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THE GIFT OF
MAY TREAT MORRISON
IN MEMORY OF ALEXANDER F MORRISON
THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA
THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA
ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS |!(»\V.\ TO TIIK Di:\TH OF LORD RAGLAN
A. W. KINGLAKE
CHEAPER EDITION VOL. III.
V.'ILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
M C ]\II
All r;hl>'.i remvfi'.
V . 3
C 0 N T E N T S.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. CHAPTER 1.
I.
PAGE
Position on the Alma, 1
IL
Montscliikoff's plan for availing himself of the position, . . 0 His forces, . . . . . . . . . .10
His personal position, . . . . . . . .11
His plan of campaign, . . . . . . . . ]"J
His reliance on the natural strength of the position, . . 12 The means he took for strengthening it, .... 13
Disjiosition of his troops, . . . . . . .14
Forces originally jiosted in the }iart of the position assailed by
the French, 15
Forces originally posted in the part of the jiosition assailed by
the English, .1(5
Formation of the Russian infantry, ... .18
Forces of the Allies, 20
The ta.sks undertaken by the French and the English respec- tively 21
III.
Conference the night before the battle between St Arnand and Lord Raglan, 22
432730
VI
CONTENTS.
Chapter I. — coitfiimed.
The French plan,
The part taken l)y Lord Raghm at the conference, . French plan for the operations of the Enrjiish nriiiy, St Arnauil's demeanour, ......
Result of the conference,
23 23 25
2G 26
IV.
March of the Allies, ..... Causes delaying the march of tlic English army.
27
28
V.
The last halt of the Allies before the battle,
31
VI.
Meeting between ]\I. St Arnaud and Lord Raglan,
33
VII.
Bos(iuet's advance, .
He divides his force, .......
Disposition of the main body of the French army, .
Of the English army, ......
The leading Divisions of the English army deploy into line.
The Light Division not on its right ground, .
The march continued, .......
35 35 36 36 38 38 40
VIII.
Spectacle presented to tlie llussians by tlic atlvance ot the Allies, ........•■
Notion whirli tlie Rns.sian soldiers had been taught to entertain of the English army, .......
Surprise at the sight of the English array.
Fire from the shipping,
Followed by a retrograde movement of Russian troops confront ing th« French, ........
41
42 42 43
43
CONTENTS.
vu
Chai'Teu I. — continued.
IX.
Half-past one o'clock. C'aiiiiDiiadc directed against the Ei line, .........
Men of our leading divisions ordered to lie do\vii, The First Division deployed into line, . Sir Richard England ordered to sujiport the Guards, Fire undergone hy our men v.hilst lying down.
,dish,
44 45 45 46 47
X.
Cannonade directed against Lord Kaglan and his staff,
49
XI.
The Allies could now measure their front with that of the
enemy .......... 51
The bearing this admeasurement had \\\nm the French plan, . 52
The ground which each of the leading divisions had to assail, . 52
The village of Bourliouk set on fire by the enemy, ... 54 The effect which this measure liad in cramping the English
line, "... 54
XII.
General Bos(piet, ........
His plan of operations, .......
Advance of Autemarre under Boscjuct in person,
Advance of the detached force under Bouat, .
Further advance of Autemarre's brigade.
Guns brought out again.st him from Ulukul Akles,
Bosq^uet, after a momentary check, estalilishes himself on th
cliff,
Measures taken by Kiriakoff upon observing Bosquet's tuniiii
movement, .........
Horsemen on the cliff, .......
55
56 57
58 58 59
60
60 61
XIII.
The effect of Bosquet's turning movement upon the mind of Prince Mentschikolf, ........ 61
Vili CONTEXTS.
Chapter I. — continued.
His measures for dealing with it. His flank nianli, . . 63
Mentscliikott' on the cliff, ....... 63
His batteries at length coining u]i, there begins a cannonade
between his .and Bosquet's artillery, ..... 64
Bosquet maintains himself, 65
Mentschikoff counter-marching, .66
Position of Bosquet on the cliff, 66
XIV.
St Arnaud orders the advance of C'anrobert and Prince Na- poleon, .......... 67
The order into which the Allies now fell, .... 67
Lord Raglan's conception of the part he had to take, . . 67
Artillery contest between the Eussian and the French batteries, 68
Canrobert's advance across the river, 69
His troops arc sheltered from fire by the steepness of the hill- side, 69
Duty attaching upon the commander of the 1st Frenc h Divi- sion, .......•••. 71
General Canrobert, . 71
His dilemma, 72
The course he takes, 73
Prince Napoleon's Division, . 73
Fire sustained by the rearward ])ortiona of the French tulumns, 73
Discouragement, ......... 73
St Arnaud pushes forward his reserves, 74
The ill effect of this measure upon the French troops, . . 74
Their complaint that they were being 'massacred,' . . 74
Anxiety on account of Bosquet, 74
State of the battle at this time, 74
XV.
Opportunities oflfercd to Mentschikoff. 76
The battle at this time languished, 77
Causes which had occasioned the failure of the French ojiera-
tions, . . . ■ 79
CONTENTS. ix
Chaptkk I. — continued.
XVI.
A despoiuling account of Bosinict's coiulitioii is Lrouglit to
Lord Raglan, ......... 80
Lord Eaglau resolves to precipitate the advance of the English
army, 81
Grounds tending to cause, or to justify, the resolve, . . 82
Order for the advance of the English infantry, ... 83
XVII.
Evans detaches Adams with two l>attalions, and with the rest
of his Division advances towards the bridge, ... 85 The conflict in which he became engaged, .... 86
XVIIL
Advance of the Light Division, ...... 90
The task it had before it, 90
Means for preparing a well-ordered assault were open to the
assailants, .......... 94
The Division not covered by skirmishers, .... 95
XIX.
The tenor of Sir G. Brown's orders ior the advance, . . 95
The advance through the vineyards, ..... 96
And over the river, ........ 97
Codrington's brigade finds the top of the left bank lined with
Russian skirmishers, ........ 99
Course taken by General Buller, ...... 99
Kature of the duty attaching upon him, . .... 101
XX.
The 19th Regiment, 102
State of the five battalions standing crowded along the left
bank of the river . . . 10-2
Sir George Brown, . . . . . . . .102
General Codrington, .106
X CONTENTS.
Chapter I. — continued.
XXI.
Codringtou resolves to storm llie (Ireat lledoubt, . . . 108
His words to tlie men, ..... ... 108
He gains the top of the haiik, ... ... 108
Lacy Yea and his Fusiliers, .... ... 110
The heaving of the crowd beneath the bank, . . . .111
Effect of the converging tendenr}^ which had governed the
troops, .......... 112
Endeavours of the men to form line on the top of the bank, . 112
The task they had before them, ...... 113
Advance of the Eight-hand Kazan column, .... 114
The column is defeated, and retreats, ..... 115
The Left Kazan column, 115
XXII.
The storming of the Great Kedoubt, 116
No supports yet coming up from the tup of the river's bank, . 127
XXI 11.
