakti; it is not work, for work is selfish; it is the intuition or immediate presentation arising from a steady remembrance ( dhruva smrtih ), uninterrupted like the flow of oil, a result of meditation. Actions are necessary only for the origination of knowledge, but no further. Thus, the function of actions with Ramanuja is secondary or subordinate as with Sarkara.
Ramanuja’s doctrine, as with the other Vedanta schools, is based on the three prasthanas, the Upanisads, the Bhagavadgita and the Brahmasiitras; to which must be added the Visnupurana, which occupies a very important place in his doctrine and from which BRAG Sribhasya quotes very frequently.
Tue DoctrinE oF NimparkA— According to Nimbarka, there are only three principles or entities, cit (the intelligent worlds), acit (the non-intelligent world ) and Isvara ( the Lord or the Supreme- Spirit ), also called by the significant names of bhoktr ( the enjoyer, the Jiva), bhogya (the enjoyable, matter) and Niyanir ( the control- ler, ruler ).
The cit or individual soul is of the nature of knowledge ( Jaana-svaripa ); it is not the phenomenon of knowledge in the sense in which Samkara understands it; in other words, the Jiva is able to know without the help of the sense-organs and it is in this sense that words like ‘ prajiana-ghanah’ ‘ svayamjyotih’ ‘ jtana- mayah’ etc. as applied to Jiva are to be understood. The Jiva is a knower also; and he can be both knowledge and the possessor of knowledge at the same time, just as the sun is both light and the source of light. Thus the soul, who is knowledge, and his attribute, knowledge, though they are both identical as knowledge, can be at the same time different and related as the qualified ( dharmin ) and
INTRODUCTION raf!
the quality (dharma), just as the sun and his light, though identical as light ( tazjasa ), are still different from each other. ‘Thus there is both a difference and a non-difference between the dharmin and the dharma; and the extreme similarity between them implies, not necessarily their absolute identity, but only a non-perception of their difference.
The Jiva is also Ego (ahamarthah). ‘This Ego continues to persist not only in the state of deep sleep, ( because our conscious- ness immediately after getting up from sleep has the form ‘I slept happily ’ or ‘I knew nothing’) but also in the state of liberation. It even belongs to the Parabrahman. Hence it is that Krsna refers to himself so frequently in the first person in the Gita, of which the chief object is thus Purusottama, who is omniscient and at the same time non-different from the Ego or Asmadartha.
The Jiva is also essentially active ( kartr ). This quality belongs to it in all its conditions, even after release ( cf. the Sutra II. 3.33). Those passages which deny this Karirtva of the soul only imply that the kartrtva is not independent (Svatantra). The Jiva is also enjoyer ( bhoktr ) essentially in all its conditions.
For his knowledge and activity, however, the Jiva depends on Hari; thus, though resembling Him in beng intelligent and knower, | he is at the same time distinguished from him by his dependence. This quality of dependence or of being controlled ( Niyamyatva ) 1s the very nature of Jiva even in the state of release, just as Niyantrtva or the quality of being the controller, forms the eternal nature of Isvara.
The Jiva is atomic in size; at the same time his attribute, know- ledge, is omni-present, which makes it possible that he can experi- ence pleasure and pain in any part of the body (cf. the Sutra IT, 3.25), just as, for instance, the light of a lamp can spread far and wide and illumine objects away from the lamp. The Jivas are diffe- rent and in different. bodies, and so are infinite in number.
The Jiva has his true form distorted and obscured owing to his contact. with karsman resulting from ignorance, which is beginning- less, but which can come to an end, by the grace of God, when his true nature is fully manifested.
The acit or non-intelligent world is of three kinds: (i) a- prakria or not-derived from Prakrti or the primordial matter, such,
28 INTRODUCTION
as the sun-like refulgence of [svara, his abode, his ornaments, etc. ; (ii) prakrta or derived from Prakrti, consisting of the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas, such as prakrti, mahat, aharhkara etc. (just similar to the twenty-four principles of the Samkhyas ); and (i) Kala or time. ‘The three categories in their subtle form are as eternal as the c’t or the individual souls.
The third principle is the Highest-self, the Brahman, or Krsna. This Krsna is naturally free from all faults ( such as ignorance, egoism, passion, hatred, attachment ), is the store of all beneficent attributes, is adorable by all, has four forms or vythas (i. e. Vasu- deva, Samkarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha) and appears under various incarnations such as Matsya, Kiirma etc. This Brahman is both the Upadana ( the material cause ) and the Nimitta ( efficient cause ) of the Universe. It is the material cause in the sense _ that it enables its natural Saktis ( capacities ), viz. the cit and the acit in their subtle forms, to be manifested in gross forms; and it is the efficient cause in the sense that it unites the individual souls with their respective fruits of actions and means of enjoy- ments. ‘Thus the creation of the universe is nothing but a mani- festation in a gross form of what was subtle before and is thus a sort of modification or Parinama. To say that the universe is only superimposed on the Brahman and hence an illusion ( Vivarta ) is against all reason; for it is only a thing actually existing elsewhere, that can be superimposed upon another thing where it does not so exist.
What is the mutual relation between these three principles, cit, and acit, and Brahman described so far ? It cannot be absolute identity or non-distinction, because it would contradict those passa- ges in the Upanisads which speak of a difference between them; and it would involve a mutual confusion of the nature and attri- butes of these three principles, although they are distinct from each other. Nor can the relation be one of absolute difference; for that would go against such passages as ‘ tattvamasi’, ‘alam brahmasmi’, fsarvam vat khalvidam brahma’ etc. and besides, Brahman, if it is quite distinct from cit and acit, would cease to be all-pervading and all-ruling and would become as limited in character as the cit and acit. Nor can we say that it is non-difference which exists in reality and that the difference we see is all due to Upadhis or limiting adjuncts; for, in that case, Brahman would cease to be pure and would be susceptible to the faults of the Upadhis, it would experi- ence pleasure, pain, hatred etc., and it would undergo modifica..
INTRODUCTION 29
tions, all which is contrary to its real nature. Hence the truth is that both the difference and the non-difference are equally real. The cit and acit are different from Brahman, inasmuch as they are described by. the Sruti as possessing attributes and capacities distinct from those of Brahman; at the same time they are non- different from Brahman in the sense that they are absolutely depen- dent on it and cannot have an independent existence by themselves, Thus bheda or difference means the possibility of an existence, which is separate, at the same time dependent ( para-tantra-satta- bhavah ) while a-bheda or non-difference means the impossibility of an independent existence ( svatantra-satta-bhavah ), ‘Thus in the sentence ‘ tattvamasi’ the word tat signifies the Brahman which is, omniscient, omnipotent, of independent existence, the self of all; the word tvam signifies the individual soul which depends for its existence upon the Brahman; and the word «si is the copula signi- fying the relation of the two, which is difference, not inconsistent with non-difference, and which can be illustrated by the relation between the fire and its sparks or by that between the sun and his lustre.
To attain deliverance, the jiva has to commence with a com- plete submission to the Paramatman, or Prapatti, whose six consti- tuents are:—a resolution to yield (anukiilyasya samkalpah ), the avoidance of opposition ( pratrkilyasy+ varjanam ), a faith that God will protect (ruksisyatiti visvasah), acceptance of him as saviour ( gopirtva—varanam ), throwing one’s whole soul upon him (a@tmani- ksepah ), and a sense of helplessness ( karpanya ). God’s grace extends itself to those who are possessed of these six constituents of prapatt, i.e. who are prapanna; and by that grace is generated bhakti con- sisting of special love for him, which ultimately ends in the realisa- tion ( saksatkara) of the Paramatman. For a devotee, the know- ledge of the following five things is quite necessary:—(i) the nature of the supreme soul, (ii) the nature of the individual soul, (iii) the fruit of God’s grace or Moksa (which is an uninterrupted realisation of the nature and attributes of Brahman, following from the absolute destruction of all actions and the consequent extinction of all ne- science), (iv) the feeling of enjoyment consequent on Bhakti and (v) the nature of the obstacles in the way of the attainment of God, such as regarding the body and the mind as the soul, depending on some one who is neither God nor the preceptor, neglecting their commands, and considering God as nothing more than an ordinary being. iat
30 INTRODUCTION
Thus we see that the doctrine of Nimbarka has very much in common with that of Ramanuja; both regard the difference as well as the non-difference as real. But, for Nimbarka, difference and non-difference are on the same level, they co-exist and have the same importance; while for Ramanuja, non-difference is the principal; it is qualified by difference, which is thus subordinate to it. Another technical distinction between the two doctrines is that according to Ramanuja, the cit and acit, which form the body of the Brahman, are regarded as its attributes (Visesana or prakara), and hence, the name Visistadvaita, which is explained as ‘the unity of Brahman qualified by cit and acit’ ( cidacidvisistaparamesva- radvaita ); but the school of Nimbarka refuses to admit this; for being a body does not necessarily mean being an attribute, and be- sides the idea is impossible in itself. An attribute is by its nature meant to distinguish the thing that possesses the attribute from another which is without it; but in the present case there is nothing from which the cit and acit should distinguish the Brah- man of which they are attributes*. Andif the cit and acit are both different and non-different from Brahman, it is ridiculous to say at the same time that there is unity of Brahman qualified by cit and acit.
THe DoctrinE oF Mapuva :—The doctrine of Madhva, purely dualistic in character, insists on the absolute and eternal difference between Brahman, jiva and jada. Madhva denies even Brahman’s being the material cause of the universe, a point clearly established in the Brahmasiitras and the very fantastic and forced manner in which he interprets many of the stitras leaves no doubt about the fact that he would have even set aside the stitras alto- gether, but that their uncontested authoritativeness prevented him from doing so.
In opposition to the pure or qualified Monism of other Vedanta schools, Madhva propounds the five eternal distinctions, the clear understanding of which alone can lead to Moksa the distinction between God and the individual soul, between God and the inanimate world, between one individual soul and another, between the individual soul and the inanimate world and finally: between one inanimate object and another.
*see Vedantatattvabodha (Chowkhamba Sanskrit series No, 123, pp. 27-32, also Tattvasiddhantabindu, both by Anantarama.)
INTRODUCTION 3]
God according to Madhva, possesses an infinite number of qualities. His chief functions are eight : creation, protection, dissolution, controlling all things, giving knowledge, manifestation of himself, involving the individual souls in the knowledge of the world and deliverance. His form is made up of knowledge and joy, he is independent of everything and remains one in the midst of different forms.
The individual souls are all distinct from God and distinct from each other individually, innumerable, going through a succession of existences and characterised by ignorance or other defects.
The world is created from Prakrti, which is ever distinct from the supreme soul, who is thus only the efficient cause but not the material cause of the universe; for, it is against reason to suppose that the non-intelligent world can be produced from a being that is intelligent.
Moksa is attained by the direct knowledge or perception of Hari. Some of the means necessary for this direct knowledge are :—(Vairagya) aversion to the enjoyments of this world or the next, the possession of equanimity (Sama), self-control and other virtues, acquisition of knowledge from the Guru, self-surrender (Saranagati), love of God (Paramatma-bhakti), resigning every act to Hari, knowledge of the five distinctions mentioned above, etc. Even in Moksa, jiva cannot be one with Brahman.
Then again the bhoktr (the enjoying self), the bhogya (the objects of enjoyment), and the niyamaka (the controlling Supreme Spirit) are three entities enternally distinct and all equally real. Thus Madhva always lays stress on those passages of the Upanisads which clearly proclaim the difference between Brahman and jiva —such as Svetasvatara 1.6; 4.5; 4.6; Mundaka 3. 1. 2 etc. While those passages referring to non-difference are explained away by him in various ways. ‘Thus ‘ tativamasi’ means ‘ vam tadiyah asi or ‘tvam tasya asi’ ‘thou art His’; ‘Ayam atma Brahma’ may be a description of jiva, meaning ‘this individual soul grows or advances’ (vardhanasilah), or a description of Brahman meaning, ‘Brahman is this that pervades’ (atm atanasilah), or it may be a mere eulogy of jiva, or the sentence may be meant for meditation, or finally it may be nothing but a statement of the Ptrvapaksa of the exponent of the Maya-doctrine. In the same way, a passage
39 INTRODUCTION
like ‘ brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati,’ ‘one who knows Brahman be- comes brahman itself,’ only means that in the condition of Moksa the individual soul in question becomes similar to Brahman, owing to his freedom from misery etc., and thus is to be understood in a metaphorical sense as in ‘ puro'hito, yam raja samvyttah,’ ‘ this priest has become a king,’ and not like a statement in ordinary language. Moreover, it cannot be said that jiva and Brahman are different ini Sarhsara, but become non-different after Moksa; for what are different can never be non-different and vice versa. So also ‘cham evadvitiyam brahma’ and ‘ sarvam khalvidam bruhma’ mean that Brahman is unsurpassed and without a parallel and that it pervades the whole world, but not that the world is non-different from Brahman. ‘ Mrtyoh sa mrtyum apnolt ya tha naneva pasyatt does not imply a condemnation of the perception of plurality, but it is a censure against those who hold that there are many momen- tary cognitions, instead of one eternal knowledge ; just as for inst- ance, “asad evedamagra asit’ only states the view of the Nihilist for being refuted further on. Duafity alone can be the truth, argues the dualist, for we everywhere see nothing but pairs or things in twos, e.g. knowledge and ignorance, merit and demerit, man and woman. So also Brahman and jiva or Brahman and prakrti must be two entities and never identical with each other.
THE Docrrine OF VALLABHA :—The doctrine of Vallabha is called ‘ Suddhadvaita’ i. e. the unity of Brahman which is pure or free from Maya. Thus the Jiva and the inanimate world are essen- tially the same as Brahman, without involving any idea of Maya. According to Samkara, for instance, the Brahman can create this world only when it is conditioned by Maya; but according to Valla- bha, it is Brahman, pure and simple, and without any connection with Maya, that can create the Universe.
The jiva is non-different from Brahman, atomic in size ( cf. Sitras II. 3. 194) and a part of Brahman ( cf. Siitras II. 3. 43.). It is produced from Brahman in the sense in which sparks are pro- duced from fire ; the jiva is a manifestation of Brahman itself, with the attribute of bliss obscured. ‘Thus it is as eternal and real as Brahman and production in its case means only a manifesta- tion (avirbhava). The jiva is either (i) suddha (pure), when its qualities such as greatness (aisvarya) are not obscured by contact with the avidya (ignorance ), or ( ii) sathsarin, when it is jn the bondage of avidya and experiences birth, death etc., owing
INTRODUCTION 33
to its connection with the subtle and gross bodies, or ( iii ) mukta, when it becomes free from bondage, by means of vidya. The jiva, though atomic can pervade the whole body by virtue of its quality of intelligence ( caitanya ), just as sandal-wood can by its fragrance make its existence known even where it does not exist (cf. Sitras IT, 93 25;,26;:23:));
The inanimate world or prapaiica is also essentially Brahman ( Brahmatmaka ), with the qualities of intelligence ( caitanya ) and bliss (@nanda ) obscured, and thus possessing the one quality of existence ( Sativa ). It is at the same time created from Brahman (Brahma-karya ) in the sense that Brahman itself is manifested in the form of the gross world. Thus the creation and destruction of objects in this world mean only the manifestation ( avir- bhava ) and disappearance ( tirobhav2 ) of the Bhagavat in those forms ; and when Brahman appears as a product and as capable of being experienced ( anubhavayogya ) the world is created ; but when it goes back to its causal form and ceases to be the object of ordinary experience, the world is destroyed. ‘The world is, there- fore, as eternal and real as the Brahman itself, its creation and destruction being nothing but the powers ( Saktis ) of Brahman. It is neither illusory nor essentially different from the Bhagavat.
Everything being Brahman, we must find the forms of all things in everything. ‘Thus for instance, in a jar, anything like patatva or the nature of a cloth may manifest itself by the will of God ; but as a matter of fact, all these have disappeared (tirobhita) and it is only ghatatva, ‘the nature of a pot’, that is manifest (avirbhita ) and so ajar cannot, for the time being, serve the
purpose of a cloth.