The Guards, 128
The Duke of Cambridge, 131
Halt of the 1st Division before entering the vineyards, . . 134
General Airey comes up, 135
His exposition of the order to advance in su[)port, . . . 135
The Division again stopped for a time, ..... 137
Step taken by Evans, 137
The l.st Division resumes its advance, ..... 137 AVant of free communication along a line passing through
enclosures, . ....•••■• 137
Advance of the Guards to the left bank of the liver, . . 138
Advance of the Iligliland lirigade to (lie left liaiik of the river, 139 Time was lapsing, . . . • • • • ■ .140 No support brought by the two l)attalions which remained
under BuUer, 140
Tlie cause of this, 140
CONTENTS.
XI
Chapter I. — continued.
XXIV.
State of tilings ill tlic ivdoiilit, 142
Battery on the higlier slopes of tlie hill brought to hear on (jur
men, 143
Our men lodge themselves outside the parapet, . .144
The forces gathered against them, . . . . . .145
Warlike indignation of the IJussian infantry on the Kourgane
Hill, 145
Movement of the Ouglitz eolunin, 14t>
Advance of the Vladimir column, ...... 147
Confusing rumours amongst our soldiery, . . . .151
Unauthentic orders and signals to the men, .... 151
A bugler sounds the ' retire,' . ...... 154
Double motive for remaining where they were, . . . 154 Conference of officers at the parapet, . . . . .155
Their fate, 155
The ' retire ' again sounded, ....... 155
Our soldiery retreat from the redoubt, 156
Losses of the regiments whieh stormed the work, . . . 157
XXV.
Cause which paralysed the Kussians in the miil.st of their suc- cess, 159
Apparition of horsemen on a knoll in the midst of the liushian
position, .......... 1()3
The road whieh Lord Kaghin took when he had ordered Ihc advance of his in fantr}-, . . . . . . .165
Lord Raglan's position on the knuU, ..... 171
His instant apprehension of the ad\aiilage gained, . . . 173
His appeal for a coujile of guns, ...... 174
Progress of the battle then going on under his eyes, . . 175
A French aide-de-camp on the knoll, ..... 176
His mission, . . . . . . . . . .176
Lord Kaglan's way with him, ....... 177
XXVi.
Causes of the depression wliirh had come upon the French, . 178 Operations on the Telegraph Height, 178
Xll CONTENTS.
Chapter I, — continued.
JJaekwanlncss of the 3d Frencli Division, .... 179
Prince Napoleon, ^ 180
The mishaps wliich befell him, . • . . . . ^ 180
The materials from which the hulk of tlie French army is taken, 181 The great difference between their clioice regiments and the
rest of their troops, ........ 182
Each Division, therefore, is furnished witli a Zuuave or other choice regiment, . . . . . . . . .182
Prince Napoleon is abandoned by his Zouave regiment, . . 183 Also St Aniaud was riding with this Division, and he therefore was answerable for its place in the field, . . . .184
D'Aurelle's brigade thrusts itself forward in advance of Prince
Napoleon, .......... 184
But in an order which incapacitates it from any immediate
combat, .......... 185
Helplessness of the deep column which was formed by D'Au- relle's brigade and Prince Napoleon's Division, . . . 186 Condition of Kiriakoff on the Telegraph Height, . . 186 The 'column of the eight battalions,' ..... 187
Kiriakoff is invested with the charge of this column, . . 187
He marches it across the front of D'Aurelle's brigade, . . 188 And then advances upon the right centre of Canrobert's Divi- sion, ,.......■•
The head of Canrobert's Division falls back, .... 189
State of the battle at this time, 190
XXVII.
The two guns which Lord Raglan had called for are brought to the top of the knoll, 192
Their fire enfilades the Causeway batteries, and causes the enemy to withdraw his guns, . . . . . .192
It ploughs througli the enemy's reserves and drives them from the field, . ' 193
The Ouglitz column was stopped in its advance, . . . 194
So also was the Vladimir, 194
XXVIII.
Progress hitherto made by Evans, 195
Guns heard resounding from the knoll, ..... 196
189
CONTENTS. XI U
Chapter I. — confiinierl.
Their visible effect upon the Causcwiiy batteries, . . .196 Evans advancing, . . . . . . . . .196
Advance of the 47th, 197
Of the 30th, 197
Of the 55th, 197
The enemy does not further resist this advance with liis
infantry, 198
Evans, joined by Sir Richard England in person, now lias with
him thirty guns, 198
Sir Richard England's dispositions for bringing support to
Evans 199
Evans's situation in the mean time, 200
XXIX.
Protracted fight between the Royal Fusiliers and the left Kazan
column 200
The 55th attacking the column in ilank, .... 208
Defeat of the column, 210
It is arranged that the defeated column is to be pressed by the
Grenadier Guards, 212
XXX.
state of the field in this part of the Russian position. Advance and discomfiture of the Scots Fusilier Guards, . The Grenadier Guards, .......
Their march up the slope, ......
Codringtou rallying some men of the Light Division,
And proposing to place them in the vacated interval between
two battalions of the Guards, ..... His proposal rejected by the Grenadier Guards, Continued advance of the Grenadiers, .... These joined afterwards by other soldiery aligning with tl
on their left, ........
The Coldstr.;am
Temper of English soldiery advancing after a check,
Advance of tlie Highland Brigade
The two battalions remaining with General P)u11it, Suggestion that the Guards should fall back, .
213
214 220 220 221
221 222 222
223 223 224 225 226 227
xiv CONTENTS.
Chapter I. — continued.
Sir Colin Canii)b(;ll, 228
Campbell's answer to the suirgestion that the Guards should
fall back, . . . r 233
His disposition of the Highland Bri.i^ade, .... '233 The nature of the tight now about to take place on the Kour-
gan&hill, . .' 235
XXXI.
238
Trince Gortschakoff's advance with a colunni of the Vladimir corps, .......•••
Apparition and voice of ' the mounted officer,' . . . 239
Manceuvre executed by the Grenadier Gnanls, . . . 239
Itsetfect, 240
The Coldstream, 241
Assailed by ordei-s to retire, .241
Its resistance, .......•• 241
The Grenadiers ami the 'Coldstream' engaged with six bat- talions in column, 242
XXXII.
The stress which a line puts upon the soldiery of a column, , 242
And upon a general who has charge of columns, . . . 243
Impressions wrought upon the mind of Kvetzhiski by tlie Eng- lish array, 243
The sight of a battalion advancing upon his right front con- vinces him that he must move, 246
ileantime the colunnis along the redoubt are becoming dis- tressed by tlie fire of the Guards, 247
Continuance of the fight between the Grenadier Guards and the left Vladimir column, 249
Defeat of the left Vhulimir column, and of the left Kazan bat- talions, .....••••• 253
Kvetzinski's obliipie movement of retreat with the right Vla- dimir column, .....•■•• 254
The Duke of Cambridge is master of the Great Redoubt, . 255
Kvetziuski is wounded and disabled, 255
CONTENTS.
XV
Cjiapti;k l. — continued.
XXX in.
Sir Colin CainpbeH's conception of the ]i:iit \w would take with liis bri^^Mile, .......
Tlie 42(1 wa.s at liis sidi', . . . . .
Sir Colin Canipbt'll and the Highland Brigade, Tlu'ir engagement with several Kussian column.'^, . Defeat of the four Russian column.s, Stand made by the Ouglitz battalion.s, . The enemy's neglect of othei- measures for covering the r Slaughter of the retreating masses by artillery, Losses sustained by the enemy on the Kourgane Hill, By the Guards and Highlanders,
treat.