From this it follows that the relation between cause and effect is absolute unity. That form of Bhagavat, in which another mani- fests itself is the cause, e.g. clay ; and the other form’ manifested is the effect, e. g. pot. Thus ‘ Sarvam—khalv-idam-brahma’ has to be understood in a literal sense.
But the infatuating ignorance affects the jiva and for him endows the real and actually existing world with illusory or un- real forms. While the world is real, it is only its experience ( pratiti ) which is erroneous. Just as, for instance. to a man in a boat in motion, the trees on the bank, though steady, appear to be
Ghate, Vedanta, 5.
» 34. INTRODUCTION
in motion, but in the cognition of the moving trees, it is only the .movement that is illusory, while the forms of the trees are real, in . the same way, the world which has objectivity for us, but which is essentially of the nature of Bhagavat and so purely subjective, -is*real in form, but it is only the objectivity with which the jiva endows the world that is unreal and projected by ignorance. ‘Thus this prapanca, which is real, appears to be in three different forms to three different kinds of persons : (i) to those who have become Brahman, it appears as pure Brahman; (ii) to those who have got the right RenGwiedge by means of the Sistras, it appears as endowed ‘with both Faliregamats (Brahmadharman ) and objectivity ( Maya- dharman ), at the same time with a clear discrimination between the real character of the former and the unreal character of the latter; as for instance, a grown up person seeing a piece of cloth appearing green, owing to his own green spectacles, perceives the reality of the form of the cloth and the unreality of the greenness which does not really belong to the piece of cloth; (111) finally, to those without knowledge, the prapafca appears as endowed with both these forms, but without any discrimination, as, for instance, _a child with green spectacles takes the greenness of the cloth to be as real as the cloth itself. ‘Thus all the difference or plurality is in the matter of the perception ( pratiti ) of the prapanca, but none at all in the matter of its form ( svarupa ). To say that the prapafica, itself is unreal and at the same time to say that it is identical with Brahman, is against all reason, since relation of identity cannot possibly exist between a real thing and an unreal thing (cf. Sutra aT dgelk4 ):
The Brahman is one, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, possess- ed of an infinite number of attributes, and essentially of the nature of sat ( existence )s cit (intelligence) and ananda (bliss). It is Suddha ( pure ), i. e. never contaminated by connection with Maya. It is possessed of aisvarya ( marvellous power ) which makes every- thing possible for it and even things mutually opposed can co-exist in its case. ‘Thus both kinds of passages, those who describe the Brahman as qualified (savisesa ) and those which describe it as non-qualified ( nirvisesa ) are equally true with regard to it. Or, the denial of attributes refers to the attributes of non-intelligent world ( prakria ) from which Brahman is free; while the affirmation of attributes refers to the infinite number of marvellous powers which it possesses and thus establishes that the Brahman is extra- ordinary (jagad-vilaksana ). Brahman manifests itself at its own
INTRODUCTION 35
will, as jiva or jada, simply for the purpose of sport, without under- going any change in essence, as when, for instance, a serpent forms itself into coils (cf. Sutra I, 2,27). Thus the Brahman. is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe ( notice in _ this, connection the explanation of the Sititra I, 1, 4); and the objection on the ground of partiality and cruelty belonging to Brahman, owing to the diversity of fortune and the miseries to be met with in, this world, objections which can be raised only on the assumption, of a difference of nature between Brahman and jiva, have no place in Vallabha’s doctrine. |
Tht Brahman has three forms, (i) the highest divine form (adhidaivika) as Krsna or Purusottama; possessing an infinite number of auspicious attributes, attainable by a devotee (bhakta) (ii) the aksara form (adhyatmika), in which all the attributes have become non-manifest and which alone is attainable by a sage (jaanin), and (iii) the antaryamin form as seen in the different, incarnations or avataras of Visnu.
Now, what is the relation between Brahman, the jiva and the jada? It is one of pure identity, one that exists between a part, (amsa) and the whole (amsin). For Vallabha, it is non-difference (abheda) alone that is real (vastavika), while all difference is simply for the sake of sport, in opposition to both Ramanuja and Nimbarka. According to these latter, though both difference and non-difference are theoretically equally real (vastavika), it is difference only that is real, while the non-difference is accounted for by the similarity of nature between Brahman and jiva or by the relation of dependence between the two (niyamya-niyanirtva). Thus’ the phrase ‘tat tvam asi’ is literally true according to Vallabha, whereas it has to be understood metaphorically by all the rest.
The Moksa, which consists in the absolute cessation of all misery and the experiencing of the bliss which was observed in the condition of Samsara, can be attained by two means, bhakti (devotion) and jfana (knowledge). Of these the. former is superior, since it leads to the realisation of the divine form of Brahman as Krsna or Purusottama, in which the Anandamea is at its best; while the latter is inferior, as it leads to the realisation of the second or non-determinate form of Brahman where the Anandawsa is of an inferior order. Bhakti itself is of two degrees, Maryadabhakti and Pustibhakti. In the former, the devotee attains
36 INTRODUCTION
Moksa by the practice of means (sadhana) on his own part, such as, the disciplines and restraints laid down in the Sastra, which produce an aversion to worldly things, or worship and prayer of the Bhagavat. In the latter,—and this is the higher kind of bhakti— the devotee, without having recourse to any sadhanas, depends upon nothing but pure and simple love of Him; his goal is only the service of Hari ; his highest pleasure is to become one of the asso- ciates of Hari and to sport with him in the celestial Vrndavana, This Pustibhakti is the privilege of only him whom Bhagavat is pleased to favour ; it begins with Preman which removes a liking for anything but Hari, and passing through asakti which produces a positive aversion to objects not connected with Hari, culminates in vyasana or entire devotion to Hari.
In addition to the three prasthanas ( viz. the Upanisads, the Bhagavadgita and the Brahmasitras ), the Vallabha school has a fourth one, i. e, the Bhagavata, passages from which are very often adduced in the Vallabha-bhasya.
Thus we see that these five schools of Vedanta agree in holding i
(1) that Brahman is the supreme cause of the universe ; (2) that Brahman is all-pervading and eternal ;
(3) that the Upanisads in the first instance and the Brahma-siitras and the Git@ are the basis of their doctrines ;
(4) that in supersensuous and purely metaphysical matters like Brahman, the scriptures are the first authority and reasoning is to be accepted as long as it does not go against the Revelation; reasoning has a jurisdic- tion over them, but owing to its limitations, the Revelation is the final court of appeal ;
(5) that actions are subordinate to knowledge or devotion; they are efficacious only for the purification of the mind or as a preparation for the right path, renun- ciation of them being quite necessary for final beatitude ;
(6) that deliverance from this beginningless sarhsara is the final goal.
INTRODUCTION 37
Sarhkara’s doctrine is distinguished from the rest in-as-much as
(1) he admits Maya, which the other four schools agree in pretending to discard ;
(2) he insists on knowledge as the sole means of Moksa; while the rest insist on bhakti or devotion.
The four Visnuite schools alike maintain (1) that Bhakti is the means of attaining Moksa ;
(2) that Brahman is Isvara, possessed of an infinite num- ber of auspicious attributes ;
(3) that the individual souls and the inanimate world are. all as real as Brahman itself ;
(4) that their individual distinctions can never be comple- tely lost ;
(5) that the individual souls are atomic, infinite in num- ber, all possessed of the attributes of knowing and acting.
The school of Madhva stands apart in that
(1) it maintains absolute duality, while all the rest try to reconcile duality and unity in one Way or another; -
(2) it holds that Brahman is only the efficient cause and not the material cause of the universe; while all the rest agree in holding that it is both; and that
(3) consequently its admission of the authority of the Upanisads and Sitras in -particular is rather in theory than in practice.
As for the mutual relations of the three entities of Brahman, cit and acit, each of the five schools has its own doctrine, which has given each its distinctive character and name.
CHAPTER I. GENERAL OUTLINE
The word Vedanta signifies literally in Sanskrit ‘ end of the Veda’; in common use, however, the word is used with reference to the concluding portions of the Vedic literature, known.also as Upanisads. The name Vedanta is applied to all the five systems of philosophy, going under the names of Sarhkara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Madhva and Vallabha, because all these five systems alike lay claim to their being specially and directly derived from the Vedanta. Really speaking, the other five orthodox schools also pretend to derive their support from the Upnisads. ‘Thus, for example, the Nyaya and Vaisesika schools quote passages from the Upnisads in support of their particular dogmas, espe- cially when they are treating of the nature and attributes of the soul, or of the difference of nature between Isvara.and thé inani- mate world. Above all, the Samkhyas, a very old and influential school, many of whose dogmas have been accepted even by the Vedanta, and whose general influence is clearly seen. throughout the philosophical literature of India, are seen to make a very great use of passages from the Upanisads, though it ‘must be noticed here that even according to themselves, their main-stay is not the Upanisads, but reasoning pure and simple. It is quite evident from the fact that all the Vedanta writers take great pains to refute the Sarhkhya doctrine, especially to show that those particular passages which are quoted by the Samkhyas in their own support, if properly and rightly interpreted, lend the least support to their doctrine. We cannot, of course, speak of the heterodox schools like the Bauddhas and: Jainas in this con- nection ; because, although from the very nature of the Upanisads, a support can be found in them for the most varied doctrines, possible, and, as a matter of fact, a number of passages may be. pointed out which would be favourable to the Baddhistic doctrine, still these schools never lay even the most distant claim to their being derived from the Upanisads; not only that, but they even directly oppose their authority.
Nevertheless, the term Vedanta applies only to the Uttara- mimamsa and the various schools which it comprises; and there
GENERAL OUTLINE 39
‘are solid reasons for this restricted application of the term. First of all, no other school makes as much use of the Upanisads, as does the Uttar-mimamsa; every small item of their doctrine ‘must be based upon and fully illustrated by passages from the Upanisads. The most important reason, however, is that accord- ‘ing to them Sruéi or the Revelation is the highest authority, nay, in fact, almost the only means of arriving at right knowledge ; and this follows, they say, from the very nature of the subject they have to deal with. For, in fact, the chief aim of philosophy, according to the Uttara-mimamsa, is to find out the truth about ‘the nature of the world, of its cause, of the soul, about the mean- ing of birth and death, in a word, to arrive at that right know- ledge which would bring about the highest, eternal bliss. Reason, -_pure and simple ( suska-tarka ), would not help us in the least to achieve this end. Indeed, truth can be only one and not many ; while reason, being subjective, brings us to several and divergent conclusions regarding the truth for which. we are making a search. And there is no means of deciding whose reasoning is ‘more correct, because each reasoner apparently pretends to be infallible and to follow the scientific canons of argument. Thus we have to resort to Sruti or the revealed scriptures; and reasoning, being only subordinate, is valid only as long as it conforms to the Sruti. Moreover, reasoning, apart from the ridi- culous variety of conclusions to which it may lead in accordance | with the nature and prejudices of the person reasoning, is very limited in its scope and cannot take us to the end of our enquiry. It can proceed only to a certain stage and then we have to make ‘certain assumptions. Well, why not then assume what is told ‘most authoritatively in the Sruti?
Thus it is that the term Vedantais restricted to the Uttara- mimamsa only, in distinction from Samkya and Nyaya, which take their main stand on tarka or reasoning and resort to Sruti only where convenient. The Upanisads are beyond question the highest authority as far as the Vedanta and the schools which claim this name are concerned. But this is not the only autho- rity. Ifreasoning is set aside or rather subordinated, because it is many-faced (i. e. leads to conclusions mutually opposed ), the case is not in any way better with the Upanisads. From their very natures, one ‘and the same passage can be interpreted in more than one way; and moreover, there are passages which are opposed to each other in their purport. Thus for instance, in one
40 THE VEDANTA
place it is said that there was existence in the beginning ; in another place it is said that there was non-existence in the beginn- ing. In one place it is said that all is intelligence, which is one and unique ; in another place, on the other hand, there is a reference to two persons, one of whom eats and the other only looks on. Once it is said that Brahman created Akasa or the element of ether to begin with ; again it is said that Brahman first created tejas or the element of light. If truth is one,—and it is this assumption which is at the root of all philosophical controversies— what shall we do with such mutually contradictory passages ? There were many attempts made to evolve a system from the complex and varied passages of the Upanisads, and the one attempt which has come down to us is embodied in what is known as the Brahma-sitras, traditionally attributed to Bada- rayana or Vyasa, believed to be the same as the author of the Mahabharata. We have said that there were many more of such attempts before; and there are some good reasons for it. In the collection of the Sutras before us, we find several times references to other writers and to their views on some important dogmas. Thus, for instance, in the Adhikarana 6, of Adhyaya I, pada 4, (sutras 19-22 ), the question is raised, how, in the Br. U. 4, 5, 6, the individual soul which is first spoken of in its peculiar nature as being the one for whose pleasure everything is ultimately dear, is in just the next sentence spoken of as the Highest Self that is to be meditated upon and realised. This identification is explained in several ways and not less than three views have been referred to. According to Asmarathya, this is an indication of the fulfilment of the promise made in | the subsequent sentence that by the knowledge of the self everything without exception becomes known. For, otherwise, if the indivi- dual soul is different from Brahman, how is this promise possible ? According to Audulomi, however, the reason for the identification in question is that really the individual soul which loses its purity of nature by contact with the limiting adjuncts such as the body, the sense-organs etc., regains its purity by the practice of such means as knowledge and meditation etc., and thus becomes identical in nature with Brahman, in the course of its going up from this body. Finally according to Kasakrtsna, it is the Paramatman himself who becomes the individual soul, when pro- ceeding to evolve name and form; and so the identification is quite justifiable. Many more instances of this kind could be pointed out. But, although there may have existed other similar
‘
GENERAL OUTLINE 4]
collections of sttras, the only one available to us is the one by Badarayana. ‘Thus in addition to the Upanisads, the Brahma- sutras form the second great authority for the Vedanta schools. A Sitra-collection as the source and authority of a philosophical doctrine is not peculiar to the Vedanta alone ; for we know that the other five orthodox schools also, all of them, claim to be based upon Siitra-collections attributed to some sage of mythical fame, supposed to be the orginator of the doctrine in question.
Besides these two, the Upanisads and the Sitras, all the Vedanta-systems claim to have the authority of the third great fountain of knowledge, so popularly known as the ‘Srimad-bhaga- vad-gita,’ or ‘the song of the Lord’. Each of the five schools of the Vedanta believes, that its own particular doctrine is the only one contained, not only in the Upanisads and the Sutras, but also in the Gita. Thus the Upanisads, the Sitras, and the Bhagvad-gita are known as the three ‘ prasthanas’ or starting points from which proceed the different Vedanta-doctrines and each of the so-called founders of the systems has written com- mentaries on the Upanisads, at least the principal ones, the Stitras and the Bhagvad-gitaé. Of these, we are here only con- cerned with the commentaries on the Brahma-siitras.
If the Upanisads by reason of their very nature, in that they contain free thoughts and attempts at guessing the truths, most freely expressed, without the slightest notion of systematising, can be interpreted in more than one way, the Siitras present in a still greater degree this character. In fact, they are very brief notes rather than sentences, consisting of as few words as possible, many words having to be supplied from the context; there is thus the greatest scope for the ingenuity of the com- mentator, who can accordingly find in them whatever ideas he wants them to convey. ‘The siitra literature in India presents a phenomenon met nowhere else. The desire to express as much meaning as possible in as few words as possible and to provide most convenient and compressed manuals, which could be easily committed to memory and, at the same time, which could easily bring to the mind a complete sense by applying to them as it were certain keys of interpretation, was sometimes carried too far, so that instead of attaining the intended purpose it often produced the contrary results. Thus, for instance, we have a number of
Ghate Vedanta, 6.