256 256 257 258 269 271 272 273 274 274
XXXIV.
The scarlet arch on the knoll, 276
Eetreat of the last Russian battalions which had hitherto stood
their ground, 278
Final operations of the artillery, ...... 278
Their Icsses, 279
XXXV.
Lord Raglan crossing the Causeway,
Prince Mentschikolf on ground not far oil".
The part he liad been taking in the battle.
His reappearance in the English part of the field, .
His meeting with Gortschakoff, ....
His omission to take measures for covering the retreat.
He is carried along with the retreating masses,
279 279 280
2S2 282 283 284
XXXVL
The array of the I'.nglish army on the ground they had won, . 2?4 Operations of the English cavalry, ...... 285
XXXVI L
Progress of a French artillery-train along the ]>lateau from west to east, .......... 2SJ
XVI
CONTENTR.
Chapter T. — continved
Officers doscryiiif; the 'column of tlie eight battalions,'
The column torn by artiHcry-ilrc, .
And moved eastward by Kiriakoll',
Its demeanour, .....
Is halted on the rif^dit rear of the Telegraph,
The jiart it had taken in the battle.
288 288 289 289 290 290
XXXVIII.
A flanking fire from the French artillery poured upon the troops on the Telegrajdi Height, ..... 290
Condition of things in that part of the field, .... 291
The result of what Kiriakoff' had hitherto observed in the Eng- lish part of the field, 291
His conviction that in that part of the field the Englisli had won the battle, 292
He conforms to the movement of the troops retreating before the English, 293
His retreat not molested by French infantry, .... 294
Kiriakoff's artillery, ........ 294
XXXIX.
Great conflux of French troops towards the Telegraph,
Capture of the Telegraph,
Nature of the comljat at the Telegraph, .
Turmoil on the Telegraph Height, .
Marshal St Arnaud, ....
295 295 296 297 299
XL.
Opportunity of cutting off" some of the enemy's retreating masses, .......... ,300
Vain endeavours of Lord Iiaglan and of Airey to cause the re- quisite advance of French troops, ..... 300
St Arnaud. Tlie extent to whidi bis mind was brought to bear on the battle, 301
CONTEXTS.
xvu
Chapter I. — continued.
XLI.
The gvouiul reached by Forey with Louiniers brigade, Position taken uj) by the rest of the French army, .
301 302
XLIL
The position taken up by Kiriakolf. 302
The effect produced u}ion the Allies by his soldierly attitude, . 303
He moves forward some cavalry, ...... 303
Lord Raglan's ve.\atioiJ, ....--■. 303
XLm.
Question as to the way in which the reti'eat sh'0\ikl be }iressed, 301
Jjord Raj,dan's opinion, ........ 30-i
His plan, 305
It is pro[)Osed to the French, ,.,,... 305
They decline to move, ........ 305
Question whether another uu-tliod with the Frmch niij,'ht have answered better, , . , . . . . . .306
XI.IV.
The close of the battle,
The cheers that greet Lord Ragkn. ....
His visit to the wounded,
The Allied armies bivouacking on the ground they had won, Arrival of the troops U4ider Colonel Torreus, .
306 30/ 307 308 308
XLY.
Continuation of the Russian retreat.
309
XLVL
Lo.sses of the French,
Of the Engli.sh,
Of the Russians. The trophici of vi'ctorv wert; scant v,
b
312 312 313 313
XVUl
( mNTKNTS.
ChaI'TKU I. — rotifiiii'i <1.
XLVII.
Qut'stion as to the expediency of attackiiij^ the Russian fo^i- tinn in front, .........
Tlie plan actually followed by St Arnaud, ....
314 314
XLVllI.
Sumniary of the enemy, .
315
XI. IX.
The meed of glovy fairly earned on the Alma 317
How far the Allies were entitled to take glory to themselves, . 318
Cause tending to impair the efficiency of the French army,
320
LI. Effect of the battle upon the prospects of the campaign, .
324
CHAPTER II.
The Allied armies after the battle of the Alma, State of the field after the battle, . Fate of the wounded Russians,
325 326 329
CHAPTEK III.
Ex])ediency of promptly following up the victory, . Causes of the ]>rotracted halt on the Alma, . . . . And of an inchoate intention to abstain from attacking the North Forts, ....
The Star Fort
Expediency of attacking it,
Perceived by I^ord Itaglan and Sir E'lmuiid Ta
Soundness of their inferences,
The first of the 'lost occasions,'
yons,
337 338
338 347 347 348 348 349
CONTENTS.
XIX
CHAPTER lY.
Advance on the Katclia, .
The village on its banks,
The people of the village.
Lord Kaglan's cavalry already on the Belbee,
Sunday the 24th,
New oKstriiction perceived by the French,
Their request for a little delay,
The advance at length resumed, but without any iixed deter- mination to attack the ' North Side,' .
Sebastopol in sight, ....
Marshal St Arnaud, . , . ,
His state .
Bend in the direction of the march,
The track of the Russian army,
Q'he proofs of its shattered state not well mastered by tlie Allies, ......
The invaders descending into the valle)' of the Belbee, .
Keconnaissance by Lord Cardigan, .....
Grave import of a resolve to shun an attack of the ' Xorth Side,'
350 350 350
352 354 354 354
35 r5 356 350' 35tj 35»J 357
3.57 358 358 353
CHAPTER V.
The design of operating against Sebastopol from the north,
The time had now come for a final decision, .
The Severnaya or north side of Sebastopol,
Its value to the Allies, .......
The plateau overhanging the North Side,
The Star Fort,
Endeavours of the Paissians after the ]4th Scjit. to strengthen
the fort and the plateau,
Duns available for the defence, ..... I'art that might have been taken by the fleets in attack on Star
Fort,
Forces available for the defence, .....
The force defending the position on the '24th and ^oth Sept. Admiral Korniloff, .......
I'olicy of attacking the north fort. .....
In the opinion of Todleben, ......
360 361 3G2 362 363 364
365 3(57
367 363 368 368 369 370
XX CONTENTS.
( 'iiAPTK.R V. — coriUnnod.
Jn that of Lord llaglan and Sir K. Lj-ons, .... ,']70 The objections that were urged against attacking the Xorth
Side, ■ . . ". . . :j7i
Sir Jolin Burgoyne the great opponent, ..... 374 Kecapitulated statement of the French ()l)jection to attack tlu;
' North Side,' 375
lieconnaissance by Sir Ednnmd Lyons, ..... 376
Failure of his endeavour to persuade St Arnaud, . . . 376 Lord Raglan's peculiar aptitude for lessening the evils of a
divided commaiul, ........ 377
Dilemma in which the Allies were placed, .... ."78
The information that had been furnished respecting the land
defences of Sebastopol, ....... 378
By Colonel Mackinto.sli, ....... 379
ByMr Oliphant, 380
Lord Raglan's original iu(din;iti(m, ...... 383
Its revival, 383
Conception of the fiimk march, ...... 3^3
Objections to which the plan was open, ..... 383
The little freedom of choice left to Lord Raglan, , . . 387
Reasons tending to justify the resort to the flank march, . 38S
Light in which Lord Raglan regarded the alternative of the
flank march, ......... 389
Sir John Burgoyne. ........ 390
His opinion, .......... 394
He is requested to ]>ut it in writing, ..... 395
Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, ..... 395
l^lan of the flank march propounded to I\rarsluil St Arnaud, . 39tJ
And by him entertained, ....... 397
Lord Raglan's conference with IMarshal St Arnaud on the even- ing of the 24th, 398
Determination to attempt the tlank march. .... 399
State of Marshal St Arnaud, 400
The decision to which the chiefs cnnie, ..... 400 Probable cau.se of the Marshal's unwillingness to attack the
Star Fort, 400
His bodily state, 401
The avoidance of the Star Fort Wiis the second of the ' lost
'occasions,' ..,.....• 4u3
CONTENTS. XXI
A P P E N D I X.