492 THE VEDANTA
unintelligible, apparently meaningless word-groups, which cannot be understood at all without the help of a voluminous commentary, which, after all may not represent properly what was really meant by. the writer of the sitras. ‘The extreme instance of this sttra- style is provided by the As/ddhydyi or the siitras on grammar by Panini, which make almost an impossible reading for the uninitiat- ed. ‘The desire for brevity weighed so much with the Indian mind that the saving of one word was regarded as a greater reason for joy than even the birth of ason. Fortunately, the sitras of Badarayana, with which we are here concerned, are much more intelligible and much less brief, especially as there are no technical terms Samjmas and canons of interpretation (paribhasas) specially created for the purpose. Still, they are in themselves, quite sufficient to give rise to a number of interpretations. Nothing will give a better idea of what a sittra is like than the traditional de- finition of a suitra, quoted by the great dualistic Vedantin Madhva- carya in his introduction to his commentary on the stitras in question. It runs thus :—
Hesse aaigeqaaar | HMA Fea aataat fag: |I (p. 10, Madhvabhasya, edited by Cencalray Palle, at Madras, 1900.)
“Tt should contain as few letters as possible, it should be decisive, not leaving any doubts as to what it means, it should contain the essence, it should be comprehensive on the topic it touches, it should not contain any explanations or supplementary syllables as for instance in a chant or song, and it should be free from any fault.”” One cannot help remarking here that the second of these conditions, i. e. ‘not leaving any doubt,’ is hardly fulfilled by any of the siitra-collections available ; and that the adjective © Visvatomukham ’, if understood to mean ‘ omni-faced ’ i. e. capable of being interpreted in various senses ad libitum, is best applicable to many of the Sutras.
Besides this very nature of the sitra-literature in general, _there are several reasons which facilitate the putting of different interpretations on the individual sutras, and the deducing of different systems from the collections as a whole. ‘Thus for in- stance, it is very difficult to decide which sutras contain the purvapaksa or the prima facie view, and which, the Siddhanta or the author’s view. ‘Thus in pada 3 of adhyaya II, adhikarana 13, stitras 19-28 are interpreted by Samkara as representing the
GENERAL OUTLINE 43
purva-paksa view according to which the jiva is anu or atomic in size ;_ while stitra 29 formulates the Siddhanta, viz. that the jiva is not really atomic (anu) but that it is all-pervading ( vibiu ); and that in certain scriptural passages it is spoken of as_ being anu only because of the internal organ (smanas ), which forms an essential condition of the individual soul as distinguished from the highest self; thus the azutva, which really belongs to manas, has only been transferred to jiva. On the other hand, Ramanuja interprets the first stitra (II-3-19) of the Adhikarana as stating the Siddhanta view, according to which the individual soul is of minute size; and siitras 20-25 are interpreted by him as only confirming this view and refuting objections raised against it; while the remaining stitras deal with another questions concerning the anutva. We see here how the same set of siitras can be inter- preted as lending support to two views, diametrically opposed to each other, on an essential point of the doctrine.
There is another circumstance tending in the same direction. There is a traditional division of the stitras into Adhyayas and padas handed down to us, on which there is a unanimity of opinion. No such division into Adhikarana, unanimously accepted, has come down to us. ‘Thus for instance, in connection with sitras 41, 42 and 43 of the third pada of the first Adhyaya, siitra 41 forms one Adhikarana deciding that the ether which reveals names and forms, — spoken of in Chandogya Upanisad, VIII, 14, 1, is Brahman, and it is neither the elemental ether nor the jiva; while stitras 42 and 43 form another Adhikarana teaching that the vijaana-maya, ‘ he who consists of knowledge ’, mentioned in Br. Up. IV.3. 7, is not the individual soul but Brahman. According to Ramanuja, and Nimbarka, the three stitras form but one single Adhikarana which establishes that akasa in the passage in question cannot refer to the individual soul, nor even to the released individual soul,because even then the individual soul continues to be different from Brahman. So the Akasa must mean Brahman and nothing else. According to Madhva, on the other hand, the three stitras form three separate Adhikaranas, sitra 41 referring to the akasa, stitra 42, to the vijnana- maya and siitra 43 referring to another passage in Br. Up. VI. 4.22, where the words aaeqifagia: ade@qara: (the lord of all, the ruler of all), refer to Visnu or the lord. |
The necessity of having to supply words to complete the mean- ing of the Stitra is another prolific source of variety of interpreta-
4.4. THE VEDANTA
tions. ‘Thus in siitra 1, pada 3 of Adhyaya II, 4 fazed: ( lit. not the ether, because of want of scriptural mention ) Sarhkara, Rama- nuja and Nimbarka supply the words ‘ wtpadyate ’ (is produced ), while Madhva supplies the word ‘anutpattimat’ (is not produced).
Some particular words in the sitras have two meanings, a circumstance which also leads to different interpretations. ‘hus the word ‘ antara’ in the satra II. 3.15 may mean both ‘in the midst (madhya )’ and ‘ without ( vina )’; Sarhkara, Ramanuja, and Nimbarka accept the first meaning and thus the Stitra, accord- ding to them, means that the mention of vijfiana and manas in the midst of the passage referring to the creation of the elements need not disturb the order of creation; while according to Madhva, who accepts the second meaning, the siitra means that the opposite order of destruction ( to that of creation ) holds good except in the case of vijiiana and manas.
Another circumstance is the fact that there is no padapatha or a record of the separate words singly in the sititras, handed down by an authoritative tradition, as there is one for the Samhita of the Regveda, which leaves no doubt regarding the splitting of a metrical line into separate words. For example, the siitra IJ. 3. 26 is read either as Wmgi@lHad or as Ugissenag both readings being equally admissible, as the words are not usually separated in manuscripts. According to Sarhkara, the sutra means that the Jiva though of minnte size (anu) can be affected in part of the body, owing to the pervasiveness of the quality of intelligence, as is, for instance, the case with certain objects in the world ( loka-vat ), e. g. with the light of alamp. According to Ramanuja, Nimbarka, and Madhva, however, ‘ alokavat ’ (like the light) gives the illustration wanted for the purpose more directly.
The fact that the Upanisad passages under discussion are not actually mentioned in the siitras must also be considered in this connection. Different commentators may take up for discussion different passages and thus one and the same adhikarana may yield quite a different meaning. For example, in the siitra I, 1, 5, the passage referred to by Sarhkara, Ramanuja and Nimbarka i is Chan- dogya Upanisad VI, 2, 1 and 2 and the siitra means that the sat in the passage cannot mean the Pradhana of the Samkhyas; because the act of ‘ willing ’ is spoken of in connection with it. ‘Thus the whole of the adhikarana beginning with this sitra is an attempt to. show that the passages which the Samkhya brings forth in support
GENERAL OUTLINE 4.5
of his doctrine cannot but refer to Brahman, if only properly interpreted with a due consideration of the context, But Madhva interprets the adhikarana in quite a different way. ‘The passages in question are, according to him, Prasna Upanisad V, 5, Br. U. VI, 4, 23 etc., in which the atman or purusa is spoken of as some- thing to be seen or meditated upon; and the siitra, accordingly means that Brahman cannot be said to be ‘ asabda’ i. e. inexpre- ssible ( avacya ), because it is described as being something to be seen or known ( iksaniya or jiieya ); and all the remaining’ siitras of the adhikarana are explained accordingly. ‘Thus we see how very easy it is that the collection of stitra before us should have been interpreted in more than one way. In fact there have been five different commentaries on them, differing in essential points in the interpretation of the individual stitras, and still more so in the general purport. [Five different schools have tried, more or less successfully, to derive their doctrines from these stitras and each has even gone so far as to show that his particular system is the only one which the author of the siitras wanted ‘to communicate through them. In spite of all these circumstances contributing to the variety of interpretations, the question still remains, why it is that this particular siitra-collection has had the privilege of having sO many interpretations put upon it, so as to give rise to not less than five different doctrines differing from each other as regards some essential dogmas. ‘There are similar stitra-collections; for instance, the Vaisesika stitras by Kanada, commented upon by Prasastapada, the Nyaya-siitras of Gautama, with the commentary of Vatsyayana, the Yoga-stitras of Patafjali, commented on by Vyasa, the Purva-mimamsa of Jaimini, with the commentary of Sabarasvamin; and we find everywhere that each siitra-collection has only one authoritative commentary or bhdsya; and though the systems of philosophy represented by these stitra-collections may have ( and asa matter of fact, they have actually in some cases ) branched offinto different sub-varieties, retaining some common points but at the same time differing in some points not always unessential, still there is no difference of opinion as regards the particular doctrine represented by or supposed to be taught by the stitra-collection in each case.
The siitra-collection before us does not differ materially from the other collections, as regards its literary character. Why then is it that an attempt should have been made to found on one and the same sitra-collection, five different. systems,—the absolute
46 THE VEDANTA
monism of Sarnkara, the qualified monism of Ramanuja, the mono- dualism of Nimbarka, the dualism of Madhva, and the pure monism of Vallabha? It is not possible, of course, that the sutrakara should have more than one system in his mind. It is difficult to answer the question positively and _ satisfactorily; and we can only offer a guess here.
As said above, it is the Vedanta that claims to be derived exclusively from the Upanisads and that sets the authority of the Upanisads over everything else, even over reasoning. Although seeds of other systems may be traced in the Upanisads, still no other system ever cared for them except in a casual and secondary manner; some even directly condemned them. Much less did any of them try to reconcile the evidently contradictory passages and to deduce one consistent system from them. This was mainly the task of the Vedanta; and the five systems before us are the results of five such attemps at deducing a system from the Upanisads.
The main question before them may be briefly stated thus : there are certain passages in the Upanisads which emphatically assert a unity and deny a plurality—e.g., ‘ azafa ’, ‘a went’, 6 a4 afeqé Fa asSanaia alread suaia’. By the side of these there are other passages which clearly assert a plurality and a duality bet- ween the Highest Self and the individual self, e. g. ‘ sal gIasTaTa- aratt’? ( Svet. 1.9), ‘gt ara agar aaa aad gt oiteeasta | aaa: freas gd Basra aarvatila i? ( Mund. III, 1, 1). How to reconcile these ? Sarhkara would say that all plurality is illusion, while unity is the only reality, and that all passages referring to plurality have in view only the phenomenal existence or the popu- lar conception of the Universe, which is however ultimately meant to be refuted. Ramanuja would say that both unity and _ plurality are real; and that the individual souls and the animate world, though really and inherently differentin nature from the Supreme Soul, are at the same time non-different from him, in that they cannot have an existence independent of the Supreme Self. Thus the cit and actt or the animate and the inanimate worlds are the body and thus the attributes of the Supreme Self. According to Nimbarka also both difference and non-difference are real, without the individual souls and the inanimate world being the distinguishing attributes of the Supreme Self, as there is nothing else from which to distinguish it. Madhva, on the other hand denies unity altogether and holds that duality is the only reality; and that all affirmations
GENERAL OUTLINE | 4.7
of unity are only for the sake of Upasana or meditation, nay, even the sentence ‘ tat tuam asi’ he reads as‘ atat tvam asi’. Vallabha, without believing in Maya or the principle of illusion, holds that the individual soul in its pure and pristine nature is identical with the Supreme Soul.
Thus these five systems may be supposed to have come into existence, in the course of the attempts to reconcile and deduce a system from the apparently contradictory passages of the Upa- nisads. The siitras also represent such an attempt independently made by Badarayana; and other similar attempts must have pre- ceded it, for instance, those by Kasakitsna, Asmarathya, Varsya- yani and others. Somehow or other the siitras of Badarayana came to survive all the rest and to possess a high reputation; so that every Vedantist came to look upon them as the most authori- tative source of his doctrine, next in importance to the Upanisads only. One can very well believe it to be very probable that all these five systems in their essential elements must have existed long before the stitras of Badarayana attained to prominence, and that when there arose great teachers like Sarhkara, and Ramanuja, Nimbarka and Madhva, they thought it their first duty, for the propagation of their system, to write a commentary or bhasya on these stitras and to prove that the siitras which are reputed as teaching the kernel of the Upanisads contain none but their own doctrines. In doing this, they naturally proceeded to interpret — the siitras in the light of their own doctrines and resorted to all sorts of twistings and _ artificialities to make the sitras yield the sense they wanted. They had ‘their own doctrine cut and dry before them, and their only task was to show that it had the authority of the siitras. Naturally they never cared to know what was the real and natural meaning of the stitras. ‘These facts are too transparent to any one who would just cursorily glance over the several bhasyas to require special emphasis.
Now the question before us is; which of these bhasyas gives an interpretation of the sitras which is the most faithful to the ori- ginal; in other words, which of these five systems, if there is any at all, is the one taught by the siitras or professed by their author. Perhaps we might not be able to arrive at a positive conclusion, to the effect that such and such a system is the one taught by the sitras. Perhaps the system in the mind of the Sutrakara was different from the five we are considering. But still the enquiry
48 THE VEDANTA
is useful even if we can say that one of these five commentaries is amore natural and correct interpretation of the siitras than the rest; or that all the stitras alike do not favour any one particular system. The method of interpretation which we are going to apply to the siitras in our enquiry is the critical one as opposed to the traditional method applied by the several commentators. For, any piece of literary work can be interpreted in two ways, either by the traditional or by the critical method. The former takes the doctrine for granted and proceeds from this assumption to find the doctrine in the work under examination. For instance, take the Bhagavad-gita. Every school of Vedanta appears to attempt to find its own system in it, shutting its eyes to all contradictory passages or more often trying to interpret them in a far-fetched manner, so as to confirm their own doctrine. Sarmkara while com- menting upon the work would find nothing but the reality of Brahman and the illusory character of the Universe in it; and all passages referring to a personal god and his devotees, which are therefore theistic in character, would be interpreted as having to do with the lower form of knowledge and the lower form of Brah- man (apara Brahman or apara vidya). Ramanuja would find nothing but bhakti in it. In all these cases, the interpreter has a certain tradition coming down from of yore and he moves always in the groove where he has once placed himself.
On the other hand, the critical method pre-supposes an atti- tude of absolute impartiality, considering the work by itself, with- out a leaning to any one particular doctrine. Of course, mistakes may often be committed in applying this method and very ridicu- lous conclusions may sometimes be arrived at, owing to insur- mountable prejudices due to birth, race and other surroundings; or owing to want of patience, or the lack of sufficient material to go upon. Thus again to take the instance of the Bhagavad-gita, one German scholar, professing to apply the critical method to it, came to the conclusion that the work was purely theistic and that all the verses which contained pantheistic ideas were later additions. But recently a distinguished Indian scholar has shown by a detailed and thorough-going study of the Gita, that not one verse can be regarded as a later addition, or as being out of place or context, that everything, as it is already there, fits in most smoothly in its context and that the chief teaching of the Gita refers to neither this nor that particular system of Vedanta, but that it is entirely practical and catholic in its character. It can be summarised
GENERAL OUTLINE 49
in one word thus—‘ jaanapurvaka—bhaktipradhana—niskama~kar- manusthana ’—‘ the performance of one’s duty, without any attach- ment to reward, proceeding from a devotion to the Lord, backed by right knowledge.’ The same may be illustrated from the history of the Vedic interpretation. Sayana’s method is mostly one-sided, not caring for consistency or the ordinary canons of interpretation. Roth, on the other hand, went to the other extreme in condemning Sayana downright and proposing sometimes quite fanciful explanations. Later on Geldner and Pischel have struck the golden mean, and they have come to find some explanations in Sayana which are correct and ingenious and based on quite sound reasons.
This critical method (as opposed to the purely traditional one) was not unknown to the old sanskrit writers, especially in the domain of philosophy. ‘The Mimarmsakas, whose special province it was to lay down the canons of interpretation, have briefly sum- marised the essentials of this method in the following verse :—
% SRAMTGATUTATSSTAAT FE | AAMAS F fos AIAN | ‘the beginning, the end, the repetition, the novelty, the object, the glorification, and argument,—these are the canons for deter- mining the purport.’ ‘Thus for instance in determining the purport. of the sixth chapter of the Chandogya Upanisad, all these can be illustrated. That the chapter mainly teaches the unity of the Supreme Self follows from the beginning e. g. ‘ekam eva advitiyam’ ( Chan. VI. 2. I) ‘ one only, without a second ’, from the close also—e. g. ‘ aitadatmyam idam sarvam’ ‘all this has it for the soul ’—( Chand. VI. 8.7); there isa repetition of the same idea throughout the chapter, e. g. the phrase ‘tat tvam asi’ occurs there nine, times. ‘There is a novelty here in that the unity of the soul can be known from this and from no other proof. ‘The object of the knowledge of the unity of the self is also mentioned there e. g. : ATaraa_Jest Aq TA aaea fat Aaa fast | ta Aq 1 Sa man who has got a teacher knows; he has to wait just until he is freed (from the body) and then he becomes one ( with the Brahman ) ( Chan. VI, 14.:2)’. Thus it is taught
* Quoted in the Sarvadarsana-samgraha (PurnaprajiiadarSana ) and ascribed to the Brhat-samhita.