j^ote 1.— Tlie Strength of the Russian Army engaged on
the Ahna, 405
Note II. — Russian Troops at the Alma, as posted at the
comniencenieut of the Battle, . . . .410
Note III. — Note respecting the Operations of the 7th, the
Royal Fusiliers, . . . . . .411
Xote IV.— Respecting the Statement that Men coming down from the Redoubt broke through tin; Scots Fusilier Guards, 417
Note v.— Respecting the Separation of the Vladimir Corps
into two Bodies, . . . . . .410
Note VI.— The Apparition of the ' Unkiunvn Jilounted
' Officer,' 4-2U
Note VII. —Respecting some of the Conditions which may
interfere with the Desire to Fight in Line, . 421
Note VIII. — Ite.specting the abandoned Theory that the Defeat of the Colunui of the Eight Battalions had been elfected by Infantry, .... 42"
Note IX. — Note respecting the Truth of the Accounts which represent that a Great and T'errible Fight took ]ilace near the Telegraiih on the Day of the Alma, 424
Note X. — Note containing an E.\tr;ict from a Letter ad- dressed by Colonel Napier, the Historian of the Peninsular War, to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, 432
Note XI. — Extract from a ]\feniorandum of a Conversation held with Sir Ednuuul Lyons, which was made by iMr George Loch, late IM ember for Suther- landshire, February 10, 1S5C, and approved as accurate on the same day by Sir Edmund, . 433 Note XII. — Argument for avoiiling the Attack of the Neath
Side, 436
BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CIIArTEIl I.
I.
For an army undertaking to withstand tho march chap of invaders who come along the shore f)-om tlie '
north, the position on the left bank of the Alma f^^Z^ is happily formed by nature, and is capable of being made strong. The river springs from the mountain-range in the south-east of the peninsula, and its tortuous channel, resulting at last in a westerly course, brings it down to the sea near the headland called Cape Loukool. In that region the right or northern bank of the stream inclines with a very gentle slope to the water's edge ; but on the south or left bank, the river presses close against a great range of hills ; and the rocky acclivities at their base have been so visibly scarped by the action of the river in its swollen state, that they almost aflbrd a measure of the loud, red torrent thrown down in flood- times from the sides of the Tchatir Dagh. Yet, VOL. III. A
2 BATTLE OF THE ALM\.
CHAP. SO long as it flows in its summer bed, tlie pure, , grey sti-e-tm oT t'le Alma, though strong and
rapid oven then, can be crossed in most places by a full- grown luan wiiliout losing foot. There are, however, some deeps which would force a man to swim a few strokes ; and, on the other hand, the river is passed in several places by easy and frequented fords. Near the village of Bourliouk, at the time of the action, there was a good timber bridge.
Along the course of the stream, on the north or right bank, there is a broad belt of gardens and vineyards fenced round by low stone walls, and reaching down to the water; but on the left or south side there are few enclosures, for in most places the rock formation, which marks the left bank of the river, has its base so close down to the water's edge as to leave but little soil deep enough for culture.
The smooth slopes by which the invader from the north approaches the Alma are contrasted by the aspect of the country on the opposite bank of the river ; for there, the field is so broken up into hills and valleys, — into steep acclivities and nar- row ravines — into jutting knolls and winding gullies, — that with the labouring power of a Eussian army, and the resources of Sebastopol at his command, a skilled engineer would have found it hard to exhaust his contrivances for the defence of a ground having all this strength of feature.
It is the hi<di land nearest to the shore which
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 3
falls most abiuptly : for when a man turns his CHAP.
back to the sea, and rides np along the river's ' .
bank, the summits of the hills on his right recede from liim more and more — recede so far that, although they are higher than the hills near the shore, they are connected with the banks of the stream by slopes more gently inclining.
The main features of the ground arc these : first and nearest to the sea- shore there is what jnay be called the 'West Cliff — for the ground there rises to a height of some 350 feet, and not only presents, looking west, a bluff buttress of rock to the sea, but on its northern front also rises up so abruptly that a man going eastward along the bank of the stream has at first an almost sheer precipice on his right hand ; and it is only when he all but reaches the village of Almatamack that he finds the cliff losing its steepness. At that point, the ground becomes so much less precipitous, and is besides so broken, as to be no longer difiicult of ascent for a man on foot, nor even impracticable for country waggons. In rear — Russian rear — of the cliff there are the villages of Hadji-Boulat, Ulukul Tiouets, and Ulukul Aides.
Higher up the river, but joined on to the West Cliff, there is a height, which was crowned at the time of the war by an unfinished turret intended for a telegraph. This is the Telegraph Height. At their top, the West Cliff and the Telegraph Height form one connected plateau or table-land ; but the sides of the Telegraph Height have not
r.
4 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, the abrupt cliaracter wliicli marks the West Cliff. They are steep, but both towards the river and towards the east tliey are much broken up into knolls, ridges, hollows, and gullies. At all points they can be ascended by a man on foot, and at some l)y waggons. Tliese steep sides of the Telegraph Height are divided from the river by a low and almost flat ledge with a varying breadth of from two to six hundred yards. The ledge was a good deal wooded at the time of the war, and on some parts of it there were vineyards or orchards.
To the east of the Telegraph Height the trend- ing away of the hills leaves a hollow or recess, so formed and so placed that its surface might be likened to a huge vine-leaf — a vine-leaf placed on a gentle incline, witli its lower edge on the river, its stem at the bridge, and its main fibre following the course of the great road which bends up over the hill towards Sebastopol. This opening in tlie hills is the main Pass ; and through it (as might be gathered from what has just been said) the Causeway or great post-road goes up, after cross- ing the bridge.* At right-angles to the line of the Pass, and crossing it at a distance of a few yards from the bridge, there are small natural mounds or risings of ground, having their tops at a height of about sixty feet above the level of the river. These are so ranged as to form, one with
* In speaking of tliis opening as a 'Pass,' 1 have followed the example of one whom I regard as a great master of the diction applicable to military suhjects ; but it is not, of course, meant llmt tliere is anything at all Alpine in the character of this range of low hills— hills less than 400 feet hi''h.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 6
the other, a low and uneven but almost conlinu- CHAP.
ous embauknieut, running from east to west, and '. —
parallel witli the river. Tiie natural rampart thus formed controls the entrance to the Pass from the north ; for it not only overlooks tlie bridge, but also commands the ground far and wide on both sides of the river, and on both sides of the great road. Behind, the ground falls and then rises again, till it mingles with the slopes and the many knolls and hillocks which connect it witli tlie receding flanks of the Telegraph Height on the one side, and the Kourgane Hill on the other. Still higher up the river, but receding from it in a south - easterly direction, the ground rises gradually to a commanding height, and terminates in a peak. This hill is the key of the position.* It is called the Kourgan^ Hill. Around its slopes, at a distance of about three hundred yards from the river, the oround so swells out as to form a strong rib — a rib which bends round the front
* This assertion was denied by a commentator in tlie 'Qunr- ' terly Review,' wlio professed to write witli military knowledge. It may therefore be well to give here the following extract from Lord Raglan's j)nblished despatch : ' The high pinnacle and ' ridge before alluded to was the key of the position, and, con- ' seijuentl}-, there the greatest preparations had been made for 'defence.' — Published Desjmtch of the 2Zd Septcmhcr 18.54. Probably no living man is a better judge of wiuit is the true ' key ' of a position than Sir John Burgoyne. Now, I have be- fore me a manuscript in his handwriting, which he wrote at the time, and whilst he was still on the banks of the Alma. In that paper he says: 'The high pinnacle and ridge on the ' right' [he is speaking of the Russian right, and of the Kourgan^ IHIl] ' was the key of the yoiiiion if attacked in front.' — A'oi« W 4iA Edition.
6 BATTLE OF TIIH ALMA.
C H A 1'. and the flanks of the bastion there built by nature, ' giving a conmiand towards the south-west, the west, tlie north-west, and tlie north-east. Towards tlie west, tliis terrace, if so it may be called, is all but joined to those mounds which we spoke of as barring the entrance of the Pass, liehind all these natural ramparts there are hollows and dips in the ground, which give ample means for con- cealing and sheltering troops ; but from the jut- ting rib down to the bank of the river, the slope is gentle and smooth like the glacis of a fortress. It was on this Kourgan^ Hill that Prince iMent- schikoff established h-is headquarters.
Tiie immediate approach to the river from its right bank is everywhere gentle, but the ground on its south side is a good deal scarped by the action of the water; and all along that part of the river which flows opposite to the Kourgan6 Hill and the main Pass, the left bank rises almost vertically from the water's edge to a height of from eight to fifteen feet.
On the north bank of the river, and at a dis- tance of about a mile from its mouth, there is the villaQ,e of Almatamack. On tlie same bank, but more than a mile and a quarter higher up the stream, there stood at the time of the war a large white homestead. Yet a mile higher up the river on the same bank, and nearly facing the entrance of the Pass, there stands the large strag- gling village of Bourliouk. Tlie cottages and farm- buildings which skirt this village on its eastern side extend far up the river. From Bourliouk to
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 7
the easternmost part of the position the distance char
is two miles. '___
To ascend the position from the north there are several frequented ways : —
1. Close to the sea and to the mouth of the river, there is a singular fissure in the rock through which there bends a path leading up to tlie top of the cliff.
2. From the ford at the viHage of Almata- mack there is a waggon-road which leads up to the top of the plateau. It was difficult hut still practicable for artillery,
3. From the white homestead there is a road which crosses the river and goes up to the plateau ; but, eitlier owing to the want of a good ford, or else to the ruggedness of the ascent beyond it, this road could not be used for artillery. The want of a road for their guns in this part of the field was a circumstance which grievously hampered the advance of the French army.
4. On the western side of the village of Bour- liouk there is a frequented ford across the river, and from that spot two waggon-roads, forking off at no great distance from one another, lead up to the Telegraph and the villages in its rear. The westernmost of these roads was found to be prac- ticable for artillery.
5. Opposite to Bourliouk two almost parallel waggon-roads lead up from the bank of the river to the top of the plateau.
6. The Great Causeway, or post-road leading from Eupatoria, goes through the eastern skirts of
8 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
Bouiiiouk, there crosses the bridge, then enters tlie Pass, and ascends by a gentle incline towards the low chain of mounds higher up. After pierc- ing that natural rampart, it bends into the south- erly course which leads it to Sebastopol.
7. To the east of the main Pass there were other roads leading up from tlie banks of the river; but they need not be specially designated, because, even where no road existed, the hill-side in this part of the field was accessible to the march of artillery.
Except at the "West Cliff, every part of the posi- tion can be reached by men on foot.
In the rear — Eussian rear — of the hills which form this position, the ground falls, and it lises a^aiu at a distance of two miles.
Down to the edge of the vineyards, the whole of the field on the north or right bank of the river is ground tempting to cavalry ; and although the south side of the stream is marked, as we saw, by stronger features, still the summits of the heights spread out broad, like English 'Downs.' Except the sheer sides of the Clilf, and the steeps of the Telegraph Height, there is little on the hiffher o-vound to obstruct the manoeuvres of horsemen.
Eroui the sea -shore to the easternmost spot oc- ciipied by liussian troops, the distance for a man going straight was nearly five miles and a half; but if he were to go all the way on the liussian bank of the river he would have to pass over more ground ; for the Alma liere makes a sti'ong bend.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 9
aud leaves open the chord of the arc to invaders chap. who come from the north.* .
IT.
Against any plan for occupying the whole of tliis range of hills by the forces of the Czar there were two cogent reasons: for the summits of the West Clilf, aud even of part of the Telegraph Height, were exposed to fire from the ships, and tlie ground was too wide for the numbers that could be brought to defend it.
But the whole of the naval and military re- Mentschi-
,,. Ill 1 ^ 1 l^ Uoffs Jil.iii
sources of the Uriinea had been entrusted to the for availing direction of Prince jMentschikoflf. AVith him it the posiiioa rested to make head against the invasion ; and it seems he had been so forcibly struck with the great apparent steepness of the West Cliff and the heights connected with it, that he thought it must be wholly inaccessible to troops. He conceived, therefore, that he might safely omit to occup)'' it, and might be content to take up a comparatively narrow position, beginning on the eastern slopes of the Kourgane Hill, and termi-
* See the maps at the eud of the volume. I am aware that in distances, ami in other material points, this description of the position differs widely from the result of the hasty surveys wliich were made soon after the battle, by English ollicers. Tlie French Government plans bear such strong marks of having been made with great care and labour, that, in geueritl, 1 have ventured to take them fur my guide in preference 'jO those of my own countrymen.
10 KATTLH OF TlIK ALMA.
CHAP, nutiiig on the west of the Telegraph Height at a
. '. distance ot" two miles from the sea. In tliat
way he thonglit he might elude both of the o])jections above stated ; for his extreme left would be comi)aratively distant from the ship- ping, and the whole ground occupied would be so far contracted that the troops which he had at his command might suffice to hold it. Upon tliis plan he acted. So, although the position of the Alma, as formed by nature, had an extent of more than five miles, the troops which stood charged to hold it had a front of only one league. l*rince Mentschikoff's resolve was based npon an as- sumption that the whole of the ground which he proposed to leave unoccupied was inaccessible to troops ; but if he had walked his horse into the waggon-track, which was within half a mile of his extreme left, he would have found that it led down to a ford opposite to the village of Almatamack, and that, although it is true very steep, the road could still be ascended by artillery. His army had been on the ground for several days, yet, with a strange carelessness, he not only omitted to break up or to guard this road from Almatamack, but based all his dispositions upon the apparent belief that the natural strengtli of the ground secured him against .any hostile approach at- tempted in that ])art of the lield. H«8 forces. The forccs brought forward to defend this position for tlie Czar were IG squadrons of regu- lar cavalry, besides 11 sotnias of Cossacks, with 44 battalions of infantry supported by 10 bat-
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 11
teries;* and, unless tliere be some grave source chap. of error in computations long accepted as sound, ^' these bodies comprised altogether a strength of 39,000 (of whom 3G00 were horsemen), witli as many as 96 guns.-f-
Prince jNlentschikoff commanded in person His personal He was a \vayward, presumptuous man, and ^''*' '""' his bearing towards the generals under his com- mand wa,s of such a kind that he did not or could not strengthen himself by the counsels of men abler than himself. J In times past, he had been mutilated by a round-shot from a Turkish gun. He bore hatred against the Ottoman race ; he bore hatred against their faith. He had opened his mis- sion at the Porte with insult ; he had closed it with threats. And now — a sequence rare in the lives of modern statesmen — he was out on a hill-side, with horse and foot, having warrant — full warrant this time — to adduce 'the last reason of kings.'