Ghate, Vedanta, 7
50 THE VEDANTA
that the attainment of Brahman is the fruit of the knowledge of the entity without a second. ‘There is also the eulogising of the unity thus : Sq amen Yard ad vaaad aaataand fama , ‘ you have asked me that instruction by hearing which, what is not heard is heard, what is not thought is thought, what is not known is known,’ (Chan. VI. 1.3). Arguments establishing the same are also stated in several places: e. g. qaq altaha Hieaea BA WIAA Aad Sarat teat away Baa ay, ‘just as by knowing one lump of clay, all that consists of clay would become known, the product depends only on name, it is a name, while clay alone is the reality’ (Chan. VI. 1.4). A cursory glance at the Bhasya will show how often this method is employed in determining the mzaning of any particular word in an Upanisad passage. As one instance among many, one may refer to the first adhikarana in the fourth pada of the first adhyaya, where in determining what the expression ‘avyakta’, the undeveloped, means in Katha Up. I. 3. 10. 11, all those canons have been applied.
Before proceeding with the critical examination of the sutras, as proposed above, we must be on our guard, not to confound the question before us, with another allied to it, but quite different from it, i. e. which of the five systems of Vedanta is the most ele- vated and conducive to the satisfaction of the human impulse for the quest of truth. It is of course very difficult to pronounce judg- ment as to which philosophical system is more profound and stands the test of reason better than any other. Every system has its merits and demerits and its advocates and opponents. Perhaps, if philosophy naainly concerns itself with finding unity in plurality, nothing may be higher than the absolute monism of Sarhkara ; and nowhere else can we see the human understanding reaching such heights of elevated thought. But we are not concerned with this point of view at all. The question before us is one purely of literary criticism and not one of philosophy proper. Here is a literary product before us and here we have so many interp etations of it ; and our object is to see which of these, if any, has faithfully represented the natural and straightforward meaning of the original, apart from the inherent philosophical value of the doctorines propounded by them.
The Brahma-siitras of Badarayana are divided into four adhyayas or chapters, each of which is again divided into four padas or quarters. ‘The sitras, though they appear to be un-
1S US AHA
GENERAL OUTLINE 51
connected from the point of view of their external form, are not really so; they are pervaded by a system running through all of them. ‘The first adhyaya is called the ‘samanvayadhyaya’ or the chapter which mainly seeks to establish that all the Upanisads deal with Brahman as their final aim. The first pada of the first adhyaya states first in general terms that Brahman is the highest object of knowledge and that from it proceed the birth, preserva- tion and destruction of the universe, the Scriptures alone being the means of knowing it and Brahman alone being their final aim, and then discusses certain Upanisad passages in detail. A doubt is raised about them as to whether they necessarily refer to Brahman, or may refer to something else, the pradhana of the Sarhkhyas or the individual soul, or some deity; but they at the same time contain clear and unmistakable indications of Brahman ( spasta~brahma- lingani). ‘The second and third padas also deal with similar passages, which, however, contain only indistinct indications of Brahman (aspasta-brahma-lingani), The fourth pada more particularly deals with those passages in which certain words are apparently inter- preted by the Samkhyas as referring to some of their principles like the pradhana or the mahat, but these are proved to refer to some categories connected with the Vedanta. The fourth pada thus con- tains a polemic specially directed against the Samkhyas.
After having so far established that Brahman alone is the object to which the Upanisads refer, the Sutrakara, in the second adhyaya, which is called ‘ avirodhadhyaya’ or the chapter dealing with absence of contradiction, proceeds to show that. nothing can be brought forth which would contradict the fact established so far that the systems of Vedanta refer to Brahman. In the first pada of the second adhyaya, all objections based on Smrtis like those of the Samkhyas, claiming to contain passages of an opposite purport, as well as those based on pure speculative reasoning, are answered. After having thus defended the Vedanta doctrine against the attacks of contradictory smrtis and speculative argu- ments ( nyaya ), the second pada aims at refuting other doctrines than Vedanta, e. g. the Samkhya, the Nyaya, the Buddhism and so forth, by the very weapons of speculative arguments, which are their forte. The third pada tries to reconcile the passages, apparently contradicting each other, regarding the creation of the different elements and the essential characteristics of the individual soul; while the fourth pada similarly deals with those passages that refer to the vital airs and the sense-organs.
cn no
THE VEDANTA
The third adhyaya is called ‘ Sadhanadhyaya ’ or the chapter dealing with the means of attaining to absolution. ‘The first pada in particular deals with the manner of the transmigration of the individual soul and inculcates ‘ Vairagya’ or aversion to the world by describing the misery involved in it. The second pada discusses the different conditions of the individual soul, e. g. the state of being awake, that of dreaming and that of deep sleep. The third and fourth padas deal with the different kinds of medi- tations enjoined as leading to ‘ Moksa’ and attempts to reconcile the contradictions and to fill up the discrepancies regarding them.
The fourth adhyaya is called the ‘ phaladhyaya’, i. e. the chapter dealing with the fruit of knowledge, the ‘Salut.’ The first pada more particularly deals with what is called ‘jivanmukti’ i. e. absolution in this very life. The second pada discusses the way of the passing away of a knowing soul; and the third and fourth padas deal with the condition of the released soul.
Each of these sixteen padas consists of a number of ‘ adhi- karanas ’ or sections, each dealing with one and only one topic or subject. The method of treating a topic, in each such adhika- rana is also very systematic. First, the subject or the matter of discussion ( visaya ) is stated; then comes a statement of the doubt or the several alternatives proposed, of which one is to be chosen ultimately ( visaya or sathsaya ); next comes the statement of the prima facie view ( piirvapaksa ). ‘Then follows the opposite view (uttarapaksa) and then last comes the siddhanta or the conclusion. Thus, for example, in the first adhikarana of the third pada of the first adhyaya, the question is, who is meant in the passage ‘ He in whom heaven, earth etc. are all woven, know him alone to be the Self etc.’(—Here is the visaya); does it mean Vayu, or the pradhana or the individual soul, or the highest Brahman ? (Here is the sarh- gaya). He is Vayu or individual soul or anything but Brahman, says the objector (pirvapaksa). No, it is only Isvara, says the Siddhantin. ( This is the uttarapaksa). This proves that the passage refers to nothing but Brahman. ( This is the siddhanta ).
After these general remarks regarding the nature, the con- tents, the arrangement, and the method of treatment of the Sutras, we now proceed to examine in detail the Stitras and their inter- pretations by the five great commentators, Sarhkara, Raimanuja, Nimbarka, Madhva and Vallabha. |
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CHAPTER II
ANALYSIS
ADHYAYA I, PADAT.
The first Sitra ‘then therefore, the enquiry into Brahman’ sets forth in general, the object of the treatise. The word ‘ then’ (atha) according to Ramanuja and Nimbarka, means ‘ after the knowledge of karman and its fruits,’ but according to Sarhkara, it means ‘ after the acquisition of the four requisites’ which are, dis- crimination between eternal and non-eternal things, aversion to the enjoyment of the objects of sense here and in the next world, possession of self-restraint, tranquillity etc., and the desire to be absolutely free. Vallabha prefers to take the word in the sense of ‘ adhikara ’ i.e. the beginning of a new topic, and remarks that the enquiry into Brahman is possible, even without any of the requisites mentioned by others. Madhva is not specific regarding the meaning of the word. All agree in the explanation of the word ‘ therefore ’ (.atah ), i. e. ‘for the reason that karman and its fruits are known, to be perishable and limited and that it is the knowledge of Brah- man alone which can lead to eternal bliss. ’
The second siitra defines this Brahman by saying that it is that | from which spring the origination etc., of this world. This defini- tion of Brahman is very important, because, at the very threshold of the work it gives a. knock to the doctrine of Sarhkara, accord-. ing to whom, Brahman proper is merely existence, intelligence and bliss ( sat, cit, ananda ); while it is the lower Brahman which, associated with Maya, produces, sustains and destroys the world, | which has nothing but a phenomenal existence. Now can we con-. vince that one who held Sarhkara’s doctrine would define Brahman in this manner at the very outset ? No such difficulty presents it-_ self, however, with the other commentators for whom this twofold character of Brahman does not exist.
The third stitra says that Scripture alone is the means of. knowing Brahman,—a fundamental point common to all systems of the Vedanta; and siitra 4 states that all the scriptures have for their ultimate purport Brahman,—a point which the siitras in Ae ts attempt to make out.
54 THE VEDANTA
Vallabha reads stitras 2 and 3 as one and interprets siitra 4 to mean that Brahman is not only the efficient cause of the world, as stated in sutra 2, but also the material cause, because it permeates all, in the form of existence, knowledge and bliss, rejecting the in- terpretation given by others as being superfluous, since the Saman- vaya as interpreted by them is the object of the following sitras. The same charge, however, may be brought against Vallabha him- self; for Stitra I. 4, 23 also makes out the same pointi., e. that Brahman is also the material cause of the universe.
The fifth adhikarana ( Sitras 5-11 ) asserts that the non-inte- lligent pradhana of the Samkhya cannot be the cause of the world, because it is not supported by the Sruti, since ‘ seeing ” or ‘willing,’ which is an attribute of something intelligent, is predicated of the cause of the world. ‘This is the purport of this Adhik., according to Samkara, Ramanuja and Nimbarka, who all refer to the same passage, i. e. Chand. VI. 2. 1. All the same, we are conscious that each has his own doctrine in view, in a cut and dry form, and then proceeds to interpret the siitra in its light. At the end of the adhik., for instance, Ramanuja remarks that this is also a refutation of the nirguna Brahman, since it asserts ‘ willing’ as its attribute; and ‘ willing ’ is only another name for ‘ being possessed of the quality of intelligence ’. Madhva, on the other hand interprets the adhi- karana to mean that Brahman cannot be said to be inexpressible, because it is described as being the object of knowledge (iksaniya ) as in the text ‘ acaeqaeata Rad. > WVallabha also has a somewhat similar interpretation: Brahman cannot be vyavaharatita 1. e. beyond all expression or proof; beacause it is described as, ‘seeing’, which means that it made itself ‘ vyavaharya. ’
After having stated so far in a general way that Brahman is the chief object of the Vedanta Sastra, that it is the cause of the origination, sustenance and destruction of the universe, and that it is intelligent, the Stitrakara proceeds with his task of examining certain passages of the Upanisads and demonstrating that certain words in them refer to nothing but Brahman.
Here again Satnkara makes the introductory remarks to the effect that the question now before us is whether the higher or lower Brahman is referred to in certain passages of the Upanisads. But this seems to be without justification, because, in the remain- ing part of the adhyaya, we are concerned with the choice bet- ween jiva and Brahman and even Sarhkara’s own commentary
ANALYSIS 55
accords with the same. Thus this is only another instance of the comentator showing the influence of his pre-conceived prejudices. The next adhikarana ( stitras 12-19 ) asserts that the ‘ ananda- maya > referred to in Taitt. Upa. II. 5 is the Highest Self and not the jiva. This seems to be a natural and straight-forward interpre- tation and all except Sarhkara follow it; Sarnkara, however, after having given this interpretation at length finally rejects it in favour of another to the effect that the word ‘ brahman’ in the immediately following phrase ‘ aa y= mast’ refers to Brahman principally and not as a member of the ‘ anandamaya’ and the reason given for accepting this second interpretation is that the ‘anandamaya ’ would only refer to the savisesa Brahman and never to the nirvisesa Brahman, which is called ‘ ananda ’ itself and not ‘anandamaya’, That this passage containing this interpreta-
tion is not an interpolation, as Deussen seems to think, follows from the fact that it is only in this passage that Sarhkara refers to the distinction between the savisesa and nirvisesa Brahman of which he makes a mention before commencing this adhikarana, and secondly because Vallabha refutes this ela gete which NUT therefore have existed somewhere. One sitra ‘ #4 aaarataat’ ( I. 1. 18) is interpreted variously :—Sarhkara and Vallabha explain it to mean that the Anandamaya cannot be also the pradhana (anumana), for ‘ willing ’ is immediately predicated of the Anandamaya. Rama- nuja and Nimbarka, however, explain thus.—‘ If the dnanda- maya were to denote the jiva, then it would be in need of some non-intelligent material cause ( anumana~acit ), just as a potter is in need of clay; but the Anandamaya has no need of any such thing because he has only to will ( kamat=sarhkalpat ), and so this
is another reason why the anandamaya cannot be jiva. ? Madhva explains:—‘we need not care for reasoning ( anumana ), for reason- ing can be had at our free-will’. Now, here the interpretation given by Ramanuja and Nimbarka seems to be more suitable, for it deals with the question between Brahman and jiva which has been raised in the preceding stitras, while Sarhkara’s interpretation unneces- sarily brings in the pradhana, although the question regarding it has been set at rest in the preceding adhikarana, and besides it would be only a repetition of stitra I. 1. 5. In this adhikarana, the sutras 16, 17, 19 deserve notice, because they all rest on the con- ception of a difference of individuality between Brahman and jiva; and Samkara, at the end of sitra 17, comes forth with his usual explanation that such siitras as these only refer to difference
56 THE VEDANTA
between Brahman and jiva, which is due to maya, whereas, really speaking, there exists no such difference.
As regard the remaining adhikaranas of this pada, all agree in their interpretation except Madhva, who refers to different passages of the Upanisads in the last two adhikaranas. ‘Thus adhi- karana 7 ( stitras 20-21 ) demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye, mentioned in Chand. Up. 1.6, are notsome individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman. Here also the siitra 21 ‘ Heeqqeaeatea:” deserves notice, as it refers to the distinction between Brahman and jiva. Adhikarana 8 ( stitra 22 ) states that the ether mentioned in Chand. Upa. 1. 9. is not the elemental ether but the highest Brah- man. Adhikarana 9 (siitra 3) says that the prana mentioned in Chand Upa. I.11.5 denotes the highest Brahman. Adhikarana 10 ( stitra 24-27 ) teaches that the light spoken of in Chand. Upa. III. 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brah- man. Adhikarana 11 (sutras 28-31) asserts that the prana mentioned in Kaus. Upa. III. 2 is Brahman. In this adhikarana, the ablative ‘ upasa-traividhyat ’ in stitra 31, is explained in two ways by Sarm- kara. ‘The stitra may either mean ‘ if it be said that Brahman is not meant on account of the characteristic marks of individual soul and the chief vital air being mentioned, we reply, no; for your interpretation would lead to or would necessitate three-foldness of devout meditation, which it is inappropriate to assume’; or the sutra may mean ‘ even the characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as the chief vital air not out of place even in a chap- ter whose topic is Brahman, on account of the three-foldness of devout meditation; ’ i. e. the chapter actually aims at enjoining three kinds of devout meditation, according as. Brahman is viewed under the aspect of prana, under the aspect of prajfia or in its own nature ( or according to Ramf@nuja, the meditation on Brahman in its own nature as the cause of the entire world, on Brahman as having for its body the totality of enjoying souls, and on Brahman as having for its body the objects and means of enjoyment ). Ramanuja, Nimbarka and Madhva follow the second way of explaining the ablative; while Vallabha follows the first way; and no doubt, the second way is more natural, as shown by the ablatives elsewhere and by the ablative immediately following in this very sutra.