So far as regards the general scheme of the
* General Todleben puts the number of battalions at 42^ instead of 44 ; but except as regards that small difference (which I deal with elsewhere) his conclusion as to the number of squadrons, sotnias, battalions, and guns is exactly the sama as the one above stated.
+ See No. II. of the Appendix. General Todleben ]iuts the cavalry at 3C00, in accordance with this statement ; hut, as re- gards the computation resulting in the sum above stated, lie differs very widely indeed, and therefore it is that I have re- sorted to the carefully qualified, and even conditional, language above appearing. The subject will be found fully treated in No. I. of the Appendix.
J I infer this from tlie fact that, the day before the action, General Kiriakoff, an officer of high reputation, was attempting indirect methods of calling Prince Mentschikoff''s attention to the defectiveness of liis arrangements. — Kiriukqff'a Stutanent.
12 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, campaign, liis conception, it seems, was this: ho ' would sufler the Allies to land without raolesta-
l^in.^It.?,."^ ^'5 on, because he desired that the defeat which lie was preparing for them should bo, not a mere repulse, but a crushing and signal disaster. He would nut attack them on their line of march, because he liked better to husband his strength f(H' the great position on the Alma. It seemed to him that there he could hold his ground against the invaders for three weeks ; and his imagina- tion was that, baffled for many days by the strength of his position, drawing their supplies from the ships with pain and uncertainty, and encumbered more and more every day with wounded men, the Allies would fall into evil days. In tlie mean time, the troops long since de- spatched from Bessarabia would begin to reach him by way of Perekop and Simphcropol ; and thus reinforced, he would in due season take the offensive, inflicting upon the Western Powers a chastisement commensurate with their rashness.
His reliance Priucc Mcutschikoff Tcstcd this structure of
on the
uaturai hopc UDon tlic assumptiou that he could hold the
Btreugth of ^ ^ ^
the position, position ou the Alma for at the least many days together, and against repeated assaults. Yet he took little pains to prepare the ground for a great defence.* On tlie jutting rib which goes round tlie front of the Kourgan^ Hill, at a distance of
* I say tins in tlie teeth of the English desjiatclies, and, I fear, of nuiny written and oral statements from oflScers ; but 1 am sure that every engineer who saw the ground will support my assertion.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 13
about 300 yards from the river, he threw up a chap. breastwork — a -vvorlc of a very slight kind, pre- '
senting no physical obstacle to the advance of ^et(J^^fo^ troops, but sufficiently extended to be capable of cnin'lfii." receiving the twelve heavy guns witli which he armed it.* This work, on the day of the battle, was called by our people the 'Great Redoubt.' f Trince Mentschikoff was delighted with it. ' Is ' not this a grand thing ? ' said ho to General Kiriakoff the day before the action; 'see, it will ' do mischief both ways.' And he then pointed out how, whilst the face of the redoubt com- manded the smooth slope beneath it, the guns at the shoulder of the work would throw their fire across the great road on either side of the bridge.
* In speaking of this field-work, one of tlie Reviewers ex- pressed a belief 'that its armament consisted of six or eight, not guns of 'position, but field-gnns and liowitzers.' As to the number of the guns, I rely upon Prince GortscliakofT iiimself, as well as upon General de Todleben, p. 173. And in proof tiiat they were ' guns of position ' I say tliat the two of them which were captured by our army are now at Woolwiuli, and liave been duly measured. The report from Woolwich snys : — 'The calibres of the guns taken at tlie Alma were as follow : — • Bnuss shot-gun, . . 4.82 inches. ,, howitzer, . . 6.12 ,,
t The work was formed by cutting a shallow trcncli and throwing up the earth in front of it. In calling this and the other entrenchment ' redoubts,' I follow tlie language very gen- erally used by our officers on the day of the battle ; but they were open towards the rear, and therefore, of course, the use of the term in its special sense would be inaccurate. The word, however (like some others, as, e.g., the word 'ship'), has a gen- eral, as well as a special, meaning, and, accordingly, St Arnaud, in his official despatch, calls these works 'rcdoutes.' Sir Colin Campbell, in his despatch, also calls tiie greater of tlie two works a * redoubt.'
14 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP. On the same hill, hut higher up and more to
. ! his right, the Prince threw up another slight
breastwork, which he armed with a battery of field-guns. Tiiis was the Lesser Redoubt.
The vineyards at some points were marked and cleared so as to give full effect to the action of the artillery ; but except the two redoubts, no fiehl- works were constructed by the Eussian Generah Wilful and confident, he was content to rest mainly upon the natural strength of the ground, the valour of his troops, and the faith that he had in his own prowess as a commander. lie even omitted, as we have seen, to break np or to guard the waggon-road which led np from Almatamack to the left of his position. The Prince did not attempt to occupy the West Cliff; but some days before the action, a battalion * supported by half a battery had been placed overlooking the sea in the village of Ulukul Akles, in ordei-, as was said, to ' catch marauders,' or to prevent a descent from the sea in the rear of the Piussian army ; and the detachment remained in that part of the field until the time when the battle began. Disi.osi- On the IcdLre M'hich divided the river from the
tlOlinfluS '^
troois. steep broken side of the Telegraph Height Prince Mentschikoff placed four Militia -|- battalions, and
* The Ko. 2 battalion of Minsk.
+ I adopt tliis inaccurate term as the hest T can find to de- scribe these scnii-regular troops, becanse to call them, as the Russians do, 'reserve battalions,' would tend to confuse, by suirr^estiuf^ the iclea of 'reserves' in the ordinary sense. I thought at one time I might liave called them ' depot battal-
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 15
Buppovted them by three battalions of rcguhir chap. infantry,* placed only a liundred and fifty yards .
in their rear, and by a fourth battalion f drawn up in a neighbouring ravine.:[; Further still in rear, he held in hand, as a reserve for his left wing, the four battalions of the ' JNIoscow ' corps which had joined him that niorning.§ At the commencement of the action, these thirteen bat- talions, with one or two companies of the 6lli Ilifles, and a ten-gun battery of artillery,!! were Fr.irrs the only forces occupying the part of the position posted in then about to be assailed by the French. They the position
, assaileil by
formed the left wing of the Paissian army, and tLeFreuch: were commanded by General Kiriakoff.
In this western part of the position the ground at the time of the battle had not been strength- ened by field-works.