The second pada of the first adhyaya deals with passages in which the indications of Brahman are not distinct. Adhik. 1 (satras
ANALYSIS 57
1-8 ) shows, according to all except Madhva, that the being which consists of mind ( manomayalh ), whose body is breath ( prana-Sari- rah ) etc., enjoined to be meditated upon in Chand. Upa. III 14. 1 and 2, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. This adhikarana is very important for our purpose, in that it contains many siitras speaking of the difference of nature between Brahman and jiva, e.g. stitras 3, 4,5, 6 and 8, and Samkara has to add his usual explana- tion after stitra 6 that all this difference is to be understood as unreal and only due to the false limiting adjuncts of the Highest Self; whereas other commentators do not feel the necessity of any such explanation. In siitra 7, it is interesting to note that the word ‘ tad-vyapadesat ’ lit. ‘ owing to the mention of that ’ is explained by all as meaning ‘ alpatva ( -anutva )-vyapadesat ’ i. e. ‘ owing to the mention of minuteness ’ and as stating one of the reasons in favour of the jiva being referred to in the passage in question. Does it not imply an admission, on the part of the Siutrakara, of the minuteness of the jiva, accepted by all except Sarhkara, accord- ing to whom alone the jiva is as omnipresent as the Brahman? But of this, later on. So also the explanations of the words ‘Vyoma- vacca’ in the same siitra, lit. ‘ like the ether’, are interesting. Samkara explains it to mean that Brahman, though all-pervading, is here described as minute, just as, for instance, the ether, though all-pervading is looked upon as limited in size from the point of view of the jar etc. Of course it must be confessed that the illustration in this sense fits in very well with Sarhkara’s doctrine, as it explains exactly the relation between Brahman and _jiva as he believes it to be. It is very curious that Nimbarka follows Sarhkara in this mode of explanation, though it must be supposed that he understands the illustration only in a limited sense, i. e. to explain how a large thing may be at the same time described as small (seqiseaed J Narsxealaaeanesa) but without any reference to the relation between Brahman and jiva. Ramfnuja very cleverly explains it thus :-—Not only is the manomaya in this passage, described as minute; but it is also described as being all-pervading like the ether, in the very same passage, e. g. in ‘ salar Grae: * etc. (Chand. Upa. III. 14. 3 ), which is thus an additional argument why the mano- maya should denote Brahman. Madhva and Vallabha explain the word just like Sarhkara. So also the word ‘ vaisesyat’ ( lit. * owing. to the difference ’ ) in siitra 8, which gives the reason why Brahman is not subject to pleasure and pain just like the jiva, “is
Ghate Vedanta, 8.
58 THE VEDANTA
explained by all except Ramanuja, to mean ‘ owing to the diffe- rence of nature between Brahman and jiva;’ but Ramanuja explains it as ‘ owing to the difference of cause of enjoyment ’1. e. it is not the abiding in the body merely which leads to the experi- encing of pleasure and pain, but the being subject to actions and to the merit and demerit resulting from them, which is, however, never possible in the case of Brahman,—a point very frequently alluded to by him.
The second adhikarana ( stitras 9-10 ) teaches that the Being to whom Brahman and Ksatriyas are but food, referred to in Katha Upa. I. 2. 24 is the Highest Self. Adhik. 3 (stitras 11-12 ) establi- shes that the two ‘ entered into the cave ’( Katha Upa. I. 3.1 ) are Brahman and jiva. All except Ramanuja agree in having these as two adhikaranas; but Ramanuja alone has them as one adhik. His attempt, however, to tackle them together is rather farfetched and without any special purpose (see, p. 245 B. S. 8. LXVIII ). Sutras 11 and 12 deserve notice; because stitra 11] contains the dual ‘ atmanau ’ speaking of jiva and Paramatman; and stitra 12 lays stress on the difference of characteristics between Brahman and jiva. Ram@anuja remarks on this sitra— aaa onl SaqAaalaal- Tea eT AIT AIA Haga ’ ( ‘ in this section, are jiva and Paramatman are spoken of everywhere as the meditator and the object of meditation, as the attainer and the object to be attained’). Even Sarhkara says— Aaa Waa saralaaarag HOA .... WAT Wedeyy ” (1. e. the jiva is supposed to be the goer; while the Paramatman, the object to be gone to ).
Adhik. 4 (Siitras 13-17) asserts that the person within the eye, mentioned in Chand. Upa. IV. 15. 1. is Brahman. Ramanuja and Nimbarka read an additional siitra ‘ Haq Ua 4 & ( ag--TaaT +) Fed? ( lit. for this reason it is Brahman ) between sitras 15 and 16. But it cannot be original, because it appears to be quite unnecessary and rather out of place, in the midst of the ablatives expressing the reasons; not to mention that Vallabha and Madhva also do not have it. Adhik. 5 ( stitras 18-20 ) says that the ruler within ( antar- yamin ), mentioned in Br. Up. III. 7. 3, is Brahman; it cannot be the pradhana of the Samkhyas on account of the statement of the qualities not belonging to it (19); nor can it be jiva, for both the recensions of the Brhad. speak of it as different from the internal ruler (20). Here Sarhkara, Nimbarka, Madhva and Vallabha read Sit.19 and 20 as 4 4 @raqaasaaenid and ‘antiRamasia Aesaasiaa’
ANALYSIS 59
while Ramanuja reads the words ‘ aiwat’ as forming part of the sutra 19. This way has the advantage of connecting both the abla- tives with the sarirah; therefore it seems preferable to have sarirah and enam ( which refers to sarirah only) in one and the same sittra. Stitra 20 asserts the difference between Brahman and jiva; and Samkara, as usual, comes forth with his explanation that all these statements of difference are due to the limiting adjuncts, which themselves are the products of Nescience.
Adhik. 6 (siitras 21-23) shows that the being described as possessed of invisibility etc.,in Mund. Upa. I. 1. 5, 6 is Brahman; and it cannot be pradhana or jiva, because of the statement of dis- tinctive attributes and difference. Here also stttra 22 speaks of the difference of nature between Brahman and jiva. Adhik. 7 ( sitras 24-32) says that the atma vaisvanarah mentioned in Chand. Upa. V. 11. 6 is Brahman.
Adhik. 1 of the third Pada ( siitras 1-7 ) proves that the being within whom heaven and earth etc. are woven, mentioned in Mund. Upa. II. 2. 5, is Brahman, on account of the term ‘atman’ being used of it; and on account of its being designated as that to which the released have to resort. It cannot be Pradhana, nor the indivi- dual soul, owing to the declaration of difference. Ramanuja alone reads sutras 3 and 4 as one (cf. above I. 2. 19, 20). It is to be noted that the sitras 2, 5 and 7 specially refer to the difference of nature between Brahman and jiva.
Adhik. 2 ( stitras 8-9) shows thas the ‘ bhtiman’ ( that which is great ) in Chand. Up. 7, 23, 24 is Brahman only and _ it cannot be prana or the vital air, on account of information about it being given subsequent to Samprasada i. e. bliss or the state of deep sleep or secondarily the prana which is awake in the state of deep sleep.—( Ramanuja, Nimbarka and Vallabha follow _ this explanation of the words ‘ aatereyreata ’ ). Madhva, however, explains the words to mean ‘ on account of its being of the nature of unsurpassed bliss and on account of its being declared above all ’ —which is not reasonable, owing to the absence of‘ ca’. Adhik. 3 ( siitra 10-12 ) teaches that the aksara (the imperishable one ) spoken of in the Brhad. Upa. III. 88. is Brahman. Adhik. 4 (sutra 13) states that the parah puruszh (the highest person) to be meditated upon by the syllable om, mentioned in Prasnopa. V. 5, is the highest Brahman, because of its being designated as the object of realisation, ( Zafewaeaqizad ) and not the lower Brahman.
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This is according to Sarhkara, Ramanuja and Nimbarka, however, translated thus—‘ The object of meditation ( iksati-karma ) is Brah- man ( n. ) and not Brahman ( m. ), because it is later designated ( vyapadesat ) as the paramatman.’ Thus the alternatives accord- ing to Ramanuja and Nimbarka are Brahman and Brahmadeva— ( HasAed ost qaqaa Sa aiat: gestaa: ) and this is natural be- cause the twofold character of Brahman, higher and _ lower, is not known to them. Vallabha, reads the siitra just like Sarhkara, but has the alternatives Paramatman and Brahma also- ‘ parapuru- sah paramatma dhyanavisayah a@hosvid viratpuruso brahma va.’ Madhva, reading the siitra like Sarhkara explains thus‘ In the passage, Chand. Upa. VI. 2, 3, aéaa etc.’ Visnu is spoken of, because the mention of the act of seeing (iksati-karma-vyapadesa ) cannot belong to any other’. No doubt Samkara’s way of trans- lating the phrase is more natural than that of Ramanuja for the Siitra should rather have been in the form ‘ afatu a AGA. ig were to be understood just as Ramanuja does; though Sarhkara’s reference to the lower Brahman is without sufficient reason, as we shall see later on.
In the next adhikarana 5 ( Siitra 14—21 ), the question is whe- ther the small ether ( daharah akasah ) within the lotus of the heart mentioned in Chand. Upa. VIII. 1. 1. is elemental ether, or jiva or Brahman. That itis Brahman is decided owing to the many epithets applied to it subsequently, such as ‘‘being free from sins’”’ etc. ; and owing to other indicatory marks, such as that all the individual souls are described as returning intoit and that it is 1tselfdescribed as being the bridge or the support which prevents these worlds from being confounded. But in subsequent passages, e.g. in Chand. Upa. VIII. 3. 4, it is the jiva which is gpoken of thus—‘ Now that serene being ( lit. complete satisfaction ‘ sarnprasadah’ ) which after having risen out from this earthly body, and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form; that is the self-—-, thus said he. And so ‘ dahara’ may as well denote jiva. The objection is answered in Siitras 18, 19, 20. Especially Siitra 19 is very in- teresting, in-as-much as the different ways of understanding it point. back to a fundamental difference in the doctrine. Sutra 19, literally translated would run thus:—‘ If it be said that from a subsequent passage, ( it appears that the individual soul is meant ), it is, how- ever, the one whose true nature has become manifest.’ Sarhkara interprets it to mean that what is referred to in that passage is the individual soul with its true nature no longer obscured by the illu-
ne ANALYSIS 61
sory limiting adjuncts, i. e. is absolutely non-different from Brah- man, Here again Samkara adds his usual remark that, in all those places where a difference between Brahman and jiva is spoken of by the siitrakara, he does not mean that the difference is real; his only object is to remove the false notion which attributes the limi- ted nature of jiva to Brahman; and for this purpose, he only takes for granted the popular belief that the two are different. Thus even Samkara in the present case, shows his consciousness of the fact that the Sutrakara here refers to a difference between jiva and Brahman. All the other commentators, however, interpret the siitra to mean that no doubt it is thejiva thatis referred to but with its true nature manifested, and hence the similarity of epithets; but even then the jiva cannot be Brahman and so ‘ dahara’ canot mean jiva. N. has ‘ qaimigagel faemfasaaesea: gaia eat: 1 enfayaeaedy sae a’. Madhva also remarks that a difference must be made between the jiva, which when released has his true nature manifested through the favour of Paramatman, and the Paramatman himself, who is indicated by the ‘ dahara’ in a preceding passage. That this second explanation of the sutra is more natural is clearly stated by Vallabha— garea aranal gua Th g Paraeaaediia a aHialst:’—here the ‘ tu’ ( but ) does not refute something, but only says that there is something, else; hence ‘ na ’ ( not ) is not used (in the sittra ),
The next two siitras 22-23, form an independent adhikarana according to Sarnkara ( whom Madhva follows also ), deciding that. ‘ He after whom everything shines ? ( Mund. Upa. I. 2. i0) is not some material luminous body, but Brahman itself. But according to Ramanuja, Nimbarka and Vallabha they form part of the pre- ceding adhikarana, giving only additional arguments for under- standing ‘ dahara’ to mean ‘ Paramatman ’. It is the imitating jiva that is referred to in the passage with which sutra 19 concerns ; while the ‘ dahara ’ must be the Brahman to be imitated. wayFay soataaay fares: | ARI Ae SSUHIA: |
The particle ‘ca’ in the stitra 22, no doubt favours Rama- nuja’s explanation, as stating something additional to support what precedes; and Samkara, conscious of this difficulty, has to explain ‘ca’ as referring to the fourth pada of the same Ssloka i. e.‘ aq wart aafaé faara ’—( by the light of him, everything is lighted ), in addition to the first three padas ( Mund. II, 2.10 or Katha, IT, 5. 15),-—-which is not very satisfactory. Ramanuja gives other reasons
also why these two siitras cannot be taken as a separate adhikarana.
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‘Some maintain that the last two stitras constitute a separate adhi- karana, meant to prove that the text, Mund. Upa. II. 2. 10, refers to the highest Brahman. ‘This view is, however, inadmissible, for the reason that with regard to the text in question, no purvapaksa can arise, it having been proved under I. 2. 21 and I. 3. 1 that the whole section, of which that text forms part, is concerned with Brahman and it further having been shown under I. 1. 24 that Brahman is apprehended under the form of light. The inter- pretation, moreover, does not fit in with the wording of the sutras.’
_ Adhikarana 7 (stitras 24-25) decides that the being,measured by the thumb (Katha.I1.4.13), is not the individual soul, but Brahman, And Brahman is described as having the measure of a thumb be- cause it dwells for the purpose of devout meditation in the heart of the devotee. The heart is of the measure of a thumb and for such meditation men alone are qualified; so that we are not con- cerned with the size of.the heart of other animals.
The next two adhikaranas ( 26-33 and 34-38 ) form a sort of digression, suggested by the preceding adhikarana. The question is whether it is men alone who are qualified for the brahmavidya. The eighth adikarana decides that the gods also are qualified for the brahmavidya and the ninth adhikarana denies this qualifica- tion to the Sittras. Adhikarana 10 ( siitra 39 ) says that the prana before whom everything trembles ( Katha Upa. II. 6.2.) is Brahman. Adhikarana 11 ( siitra 40 ) says that the jyotih ( light ) mentioned in Chand. Upa. VIII. 12. 3 is Brahman.
Thus stitras 24-40 form, according to Sarnkara, five’ separate adhikaranas. Ramanuja, however, regards all these as forming one main adhikarana, referring to the ‘ aeqgara: ges: '. Stitras 24-25 refer directly to this purusa, while siitras 26-30, 31-33 and 34-38 form three sub-adhikaranas,referring to the qualification of the gods for the brahmavidya ( which forms the devatadhikarana ), the madhu-vidya (forming the madhvadhikarana) and the disqualifica- tion of the Sadras (styled as the apasudradhikarana) respectively. Sitras 39 and 40 state additional reasons for regarding the angu- stha-matra-purusa as Brahman; for the passages referring to him before whom everything trembles (Katha. Upa. II. 6. 2) and to’ the primordial light (Katha, II. 5. 15),—both which cannot be anything but Brahman,—occur between the two other passages of the Katha. Upa. (i. e. II. 4. 12 and II. 6. 17) mentioning the angustha-matra-purusa. So stitra 40 is translated by Ramanuja
ANALYSIS 63
‘thus :--(the angustha-matra-purusa is Brahman) because a light is seen to be mentioned (in the intervening passage),--which means that he treats jyotirdarsanat as one compound word.
Nimbarka follows Ramanuja in regarding all these sutras (24-40) as one adhikarana (pramitadhikarana).
Madhva refers stitra 24 to a passage of the Katha. Upa. 5-3, ay TAA FY eat Sqea.and traslates it thus :-‘Visnu is meant or understood (pramita) owing to the direct mention of vamana which cannot but mean Visnu.’? Thus Madhva understands the word pra- mita 10 mean ‘ known’ as against others who take it to mean ‘mea- sured’. Otherwise Madhva exactly follows Sarhkara, in the division of the adhikarana. Vallabha also follows Sarhkara generally.