In the main Pass, facing the bridge, and des- tined to confront the 2d Division of the English army, Prince Mentschikoff placed four battalions of light infantry ,11 with also some portion of the
' ions,' but upon the wliole it seemed to me that the toiTA 'militia' would be less likely to convey a wrong notion than the term 'dep6t.* They are troops regarded as very inferior in quality to troops of the line. The four battalions which 1 call ' militia' wore the 'reserve' battalions of the 13th Division. — A n itchkoff, Chodaslcwkz.
* Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of the Taroutine corps. — Ilnd.
+ The No. 1 battalion of the same corps. — Ibid.
+ Chodasiewicz.
§ The battalions of the Moscow corps. — Anitclikoff^Clmdasiewicz.
II Viz., the No. 4 battery of the 17th brigade of artillery. —Todlcbcn, p. 177.
H The foui 1 iittalions of the Borodino corps. — Anitchkofl, Chodasiavlc:, I'odkhcn,
16 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
cu A r. Gth lUflcs ; * and some of these troops had orders • to advance and skirmish in the vineyards. Near Tdg^naiiy ^^^^ bridge, and with materials in readiness for {i?ep'irt"of destroying it, there was posted a battalion of sap- assai'iedV.y" P^s and mlners. f Astride the gi-eat road, and the English, disposed along the chain of hillocks which runs across tlie Pass looking down on the bridge, there were planted the sixteen pieces of field-artillery which are here termed 'the Causeway batteries,' J whilst eight other guns placed furtlier eastward connected the defences here ranged with those of the Kourgane Hill. § The force in this part of the field formed the centre of the Uussian line of battle, and was practically under the orders of Prince Gortschakolf, || who also, however, com- manded the whole of the enemy's right wing.
The right wing of the Russian army was the force destined to confront, first our Light Division, and then the Guards and the Highlanders. It was posted on the slopes of the Kourgane Hill. Here was the Great Eedoubt, armed with its
* Anilchkoff, Cliodasiewlcz, Todlrbcn.
+ Anitclikoff .speaks of tliis body as a whole battalion, but Grncral de Todleben calls it only a half battalion.
X Prince GoitschakofT says that the Causeway j,Tins were eighteen in number.
§ The 2i giins above mentioned were furnished by the two 12-gun Light batteries, Nos. 1 and 2 of the ICth Artillery brigade. — Anitclikoff, Chodadcwicz, 'fudlchcn.
II The Borodino corps formed part of General KiriakofTs command ; but the nature of the ground and the course which the action took prevented him from having it in his actual con- trol ; and Gortschakoffwas the General to whom the corps had to look for guidance.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 17
twelve heavy j^uiis;* and Prince Meutscliikoff cilAP was so unsparing of efforts to defend this part of '
the ground, that he gathered, on the slopes of the hill, a force of no less than sixteen battalions of regular infantry ,-|- besides the two battalions of sailors, I and in addition to the twelve guns last mentioned, four batteries of field -artillery.§ The right of the forces on the Kourgane Hill rested on a slope to the east of the Lesser Ee- doubt, II whilst their left touched those other de- fences wh.ich barred, as we saw, the great road. Twelve of the battalions of regular infantiy were posted on the flanks of the Great Redoubt ; whilst the other four battalions, drawn up in one massive column, were held as a reserve for the right wing on the higher slope of the hiil. One of the field-
* No. 1 12-gun battery of position, IGtli Artillery Brigade. — Todleben.
+ The four battalions of the Kaxan, or Prince Jlichael's corps, the four battalions of the Vladimir corps, the four bat- talions of the Sousdal corps, and the four battalions of the Uglitz corps. — Anitchhoff, C'hodasiewicz, Todlehen.
J Chodasiewicz. AnitehkofT calls this force a half battalion only; and Todleben speaks of it as one battalion; but C'ho- dasiewicz saw the two battalions in march with their four guns, and I accept his statement, for he was an admirably accurate observer. Before the action began these seamen were thrown forward as skirniishers, and endeavoured to operate in the vine- yards which belt the right bank of the river, but were after- wards withdrawn to the Kourgane Hill.
§ Two of the 14th Artillery Brigade, and two of the Don Cossack Batteries. The five batteries altogetlier numbered 44 guns. — Todleben.
II From the Lesser Kedoubt there were only fired five guns at tlie time when the Highlanders advanced ; but it is believed thit tlie three additional guns requisite to complete the battery were in the work at the beginning of the action. VOI^ in. B
18
BATTLE OF TIIH ALMA.
CHAP. I.
Formation ortlje Kussian Infantry.
Latteries armed the Lesser Iiedoubt, another was on tlie higli gronnd commanding and supporting the Great Hedoubt, and two were hekl in reserve.* Though subordinated to Prince Gortscliakoff, General Kvetzinski was in immediate command of the troops in this part of the field.
As regards the formation of the Russian infan- try in this and other parts of tlie fiekl, it may be said, speaking generally, that those battalions which operated in the immediate rear of the skirmishers were broken up into columns of com- l-)anies, whilst tlie battalions supporting them stood massed in columns of attack.
On his extreme right, and posted at intervals along a curve drawn from his right front to his centre rear, Prince JMentschikoff placed his six- teen squadrons of regular cavalry and his eleven sotnias of Cossacks, making up altogether a force of 3600 horsemen.
Thus, then, it was to bar the Pass and the great road, to defend the Kourgan^ Hill and to cover his right flank, that the Russian General gathered his main strength ; and this was the part of the field destined to be assailed by our troops. That portion, of the Russian force which directly con-
* Although I necessarily gather the minibers and ilcscrip- tions of tliese forces from Kussian authorities, I draw nuR-h of my knowledge of the way in which they were disposed from the observation of ourofHcers ; and it should he observed that the above description, so far as concerns the cavalry, applies rather to the state of the field at the time when the battle was going on, than to the disi)Ositions which Prince Mcntschikofl" may have made in the earlier part of the day.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 19
fronted the English army, consisted of twenty- chap,
seven squadrons or sotnias of horse, with twenty- three battalions of infantry, besides the before- mentioned part of the 6th Fiiflcs, and was sup- ported by sixty -eight guns.*
But besides this force, Prince Mentschikolf, at the commencement of the action, had posted across the great road leading down to the bridge a force of seven battalions of infantry,-]- with two batteries J of artillery. These troops he called his ' Great JJeserve ; ' and they were, in fact, his last. § Yet he held them so closely in rear of the battalions facing the bridge, that they might be regarded as forces actually operating in support. Plainly this disposition of his troops was governed by a keen anxiety to defend the great road and the Kourgane Hill — for it was so ordered that, to sustain the struggle there, it would cost him but a few moments to bring his last reserves into action ; and, in truth, he committed himself so
• TodkUn, p. 178. Viz. :—
Causeway batteries, . , . 16
Adjoining batteiy, ... 8
Kourgau^ do., ... 44
68 t The four battalions of the Volhynia corps, and three bat- talions, Nos. 1, 3, 4, of the Minsk cor\)5.—Aniichl:off, Cliod- asiewicz, Todlehe.n.
J No. 5 light battery of the 17th brigade of Artillery, and the No. 12 troop of Horse- Artillery. — Todleben, p. 173.
§ The sixteen squadrons of regular cavalry were also con- sidered as a part of this ' Great Reserve ; ' but, as we liave seen, tlipy did not remain posted on the same ground as the infantry reserve.
I.