Adhikarana 12 (siitra 41} decides that the ether which reveals names and forms ( Chand. Upa, VIII. 14. 1) is neither the ele- mental ether, nor the individual soul, but the highest Brahman. The next two siitras 42-43 form, according ‘to Samkara and Vallabha a separate adhikarana deciding that the Vijhanamaya (he who consists of knowledge), spoken of in Brhad. Upa. 1V. 3-7, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. Ramanuja and Nim- barka, however, regard the three sitras as forming but one adhi- karana dealing with the akasa in Chand. Upa. VIII. 14.1. To the objection that the jiva or pratyagatman is nothing but the Paramatman, owing to many passages teaching their unity and condemning duality and that therefore, the akasa may be the jiva in its released condition, spoken of in the immediately preceding passage, stitra 42 replies ‘ no; for the jiva and brahman are spoken of as being distinctly different from each other in the condition of deep sleep in the departure from the body.’ And even in the state of release, the jiva can never be non-different from Brahman. It is to be noticed that stitra 42 distinctly speaks of the difference between Brahman and jiva. And the same passage from the Brhad. Upa., i.e. IV. 3. 24, is adduced by both Sarmkara and Ramanuja as proof. ‘The fact that the word ‘ vyapadesat’ has to be implied in stitra 42 seems to be an argument in favour of taking siitras 42 and 43 as belonging to one and the same adhi- karana. Madhva takes these three sttras (41, 42 and 43) as forming three different adhikaranas referring to the akasa (Chand. _Upa. VIII. 14. 1), the prajfia (Brhad, Upa. IV. 3. 21) and to the
Lord of all (Brhad. Upa. VI. 4. 22) respectively, and decides that all these are nothing but the highest Brahman.
64 THE VEDANTA
ApuHyaya I, Papa 4.
It was shown in I. 1.5 that the pradhana cannot be the cause of the world, for it finds no support in the scriptures; and further it was shown that Brahman alone is the subject of the various doubtful passages of the Upanisads; still the Samkhya comes forth with certain passages in which occur terms most fami- liar to the Sarhkhya doctrine. ‘The last pada of the first Adhyaya specially aims at showing that such terms cannot but denote something connected with the Vedanta doctrine.
The first adhikarana (sttras 1-7) establishes that the word avyakta (the undeveloped ), occurring in Katha. Upa. I. 3. 10 and 11, does not denote the pradhana, but the subtle body as well as the gross body viewed as an effect of the subtle body. Sarhkara, Ramanuja and Nimbarka all agree exactly. Madhva, who reads an additional siitra ‘prakaranat’ between 5 and 6, who also in- cludes stitra 8 in this adhikarana, tries to show that the avyakta denotes Visnu and he interprets siitra 4 S4qM@aaisa differently from the rest. According to all except Madhva, the siitra means that the avyakta cannot be the pradhana; for if it had been the pradhana, jfieyatva (or being the object of knowledge) should have been predicated of it, since according to the Sarmkhyas it is the knowledge of the pradhana that leads to Moksa. But as it is not so predicated, the avyakta can mean only something else. Madhva understands it to mean that the avyakta denotes Visnu, because jfieyatva can never be mentioned of anything but Visnu. Accord- ing to Vallabha, the avyakta in the passage in question denotes the grace of the Lord, which is also identical with the Lord him- self or with the Brahman that is subtle.
| Adhikarana 2 (stitras 8-10) shows that the tricoloured unborn one ( tri-raipa aja) in Svet. Upa. 1V. 5 cannot be the pradhana or prakrti of the Samkhyas, but it is ‘ jyotirupakrama ’, the causal matter of the world, consisting of the three elements of light, water and earth, (instead of the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas, as the Samkhyas would say) or it is the divine power of Brahman which creates this causal matter. And the term ‘ aja’ ( goat ) is only a metaphorical description, a ‘kalpana.’
Ramanuja and Nimbarka have the same general purport for the adhikarana, but in accordance with Aa doctrine, the aja more particularly means ‘ the suksma-cid-acid-vastu ’ the intellegent and
ANALYSIS 65
material world in its subtle condition which forms the very body of the Paramatman. Ramanuja and Nimbarka, however, explain the words ‘jyotirupakrama’ in sutra 9 and ‘kalpana’ in sutra 10 to mean ‘ produced from Brahman ’ (brahma-karanika) and ‘ crea- tion’ respectively. If it be asked how the aja be called ‘produced _ from Brahman’ and at the same time ‘unborn’, the reply is that it refers to the creation, e. g. in 4lat aamaaaeqaq Rv. X. 190. 3— (the creator created just as before). Ramanuja also takes great pains to refute the explanations of the words as given by Samkara. Vallabha generally follows Samkara, though he reads stitra 9 as ‘hia: Samad &c.’: ‘the aja is jyotih i. e. the first creation of Brah- man, owing to the statement at the commencement of the passage >. Madhva, however, who also reads siitra 9 just in the same way as Vallabha, interprets the adhikarana to mean that the words denoting karman, i.e. sacrifices like the jyotistoma, also denote none but Visnu,—an interpretation which is the natural consequence of the way how he has explained the preceding adhikarana.
Adhikarana 3 ( siitras 11-13 ) according to all the commen- tators decides that the ‘qq qqaat:’ Brhad. 1V. 4.17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Samkhyas, but the five pranas.
Adhikarana 4 (siitras 14-15 ) asserts that there is no contra- diction whatsoever in regarding Brahman, whose essence is in- telligence, being the cause of the world. Ramanuja and Nim- | barka have the same general purport, but they connect the adhi- karana more directly with the subject matter of the preceding part of the pada, i.e. the refutation of the Sarhkhya. The cause is sometimes called sat, sometimes asat or avyakrta, says the Sarm- khya ; so it must be the pradhana and the willing (iksana ) re- presents metaphorically ‘the being ready to create of the pradhana.’ No, says the Vedanta, even the word asat means Brahman and it is so called only with regard to the vyakrta or the gross world, endowed with name and form ; and it does not mean absolute non-existence. Samkara, however, followed by Vallabha, thinking that the refutation of the Sarmkhya is over, connects this adhikarana with the general question of the samanvaya of the Vedic texts and decides that although there may be contradiction among the texts regarding the order of the creation, there is no such contradiction regarding Brahman being the cause of the world; and so the
Ghate, Vedanta, 9
66 THE VEDANTA
samanvaya need not be called into question. Madhva, explaining stitra 14 just in the same way as Sarnkara and Ramanuja, SEES, however, a new adhikarana in stitra 15, which he interprets to mean thus :~‘even though all words ultimately denote the Para- matman or Visnu, still they may, at the same time, denote other objects in the world, by being secondarily transferred to them’ : GRA AAR: Bel: PATINA | sqalEaead sad SIs: II
Adhikarna 5 (sutras 16-18 ), according to Sarhkara and Vallabha, proves that ‘he who is the maker of those persons, of whom al this is the work,’ mentioned in Kaus. Upa. IV. 19° 1s ‘neither the vital air nor the individual soul, but the Brahman. Ramanuja and Nimbarka, who agree in the general purport, how- ever, bring it more directly in reldtiont to the refutation of the Sarh- khyas, who see in this passage the purusa.
Adhikarana 6 ( siitras 19-22) demonstrates that the ‘ self to be seen, to be heard, etc.’ in Brhad. Upa. II. 4. 5, is not the indi- vidual soul, but the Highest Self. In this also, Ramanuja and Nim- barka see a refutation of the Samkhyas according to whom the * purusa ° is spoken of in the passage. This adhikarana is import- ant, because it raises the question how it is that while the passage WMA BAA Bq 194 vata ( every thing is dear for the pleasure of the self ) 1s referred to the jiva, the subsequent passage ada faataa aa faaid vata ( by knowledge of the Self, everything becomes known) is to be maintained as referring to the Brahman; and three different views are stated under the names of Asmarathya, Audu- lomi and Kasakrtsna, the last representing the siddhanta. Stitra 22 however, containing the view of Kasakrtsna, is interpreted differ- ently. According to Samkara it means ‘because ( the Highest Self) exists in the condition, ‘avasthiteh’ ( of the individual soul); i. e. because the Highest Self only is that’ which appears as the individual soul, which is evident from» such a passage as ‘let me enter into them with this living self and ‘evolve names and forms’. This implies an absolute identity of the jiva and Brahman. According to Ramanuja and Nimbarka, however, the word ‘avasthiteh’ means ‘ on account of ( Brahman’s*) abiding ( within the individual soul, ) i.e. the words denoting the jiva are applied to Brahman, because Brahman abides as_ its sélf within the individual soul, which thus constitutes Brahman’s body ( cf. ‘he who dwelling within the self etc., whose body the ‘self >is etc.’ Brhad. Upa. III. 7.22.) ‘Thus Ramanuja and Nimbarka refer
ANALYSIS 7 67
to the Antaryamin ‘the ruler within’, implying a real difference of individuality between Brahman and jiva. Vallabha explains the word avasthiti to mean avastha and says that the jiva is only an avastha ( condition ) of bhagavan and hence the words denoting the jiva are applied to Brahman, thus referring to his doctrine of pure monism ( without the help a maya). It is difficult to say which of these meanings of the word ‘ avasthiti’ is the most natural; or very probably the advocate of this view, not having in view any definite solution of the problem, used a general word to explain the relation between Brahman and the jiva. |
Adhikarana 7 (siitras 23-27 ) teaches that Brahman is not only the operative or efficient cause ( nimitta karana ) of the world, but. the material cause ( upadana or prakrti) as well. Here again Rama- nuja takes this as a special refutation of the Sesvara—Sarmkhya, according to whom, the ixvara is only the operative cause; while, the pradhana is the PRE material cause. Vallabha, follows Sarhkara. Here the world ‘ parinamat? in siittra 26 is most. important; for it is distinctly applied to the vivarta ( superimposi- tion ) doctrine held by Sarhkara.
- The last stitra (28) of the pada is explained by Sarhkara and Vallabha thus : the refutation of the Samkhya view can be and _ is applied mutatis mutandis to other doctrines also, such as the doc-’ trine of the world having originated from atoms. Ramanuja and ° Nimbarka, however, translate it thus : all the passages of the Vedanta text are explained as referring to Brahman and Brahman alone. These two modes of translating ‘this last stitra are very surprising, indeed, in view of the fact that Sarhkara has nothing to do with Sarhkhya doctrine in the preceding four adhikaranas (siitras 14-27); while Ramanuja connects them as a rule, with the refutation of one or other point in the Sarhkhya doctrine. Sarhkara is no doubt, in- consistent with himself in not referring about half of the pada to the refutation of the Sarmkhya doctrine, though in introducing the pada he remarks that this pada has rai its special aim, the demons- — tration that certain words and passages claimed by the Samkhyas as - supporting their doctrine can really speaking only refer to certain - things connected with the Vedanta doctrine. On the other hand - Ramanuja and Nimbarka, following him, have uniformly directed ae whole of the pada against the refutation of the Sarhkhya doctrine. ;
“Madhiva differing from all the rest, sees in this pada an attenipt™ to pee that all words without exception ultimately denote Visnv ; of
ad
68 THE VEDANTA
and from this point of view, he has consistently interpreted all the sutras. Stitras (15-22) form one adhikarana and are explained con- sistently with the stitra 15 explained above. Thus the use of words to denote the worldly objects as opposed to Visnu is due to the popular usage and it has nothing to do with the Sastra; and thus there is no inconsistency at all; for all words denote Visnu esoteri- cally; while at the same time, they may denote worldly objects exoterically (stitra 16). Since an object may be denoted by words referring to Visnu, all objects being dependent on and owing their existence to Visnu, the jiva and the chief vital air also may be denoted by words referring to Visnu, owing to the three-foldness of Upasana (see above I. 1. 31 ) (sutra 17). All the following siitras are explained by him in the same strain. Thus for instance, the three stitras 20, 21 and 22 give the different views regarding the reasons why words refer to actions in the first instance and to Visnu ultimately, Kasakrtsna’s view being that words denote the worldly objects, because everything i is in Paramatman, is supported by and rests in Visnu (avasthiteh ), Stitras (23-27) form another adhi- karana, proving that the word ‘ prakrti’ and all other similar words mean Visnu ultimately. Stitra 28 finishes the topic by asserting that all words (like stinya, abhava, etc. )* may be explained or derived as meaning Visnu. According to Madhva, thus, the whole of this pada serves one purpose, viz, to demonstrate that all words, like avyakta, aja, prakrti and what not, ultimately refer to Visnu. Thus Madhva’s iterpretation, though standing by itself, and rather fanciful in some cases, has the merit of consistency, in that it strictly takes its stand on Sasmanvaya, the title of the first adhyaya,
Apuyaya II, Papa I,
After having established in the first Adhyaya that all the Vedanta passages aim at the intelligent Brahman being the cause of the universe and that no passages support the Samkhya doctrine, the Siitrakara next proceeds to answer objections against the doct- rine of Brahman, based on the grounds of smrtis or speculative reasoning. ‘The first adhikarana ( stitras 1-2 ) of the last pada of
*Madhva derives the words ‘Stinya >and ‘abhava’soas to mean Visnu ;-' 21 Sa Hed wat zeqa:’ i.e. he who makes the pleasure of others inferior to his own’ and ‘#4 alalag aia: wdisara qaedaa’ i.e, the is not capable of being thought of and hence is called abhava.’
ANALYSIS 69
the second adhyaya answers the objections that the acceptance of the Vedanta doctrine involves the rejection of certain smrtis, such as that of Kapila, which preach the Sarnkhya doctrine, by saying that the acceptance of the Samkhya doctrine would in its turn involve the rejection of many other smrtis, such as that of Manu, which preach the doctrine of Brahman.. And when two Smrtis disagree, that alone is to be accepted which is in conformity with the Sruti; no support whatsoever can be found in Sruti for the Kapilasmrti. All agree as regards the general purport of the adhikarana,. But siitra 2 is explained differently. According to Samhkara and Vallabha it means ‘ because other principles of the Samkhyas, such as mahat etc. are not found in Smrti, nor in Veda nor in the popular belief. ’ According to Ramanuja and Nimbarka it means ‘ because, in other Smrtis like those of Manu, the doctrine of the pradhana is not found,’ which involves a repetition of a part of the first stra. Madhva explains it to mean ‘ other Smrtis
are not authoritative, because other things such as the fruits etc,
spoken of in these Smrtis, are not experienced directly,’ which is
not satisfactory, Adhikarana 2 ( siitra 3) applies thesame argu-—
ment to the Yoga doctrine.
In adhikarana 3 ( siitras 4-11 ), the objection that Brahman which is intelligent cannot be the cause of the world which is non- intelligent is answered by pointing out instances of dissimilar causes and effects, e. g. the cowdung and the scorpion produced from it, etc, Nor can Brahman be soiled or rendered impure by the
effect being merged into it, the cause. And reasoning pure and - simple will not do in such supersensuous, purely metaphysical _
matters owing to the diversity of the judgment of different s vants, who all claim to be equally infallible. All except Madhva agree in this general purport of the Adhikarana. Stitra 7, however, is explained differently. According to Sarhkara it means ‘if it be objected that the effect is non-existent before its production, we do not allow that, because it is a mere negation ( without any object to be negatived ).’ For, as a matter of fact, the effect always exists, whether before or after its origination, through and in the form of the cause itself. Ramanuja and Nimbarka explain it thus :—The effect cannot be said to be non-existing; because what the preceding sutra has laid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule deman- ding that cause and effect should be of the same nature; it was not asserted that the effect is a thing altogether different and sepa-
rate from the cause. Vallabha on. the other hand says—‘ if it ©
70 THE VEDANTA
be said that even the asat is spoken of as being the cause in Sruti, we reply, no;.for the mention is made only to deny that something - non-existing can be the cause, e. g. in ‘ #4 Baa: aad, how can sat be produced fromasat?’ Itis to be noticed that this adhi- karana rests entirely upon the doctrine of parinama and the in- stances quoted in commenting on sttra 6 by all including Sarnkara are such as lend support to parinama; and none implies the idea: of vivarta. Here also it is to be noted that it is the Samkhya doctrine of the similarity of cause and effect and the supposition that the pradhana consists of the three qualities in order to account for their existence in the world which is intended to be rebutted. Adhikarana 4 ( stitra 12 ) says that the same line of reasoning may be directed agains! other doctrines, like that of the atoms etc.
~ Madhva, however, puts rather a different interpretation on. sitras ( 4-12.) In siitra 4 forming an adhikarana by itself, he shows ° that the sruti and the smrti following it, which are eternal and free_ from faults are quite different in character from other sources of. proof and so their pramanya must not be questioned: on the ground of the fruit not being immediately perceived. Sititras 5 and 6, forming another adhikarana, answer the objection that the Veda is opposed to reasoning, because it describes the earth as speaking © ( e.g. “mrd abravit’ ), which is impossible, by saying that it.is the - sentient deities that are meant here; and that they have a special ’ power which is seen only by great beings ( ‘ z4a4’ instead of ¢ gga qd” which is the reading of all others ). Stitras ( 7-12 ) form-~ jng an adhikarana prove that the mention of asai as the cause of | the world does not involve any contradiction, since it is only meant © for denying that asat can be the cause. And even in pralaya, the” non-existence ( asattva ) of the world and its cause is contrary to - reason; for, instances can be given in favour of sativa, but none in’ favour of asattva. Nor can we resort to another mode of reasoning than this for in that manner moksa and the other things, admitted to. be true so far, will have to be given up. In the same way, i. e. - owing to the presence of favourable instances and the absence of unfavourable instances, all other doctrines not accepted by Sruti~ can be repudiated. |
Stitra 13, which comes next and forms adhikarana 5, is very | interesting, since each commentator has his own peculiar way of. interpreting | it: . According to Sarnkara, it teaches. that. although . the enjoying souls ( bhoktr ) and the object of enjoyment ( bhogya ) |
ANALYSIS ms
.are really non-different from Brahman, still they will not necessarily be identical with each other, i. e. their mutual distinction may at ‘the same time be maintained; just as, for instance, in the world the waves and ripples, though all non-different from the sea. still preserve their mutual distinction. Vallabha strictly follows Samkara, ‘though he takes another instance, 1. e. that of the bracelet and the ear-ring, both being non-different from gold, at thesame time being individually eoulelsle from one another. He also prefaces his explanation by saying ‘ #RnaN IRE Haines’ ‘so far the objections regarding the cause were removed; now we _ proceed to remove those with regard to the effect (i. e. the world consisting ‘of enjoying souls and the objects of enjoyment ).’ .
Ramanuja, however, translates the sutra thus :-‘ If it be said that from ( Brahman ) becoming an enjoyer there follows non- distinction ( of Brahman and jiva ); we reply, it may be as in ordi- nary life *. If the cit and acit, whether in a suitable or gross condi- tion, form the body of Brahman, then Brahman being as much embodied as the jiva, would like him, be also an enjoyer; so. the difference of nature between Isvara rartl; jiva (1. e. that-one is the enjoyer, while the other is not ) would no longer be possible. No, we reply, it would be possible, because bhoktrtva,‘ being an en- joyer ’, is not due to mere sa-Sariratva ‘ having a body ’, but to karmavasyatva ‘ being subject to merit and demerit.’ And we see in the world that a king, though an embodied being just like his servants, does not experience their pleasure and pain.
Nimbarka very similarly explains thus: If Brahman is the cause of the world, then Brahman in the form of jiva would have to be the experiencer of pleasure and pain; and so the distinction between Brahman and jiva that Brahman is niyantr, ‘the controller,’ and jiva is the bhoktr, ‘ the enjoyer, ’ would no longer be possible. The reply is that. it Tould be possible simultaneously with the non-difference of Brahman and jiva, just as, for instance, the- sea and the wave, or the sun and the lustre, are both nanedetecent and different. ere
'. According to Madhva, the sittra teaches thus : If the indivi- dual soul ( bhoktr ),; when released, is described as being one with the Highest Self, so that there is non-difference between. the. twa, then, even before release, we shall have to admit a. similar non- difference; for, that which is once different can never be non- different. The reply is that the released soul, though being one
72 THE VEDANTA
with the Highest Self, still continues to preserve its difference, Just as one mass of water mixed with another becomes apparently one, but is really different and not the same, as is proved, for instance, by the increase in the volume of the water.
The difference of interpretation mainly turns on the transla- tion of the word bhoktripatti. Sarhkara and Vallabha take it to mean ‘ the bhoktr becoming bhogya and the bhogya becoming bhoktr,’ Ramanuja and Nimbarka, ‘Brahman being the bhoktr’ and Madhva, ‘ the bhoktr being Brahman.’ Now it is quite evident that the first translation is not natural. The Sitrakara would rather have said ‘ gqvaqwaraiad: ? or ‘ Yaauieaad:’. And moreover, the ques- tion of the difference or non-difference between bhoktr and bhogya seems to be rather out of place, inspite of the explanation given by Vallabha. For, we expect something regarding the relation bet- ween cause and effect ( and this is the subject of the following stra also ); and the question regarding the relation between Brahman and the material world being already disposed of in the third adhikarana, the stitrakara would naturally occupy himself with its sequel, i. e. the relation between Brahman and jiva as cause and effect. Also the illustration of the wave and ripple and the sea does not quite fit in with the bhoktr, the bhogya and the brah- man; for the relation between bhoktr and bhogya cannot bear com- parison with that between a wave and a ripple or that between a bracelet and an ear-ring. And how is it conceivable that one who held the doctrine of absolute monism should devote a separate adhikarana to the establishing of the difference between bhoktr and bhogya? And as usual, Sarhkara comes forth with his explanation that what this stra has to say does not refer to the highest Vetiey, but only to the popular conception.
Madhva explains the siitra so as to establish his doctrine of absolute difference between Brahman and jiva; but his way of taking the word ‘bhokrapatteh’ is far from satisfactory; and more- over, his reference to the released condition of the individual soul makes the adhikarana more appropriate in the phaladhyaya; and Madhva himself, conscious of this, tries to show the propriety of the adhikarana in the present pada which deals with a-virodha or the removal of contradictions : ‘ Faq aft afafada aeaHrarearny, ’.
Ramanuja’s way of taking the word ‘ bhoktrapatteh’ is the most natural, and the question he refers to is also quite in place here. He also quotes the authority of the Dramida-bhasyakara jin
ANALYSIS 13
support of his view, and, before concluding, tries to show the unreasonableness of Sathkara’ s way of interpretation, by remarking that no one ever doubts the difference or non-difference between bhogya and bhoktr, whatever be the relation between Brahman and the Universe as cause and effect.
The same remarks may be made about Nimbarka’s explana- tion though he tries to bring out more clearly his doctrine of * bhedabheda ’.
Adhikarana 6 ( siitras 14-20 ) states according to all except Madhva the Vedanta-doctrine of the non-difference between cause and effect, which is opposed to the Vaisesika view according to which the effect is something new created from the cause. But this non- difference itself is interpreted by the different commentators accord- ing to their respective doctrines. ‘Thus Sathkara thinks that the non-difference of cause and effect means that the cause alone is the reality; while the effect is mere delusion, something super-im- posed upon the cause. Brahman alone therefore is the reality; while the universe, both intelligent and non-intelligent, is only illusory ( vivarta). Ramanuja thinks that the effect is only a modification of the cause ( parinama ); thus Brahman with the cit and acit in their subtle condition as body is the cause, which sometimes transforms itself into the effect, Brahman with the cit and the acit in their gross condition as body. Nimbarka explains — ‘ ananyatva ’ as ‘ na atyantabhinnatva ’ ‘ not absolute difference ’ and holds that the effect is both different and non-different from the cause. Vallabha maintains a non-difference without any re- ference to maya. ‘The passage, expressly referred to in sitra 14, is that which contains the word—‘ arambhana ’—* aaa fear aay alin aad’ ( Chand. VI 1, 1). All depends upon how the word ‘ vacarambhanam”’ is Understood. Sathkara translates it thus— ‘ the modification ( i. e. the effect, the thing made of clay ) is a name merely, which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that itis clay merely. ’. ‘Thus he deduces the doctrine of mithyatva, the unreality of all effects, Brahman alone being real. Ramanuja translates it thus :— ‘ on account of speech (1. e. for the sake of the accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water etc., which are preceded by speech ) the clay takes an effect ( form ) and a name; they all ( the things made of clay ) are clay, -
Ghate Vedanta, 10.
74 THE VEDANTA
this only is true ’, i. e. the substance clay itself receives a new con- figuration and a new name.
A little consideration will show us that Sarnkara’s interpreta- tion is open to the objection that the two words ‘ vacarambhanam ’” and ‘ namadheyam’convey the same idea and are almost synonyms, so that one of the words is superfluous; whereas, according to Ramanuja the two words convey two distinct ideas. ‘Namadheyam’ means ‘ name’ as opposed to ‘ form’; while ‘ vacdrambhanam ’ means ‘ having nothing but a practical purpose in view, ’ the idea being that the products of clay, for instance, are clay, with the difference, however, that they can serve a practical purpose, which clay in itself cannot.
The illustration of clay and its products is distinctly in favour of the parinama-vada and makes it difficult to deduce the vivarta- vada. Vallabha very aptly makes some scathing remarks against those who deduce the doctrine of the unreality of all products from the Upanisad passage in question, which is quite against the spirit of the whole section and which is not spported at all by the word- ing of the siitra before us, Ramanuja also criticises Sarhkara’s explanation. ‘To the same conclusion lead the two illustrations in the stitras 19 and 20. The effect is non-different from the cause just as a piece of cloth is non-different from the threads etc. of which it is made, or just as the different vital airs performing diffe- rent functions and as such receiving different names are none but the vital air. All this only supports the parinamavada and cannot, even by the highest stretch of imagination, be made to favour the vivartavada.
Madhva, on the other hand, interprets the adhikarana differ- ently. According to him the question is whether Brahman wants the help of Karanas or instruments like ordinary agents in this world. The reply is that Isvara creates the world without the help of any other instrument ( ananyatvam ) as is seen from Rgveda X 81. 2, in which all instruments etc., are denied. ‘f& feaq AIAN’ etc. And if there had been any such instruments they might have been known or demonstrated in the Vedas; but as a matter of fact they arenot. ‘The remaining sitras of the adhikarana are also interpreted by him in the same strain. It is quite evident that the topic is irrelevant in the present place.
Adhikarana 7 ( siitras 21-23 ) answers the objection that if Brahman and jiva are exactly identical, as evidently follows from
ANALYSIS , 75
such passages as ‘ tat tvam asi ’ etc., then the Lord would be open to such faults as not always doing what is good and he would be also subject to the miseries of the worldly existence, by saying that Brahman is something over and above and superior to jiva, because their difference is clearly and explicitly stated as in Brhad. Uap. II. 4, 5 ‘ the self is to be seen, to be heard etc.’ and elsewhere ( Chand. Upa. VIII. 7. 1, Brhad. Up. 1V. 3. 35), This adhikarana leaves not the slightest doubt that according to the sitrakara, the jiva and the Brahman cannot be absolutely non-different as understood by Samkara; and one can easily see that Samkara was conscious of this, since he comes forth with his usual explanation that the diffe- rence, maintained in sutra. 22, isnot real, but due to the soul’s fictitious limiting adjuncts. On the other hand, Ramanuja, Nim- barka and Vallabha simply follow the words of the siitras, of which sutra 21 formulates the objection, while stitra 22 states the reply. Stitra 23 is explained by Samkara to mean that the objections raised by others cannot be established, because the case is anal- ogous to that of stones etc., 1. e. just as some stones are worthless and others are very precious, though all are alike stones, in the same way one and the same Brahman may perform different kinds of functions ( qeqane: =Iwaferaarsigqard: ). Ramanuja, however, ex- plains thus:—‘ just as the material world or acit, ( of which stones are a type ) can never be absolutey identical with Paramatman in the same way, the jiva or cit can never be absolutely identical with the Paramatman ( deqaafe: = zaeeareanaqad: )’. Nimbarka has:-— ‘ The jiva though non-different from Brahman is at the same time, individually different, just like adamant, diamond etc., which are all modifications of the element earth ( prthivi ).’ Vallabha inter- prets somewhat similarly to Samkara. It is difficult to say which of these interpretations is more natural than others, still stitra 22 ‘ afar gd Neladara ’ decides the purport of the adhikarana beyond doubt.
Adhikarana 8 ( sutras 24-25 ) affirms, according to all except Madhva, that Brahman can create the world by its mere will, without the employment of other external instruments, just as gods can do; and just as milk can, of itself, turn into curds. Adhi- karana 9 (stitras 26-29) teaches that Brahman can create the world, without entirely passing over into it, and at the same time remain- ing one and undivided; for it is so stated expr:ssly in the script- ures, Adhikarana 10 ( siitras 30-31 ) says that Brahman, although
76 THE VEDANTA
unassisted by other means, can create the world, by virtue of its
manifold wondrous powers. Ram&nuja and Nimbarka regard sutras 26-31 as forming one adhikarana, though they agree with Samkara as regards their general purport. However, Sarhkara would explain this sort of the creation of the world, by its illusory character; while Ramanuja would say that the creation of the world means merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle, imperceptible condition. Vallabha explains the creation as being possible through the unfathomable greatness and the incomprehensible powers (aisvarya) of Brahman in which all sorts of opposites are possible.
Adhikarana 11 ( siittras 32-33 ) states that Brahman in creating the world has no purpose but mere sport. Adhikarana 12 (siitras 34-36 ) says that Brahman cannot be laid open to the charges of cruelty and partiality owing to the unequal fortunes of the beings in this world and the universal suffering; for Brahman acts only with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls; and this succession of merit and demerit and their corresponding conse- quences, i. e. this Sarhsara, is without beginning. Adhikarana 13 ( sutra 37 ) finishes the pada by declaring that all the qualities, such as omniscience or omnipotence, are possible in Brahman and thus make it capable of the creation of the world. Vallabha, Ramanuja and Nimbarka agree as regards the interpretation, al- though Ramanuja regards siitras (32-37) as forming one adhikarana.
Madhya, on the other hand, regards sutras (21-26 ) as for- ming one adhikarana, whose object is to refute the view that jiva is an independent creator of the universe. Ifthe jiva were such an independent agent, he should always do what is good and never do what is bad; but as a matter of fact, the case is quite the contrary; therefore, jiva cannot be an independent agent (21). Paramesvara, on the other hand, is possessed of superior powers and therefore no such faults are possible in his case (22). And the jiva, even though intelligent like Paramesvara, cannot possibly be the maker of the world, because he is dependent and not a master of himself, just like the non-intelligent stones etc. (23). If it be said that this denial of kartrtva to jiva is not right, because he is seen to finish or put_an end to things, we reply, that even in this he is dependent on Isvara ( 24). Isvara, though unseen, can be the maker just like gods and goblins etc. (25). Moreover, if jiva is the maker, either he should exert his whole strength entirely in every little thing,—
ANALYSIS PL
but this is not seen,—or he should exert himself only partially,—but that would contradict his being one without parts. For all these reasons jiva cannot be an independent creator ( 26 ).
Sttras (27-31) form another adhikarana which says that no similar objections can be brought against the Paramesvara being the independent creator; for his kartrtva is based on sruti ( 27). And Paramesvara does possess marvellous and manifold powers (28). And all the objections raised above can be applicable only to jiva but not to Isvara (29). Isvara is moreover possessed of all powers ( without exception ) (30). Nor can the objection on the ground of the absence of helping instruments be raised, because such absence is admitted by the scriptures. ‘The remaining sitras of the pada are divided into adhikaranas and interpreted just in the same way as is done by Samkara.
ApuHyaya II, Papa 2.
In the second pada of the second adhyaya, the Siitrakara pro- ceeds to refute the philosophical theories regarding the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta view, by means of speculative argument, independent of passages from the scriptures. Adhikarana | (siitras 1-10) is, according to all except Madhva, directed against the Samkhyas and goes to prove that a non-intelli- gent cause like the pradhana cannot possibly create or proceed with any activity without the guidance of an intelligent being. | The second stitra means according to Sarkara and Nimbarka that ‘the pradhana cannot be the cause, because of the impossibility of activity’, thus implying the word ‘anupapatteh’ from the first surta. Ramanuja has : ‘ because a non-intelligent cause is seen to be active’ when guided by an intelligent being ( asaraifatsaea eraletu- yadeaiaieq ). Sutra 4 is alsointerpreted differently by Sarhkara, Ramanuja and Vallabha; but the differences are of no material importance. At the end of this adhikarana, Ramanuja, remarks that the doctrine of the nirvisesa Brahman is even more unreason- able than the Samkhya doctrine, in that the latter admits of a plurality of souls to account for births and deaths; while the maya- vadins do not even admit that.
Madhva regards stitras (1-4) as forming one adhikarana refuting the nirisvara-samhkhyas, stitra 5 as another adhikarana refuting the sesvara-sarnkhyas, siitra 6 as the third adhikarana, levelled against the carvakas, stitras (7-8) as the fourth adhikarana,
78 THE VEDANTA
4 denying the activity of the primordial matter as_ being subordinate to the purusa ( gesiqastasafatda ) and siitras (9-10) as forming the fifth adhikarana, directed against the activity of the purusa being subordinate to the primordial matter ( yeqqasiayqeazda ).
The next sutra (1 1) forms an adhikarana by itself according to Satnkara, who sees in it a reply to the objection raised by the Vaisesika against the doctrine of the intelligent Brahman being the cause of the universe. Just as a binary atomic compound differs in its dimensions from the cause, the atoms, in the same way the world may be produced from Brahman and may not possess all its qualities. Stitras 12-17 form an adhikarana refuting the doctrine of the Vaisesikas, according to whom the world is created from atoms set in motion by the adrsta. According to all the other commenta- tors, however, siitras 11-17 form one adhikarana directed against the Vaisesikas, siitra 11 meaning that the whole of the Vaisesika doctrine is unreasonable, just like the production of the binary and tertiary atomic compounds from the atoms and binary atomic com- pounds respectively, though they differ in dimensions; and this appears, no doubt a more reasonable procedure ies that of Sarhkara; for in the midst of the refutation of the several doctrines, opposed to the Vedanta, with which the entire pada is occupied, it is rather awkward to understand onesolitary stitra as answering an objection raised against the Vedanta-doctrine, especially on the ground of the vilaksanatva or the difference of nature between cause and effect, a point which has been sufficiently thrashed in the
preceding pada.
Siitras (18-32) are directed against the Bauddhas who can be distinguished either as bahyarthavadins or sarvastitva-vadins(Realists), according to whom both material objects and their cognitions are real, or as vijfidna-vadins or yogacaras (Idealists), who hold that ideas only are real and that external objects apart from their cognitions have no independent existence, or as sunyavadins (Nihilists) according to whom everything is void or unreal. Accord- ing to Sarnkara and Vallabha, stitras 18-27 are directed against the Realists, and siitras ( 28-32) against the Idealists, the last stitra (32) being a general condemnation of the Bauddha doctrine as a whole. Both Sarhkara and Vallabha remark that the Sitrakara did not care to refute the Nihilists, as their doctrine is, on the face of it, contrary to all reasons, Vallabha also adding that a Nihilist is as absurd as a mayavadin, Ramanuja and Nimbarka
ANALYSIS 79
agree with Sarhkara in all points except that they regard this last stitra as directed against the Nihilists. Madhva_ regards sutras 18-25 as directed against the Realists, stitras 26-29 against the Nihilists and sititras 30-32 against the Idealists. Owing to the peculiar nature of the siitras, it is not possible to decide exactly which sutras refute which particular school of the Baud- dhas, though Prof. Stcherbatskoi holds that the Buddhist doctrine referred to in the sitras is the vijianavada and Prof. Jacobi that it is the sdnyavada,* not to speak of the fact that what is a refuta- tion of the idealist (e. g. proving the existence of external objects) may as well bea refutation of the Nihilist. The truth of this may be illustrated by noting here some of the sutras which have been interpreted differently. Thus siitras 26 ‘4 Haq: Hezm1d is explained by Sarhkara, Vallabha and Nimbarka to mean that an entity cannot spring from a non-entity on account of this being not observed, whereas the Bauddhas who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven to maintain that an entity ‘springs from a non-entity. Ramanuja, who directs the stitra against the sautrantika Bauddhat in particular, maintaining that a thing can become an object of cognition, even though not in actual existence at the time of the cognition, interprets it thus : ‘ The special forms of cognition such as blue colour etc., cannot be the forms of things that have perished and therefore are not in being, since this is not observed. For it is never observed that when a substrate of attributes has perished, its attributes pass over into another thing.’ Madhva directing the stitra against the Nihilist explains it to mean that a non-entity (stinya) cannot be the cause, because, it is never so observed. So also siitra 28, accord- ing to Sarmkara, Nimbarka and Vallabha, means that the non- existence of external things cannot be maintained, on account of our consciousness of them. According to Ramanuja it means: ‘The non-existence of things apart from ideas cannot be maintained, be- cause we are conscious of cognitions as something that renders the knowing subject capable of thought and intercourse with regard to particular things.’ According to Madhva, who directs the sutra against the Nihilists, it means: ‘it should not be said that the
* Journal Am. Or. Society, Vol. 31.
{The Realistic Bauddhas are of two kinds,—Sautrantikas, who hold that external objects are only inferrable, and the Vaibhasikas, according to whom they are also perceptible.
80 THE VEDANTA
world itself is a void (Siinya), for we actually see it.’ Stitra 30, according to Sarhkara, Nimbarka and Vallabha, maintains the impossibility of the existence of mental impressions in the absence of the perception of external objects; while according to Ramanuja, it maintains the impossibility of the existence of mere cognitions devoid of corresponding things, owing to our never perceiving cognitions not referring to a cognised object. Madhva, directing the stitra against the idealist, explains it to mean that the world cannot be mere idea or thought, because of the absence of such a consciousness in us.
The next adhikarana (stitras 33-36) contains a refutation of the Jaina doctrine and siitras 37-41, forming a single adhikarana, are directed against the Pasupatas, according to whom Ivara is only the operating or efficient cause of the universe, but not its material cause,
The last adhikarana of the pada (siitras 42-45) refers to the Paficaratra or Bhagavata doctrine. According to Samkara and Vallabha, this is also refuted just like the other doctrines in the rest of the pada. According to Ramanuja, however, thé first two siitras only of the adhikarana (42-43) contain objections against the doctrine in question; but the last two sutras ( 44-45 ) refute those objections and ultimately establish the Bhagavata doctrine, which is, thus, the doctrine held by the Sttrakara. Nimbarka agreeing neither with Sarhkara nor Ramanuja, regards the adhikarana as a refutation of the Sakti doctrine, according to which, the Sakti, independent of the intelligent being, can create the world. Madhva also follows Nimbarka.
To come to the meaning of the stitras individually, Sathkara commences by remarking that the Bhagavata doctrine deserves our acceptance, so far as it holds that Isvara is both the efficient and material cause of the Universe. So also when it says that the one holy Vasudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and that he, dividing himself in four parts, appears in four forms as Vasudeva (denoting the Highest Self), Sarhkar- sana (individual soul), Pradyumna (the mind), and Aniruddha (the principle of egoism), we have nothing to object. But when it further adds that Sarhkarsana springs from Vasudeva, Pradyumna from Samkarsana, and Aniruddha from Pradyumna, we must take exception to it. For it is impossible that the individual soul would
ANALYsIs 8]
spring from the Highest Self, which would make the former non- eternal (42); nor is it observed that the instrument (i. e. the mind) is produced from the agent (i. e. the individual soul, 43). Or even if it be said that in consequence of their being endowed with knowledge, glory, ruling capacity etc., Samkarsana and others are really all Lords, all Vasudevas, free from faults, and without any imperfections, still the objection raised above remains uncontra- dicted (44). And moreover, the Bhagavata doctrine cannot be accepted owing to there being many contradictions in the doctrine itself and ar ine to its containing many passages contradictory of the Vedas (i. e. ‘not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas, Sindilya studied this Sastra ’ )s Vallabha follows Sarhkara except in sitra 44, where ‘ ag staat’ is explained by him to mean ‘ Zagat wordt ’ i.e. because of the plurality of lords—which is unreasonable—remaining uncontradicted.
Ramanuja, however, Be Ae the first two stitras just like Sathkara, explains siitra 44 thus :—‘ or if they are of the nature of that which: is knowledge and so on, there is no contradiction of that (i.e. the Bhagavata doctrine ).2 What the doctrine really means is that Sarhkarsana etc., are of the nature of the highest Brahman, which, from kindness to those devoted to it, voluntarily abides in a fourfold form, so as to render itself accessible to its devotees, its birth being nothing but a voluntary assumption of bodily eras Sitra 45, moreover, says that the origination of the jiva, which is brought forth as an objections is distinctly contro- verted in the books of the Bhagavatas also. Ramanuja winds up the adhikarana with a long discussion on the authoritativeness of the Bhagavata doctrine, being strongly recommended in _ the Mahabharata, by Vyasa himself, the author of the stitras, and remarks that the statement that Sandilya not finding any satisfac- tion in sruti and smrti, at last found it in this doctrine is opposed in no way to sruti and smrti, on the other hand, it means a high eulogy of them.
Nimbarka explains the sitras thus :—It is impossible that the world can be produced (from sakti without the purusa) (42). ( If you think that the purusa is there in touch with the sakti), still there is no instrument, ( because all instruments are produced only after the creation has begun ) (43). And if you think that the sakti is possessed of inherent knowledge etc., then there is no objection
Ghate Vedanta, 11.
§2 THE VEDANTA
( because you have thereby come over to our doctrine of Brahman ) (44). ( Moreover the doctrine of sakti cannot be accepted ), because it is opposed to sruti etc. (45).*
It is very difficult to decide which of these interpretations is the correct ene, especially, whether the adhikarana is only a refu- tation of the Bhagavata doctrine or whether it aims at establishing it. Between the two explanations of sitra 44, which turns the whole drift of the adhikarana, there is nothing to choose; ¢ and the argument that it is not an un-natural procedure to end the polemical pada with the defence of the doctrine which is to be viewed as the true one is without force; since, the exposition and defence of the true doctrine, whatever it be, is the subject directly or indirectly of the whole book, and, what is more important, we do not meet with, even once in the siitras, terms like Vasudeva, Sarnkarsana etc., so peculiar to the Pajicaratra doctrine; not to mention the fact that Ramanuja is the only commentator who sees in this adhikarana such a defence of the doctrine. The fact that this particular doctrine is re- futed last of all, can be explained by the circumstance that it is the most allied to the Vedanta doctrine, and Sarhkara has admitted this at the beginning of the adhikarana, as we have remarked above.
ADHYAYA II, Papa 3.
The third pada of the second adhyaya proceeds to discuss the question whether the different forms of existence which ‘constitute the universe are produced or not. The first fifteen sttras deal with . the elements, while the remainder of the pada deals with the indi- vidual soul. Adhikarana 1 ( siitras 1-7 ) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect. Adhikarana 2 ( suitra 8 ) shows that air similarly springs from ether. Adhikarana 3 (stitra 9) is akind of digression saying that Brahman,
* It is very curious that, though Srinivasa in the Kaustubha exactly follows the Parijatasaurabha of Nimbarka,Kesava-kasmirin in the Kaustu- bhaprabha begins with a lengthy explanation, word for word identical with that in the Sribhasya, and in the end very briefly observes that, really speaking, this adhikarana should be a refutation of the Sakti doct- rine, and then gives a short explanation, exactly following Nimbarka and Srinivasa. |
t Perhaps the partical ‘va’ in the stitra 44 goes well with Samkara’s way of interpreting.
ANALYSIS 83
whichis only sat ‘that which is’ cannot have originated from anything else. These nine sitras are regarded by Ramanuja as one adhika- rana, without any special reason; the other commentators are in entire accordance with Samkara.
The next three siirtas (10-12), forming three adhikaranas, teach respectively that fire springs from air, water from fire, and earth from water. Adhikarana 7 (stitra 13) proves that it is Brahman only in these various forms, to which the creation of the elements is due; and that it is not effected by the elements themselves. Adhi- karana 8 ( stitra 14) teaches that the order of re-absorption of the elements is just inverse to that of their c1eation or emission. Adhi- karana 9 ( stitra 15) observes that the above-mentioned order of creation and absorption of the elements is not disturbed by the organs of sense and the mind; for these latter, being themselves of elemen- tal nature, are created and destroyed along with the elements of which they consist. Thus Sarmkara has six adhikaranas for the six suitras (10-15 ); and Vallabha is quite in accordance with him.
Ramanuja, however, regards all these siitras ( 10-15 ) as form- ing one adhikarana, of which sittras 10-12 (stitral2 is split into two by Ramanuja ‘prthivi and adhikara etc.’) form the ptirvapaksa, stating that every preceding element itself produces the subsequent element, and siitra 13 begins the siddhanta to the effect that it is Brahman that creates. Sttra 14 is interpreted by him differently so as to be an argument in favour of the siddhanta view in sitra 13: “The order of succession ( kramah ) which is contained in such passages as ‘ UqeHISTad OM: Aa: Galeaana a a aqsaifaas: Tat faq atfat’ |] ( Mund. Up. 2. 1.3 ), describing the direct origination from Brahman of all effects, and which is reverse ( viparyayena ) from the order mentioned so far (i. e. each preceding element producing the subsequent one ) is possible ( upapadyate ) only on the supposition of the origination of each effect being really from Brahman itself (atah) in the form of a special causal substance.” That this interpretation is far less natural than the one given by Samkara goes without saying. Nimbarka also, just like Ramanuja, regards stitras 10-13 as one adhikarana of which siitras 10-12 state the ptirvapaksa and _ sitra 13 states the siddhanta; but he reads stitras 14-15 as forming two separate adhikaranas and interprets them just like Sarhkara. Madhva regards sutras 10-14 as forming five adhikaranas; but he interprets the stitras 10-12 as meaning that the elements are all produced from Visnu and not that the subsequent element is
84 THE VEDANTA
produced from the preceding one. Siitra 13 is interpreted as assert- ing that not only. the creation but the destruction also proceeds from Visnu and from no other being such as Rudra etc. Siitras 15 and 16 according to him form one adhikarana, siitra 15 stating the purvapaksa and stitra 16, the siddhanta.
Stitra 16 and the rest of the pada deal with the nature of the individual soul, and as such is very important for our purpose. As we know, all the five schools agree in holding that the jiva is unborn and eternal; and that the birth and death, spoken of in the case of the jiva, are only metaphorical, as they really belong to the body of the individual soul. This is the purpose of sitra 16. Sarhkara, Nimbarka.and Vallabha agree literally. Ramanuja ( according to whom this is stitra 17, forming part of the preceding adhikarana), on the other hand, interprets the siitra differently thus :—The words in ordinary use, which are connected with and thus denote the moving and non-moving things, possess with regard to Brahman a denotative’ power which is not secondary but primary and direct (Ramanuja reads ‘a-bhaktah’ while others read ‘ bhaktah’), because the denotative power of all words is dependent on the being of Brahman. The very obscurity of the explanation is sufficient for its rejection. Madhva’s interpreta- tion also is equally unsatisfactory. He connects it with the preceding sutras and thus explains:—The production of vijaana from manas ( which has been put forth as disturbing the order of creation and that of destruction, which are exactly opposite ) does not mean that the category called vijazna is produced from the category called manas ; but it only means that knowledge arises from the act of reflection, referring to moving and {egal things : this is thus a kind of metaphorical statement.
The next stitra (17) means that the individual soul is never produced ; because the scriptures never speak about its production, on the other hand, everywhere assert its eternal character. Here Sathkara and Nimbarka read ‘a oqRaT saa: °; while Ramanuja, Vallabha and Madhva read ‘ 4 sat 4a:’ ; but that does not make any difference as regards the ultimate sense. Here also all agree in referring this sutra to the denial of birth for the individual soul, except Madhva, who explains it to mean that the soul, i. e. the Paramatman is not destroyed or absorbed in something else. ‘That the interpretation of the preceding siitra, as given by Ramanuja, is not natural enough follows from the following sitra itself ; since the
ANALYSIS 85
denial of the birth of the jiva is the logical corollary of the state- ment that the so-called birth and death of the jiva really belong to the material body.
The next stitra (18) which runs as ‘ a: 3a: Wa’ is interpreted by Samkara to mean that the individual soul is ‘knowledge, (jfanam ); while Ramanuja and Nimbarka explain it to mean that the