20 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, deeply to this, liis favourite part of tlie battle- • field, that, when he afterwards endeavoured to shift a portion of the Great Reserves towards his left, he was unable to make their strength tell. Forces of Tlie forces with which the Allied commanders
prepared to assail tliis position M-ere thus com- posed : There were some 30,000 French infantry and artillerymen,* with sixty - eight guns ; and, added to this force, under the command of the INIarshal St Arnaud, was the division of 7000 Turkish infantry.-}- With Lord Eaglan, and present under arms, there was a force of fully 1000 cavalry, 25,000 :|: infantry and artillerymen, and sixty pieces of field-artillery. § In all, the Allied armies advancing upon the Alma com- prised near 63,000 men and 128 guns.
St Arnaud, with his 37,000 infantry and artil- lerymen and sixty - eight guns, and effectually supported by the fire of nine war-steamers, || was destined to confront at the commencement of the
* 'Precis Ilistorique,' pp. 101, 102, which gives 30,204 as the total, but that is a computation of the force embarked ; and, since cholera was prevailing, the deductions from strength be- tween the 7th and the 20th of the month must have brought the numbers below 30,000.
+ Ibid.
t Or, speaking more closely, 24,400. The 'morning state' which I have before me is of the 18th September, and it gives as present under arms (without including the cavalry, of which there was no ' state ') a total of 26,004 officers and men, and, de- ducting the 1600 men detached under Colonel Torrens, there remained 24,404 infantry and artillerymen.
§ The official 'state' prepared for Lord Eaglan gives two troops of horse-artillery, and only seven batteries, but it omits the liattery attaclied to the 4th Division.
U Official despatch of Admiral Hauielin.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 21
action much less than ono-tliird part of the PiUS- chap. sian force ;* whilst much more than the other ,
two-thirds of it was left to the care of the Eng- lish. St Arnaud, with his Frenchmen alone, was to his then confronting adversaries in a proportion not very far differing from that of three to one ; and tlie 7000 Turks that he also commanded in- creased yet further his great numerical preponder- ance, whilst, moreover, of guns he had sixty-eight to ten. Lord Raglan, on the other hand, was upon the whole fairly matched by his appointed antagon- ists in numbers of men and guns ; f but the dis- tinguishing characteristic of the task that awaited him was this : — he had to attack troops entrenched, and entrenched too upon very strong ground.
The heights about to be invaded by the French The tasks presented grave physical obstacles to their ad- by tiie vance, but the greater part of them were unde- theEngUsh fended by troops, and had nowhere been strength- ened by field-works. The ground attacked by the English did not oppose great physical obstacles to the advance of the assailants, but it had been entrenched, and, besides, was so formed by nature as to give great destructive power, and, by con- sequence, great strength, to an enemy defending it with the resources of modern warfare.]: The
* Tlie iiroportion clianp;ed afterwards, as will be liy-and-by .shown.
t In the Ap]tendL\; No. II., the proportions are shown with more particularity ; and the two la.st footnotes annexed to the Table there given show the changes that those proportions underwent in the course of tlie action.
+ In these days, mere inert physical obstacles are commonly
22
BATTLE OF THE AUIA.
CHAP.
I.
French were covered and su])ported on their right by tlie sea and the ships ; on their left, by the Enghsh army. The English were covered on their right by the French, but they marched with their left flank quite bare. The French advanced upon heights well surveyed from the sea. Ex- cept in an imperfect way from maps, the English knew nothing of the ground before them. No deserters, no spies had come in.
Conference the ni^'ht before the battle be- tween St Arnaud and Lord Raglan.
Ill,
Late in the evening of the 19th, Marshal St Arnaud, attended by Colonel Trochu, rode up to the little post-house on the Bulganak in which Lord Raglan had established his quarters. He came to concert a plan of attack for the following day.
From on board their ships the French had long been busily engaged in surveying the enemy's posi- tion, and by this time they had gathered a good deal of knowledge of that part of the ground which lies near the sea-shore. They had ascertained, or found means of inferring, that the stream was fordable at its mouth, and they moreover assured themselves that, at the time of their last observa- tions, the West Cliff was not occupied in strength by the enemy. Upon these important discoveries
overcome or eluded ; and the security of tlie defender depends not in general upon those geogi-aphical features which would make access difficult for travellers, but rather upon such a con- formation of ground as will give him the means of doing harm to his assailants.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 23
Marshal St Arnaud based his ydan of attack. He chap. proposed that the war-steamers, closiug in as nearly '
as was practicable, should move parallel with the ^lau.^"'"''"'* land-forces, and a little in advance ; that, under cover of their fire, a portion of the French force should advance along the shore and seize the "West Cliff; and that this movement should be followed up by a resolute, vigorous, and unremitting attack upon the enemy's left flank and left front.* !M. St Arnaud was at this time free from pain ; and, knowing that now, at last, he had an enemy in his front, and that a great conflict was near at hand, he seemed to be fired with a more than healthy energy. Sometimes in English, sometimes in the rapid words of liis own tongue, and always with vehement gesture, he laboured to show how sure it was that the attack from his right centre would be fierce, unrelentinf]^, decisive. Lord Eaglau, The part
, ' . . , ' takeu br-
east in another mould, sat quiet, with governed LordHag-
' i- > o Ian at the
features, restraining — or only, perhaps, postpon- coufereLca. ing — his smiles, listening graciously, assenting, or not dissenting, putting forward no plan of his own, and, in short, eluding discussion. This method, perhaps, w^as instinctive with him ; but, in his intercourse with the French, he followed it deliberately and upon system. He never forgot tliat to keep good our relations with the French was his great duty ; and, studying how best to
* The plan was like that of the j^reat Freileiick at LciUhcn, but with the difrerence that the force advancing to turn the enemy's left was to be covered and supported by fire from tha shipping.
24 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, avert the danger of misuuderstaiulings, he had
. L_ already made it his maxim tliat there was hardly
any danger so great as the danger of controversy. AVhether in any even small degree the English General had been brought to share the opinion entertained of j\T. St Arnaud in the French capi- tal and in the French army, the world will never know. Of a certainty, Lord Eaglan dealt as though he held it to be a clear gain to be able to avoid entrusting the Marshal with a Icnowledj^e of what our army wo\dd be likely to undertake ; but my belief is that this, his seemingly guarded method, was not so much based upon anything v/liich may have come to his ears from Paris or from the French camp, but rather upon his desire to ward off controversy, and upon his true native English dislike of all premature planning. He was so sure of his troops, and so conscious of his own power to act swiftly when the occasion might come, that, although he was now within half a march of the enemy's assembled forces, he did not at all long to ruflle his mind with projects — with projects for the attack of a position not hitherto reconnoitred.
M. St Arnaud's plan of turning the enemy's left was to be executed by the French army, with the aid of the shipping ; and the part which the English land-forces should take in the action was a matter distinct. But for this, also, the French commander and his military counsellors had care- fully taken thought.
To illustrate the operations which he proposed,
BATTLE OF THE Al.MA. 25
^I. St Arnaiul produced a rough map, — a map cHAP. slightly and rapidly drawn, yet traced with that '
spirit and significance which are characteristic of ^,7^,';^ •''''" French military sketches. In this sketch Bos- Z^^;;" quet's Division and the Turkish troops were """^■ represented as effecting the turning movement on the enemy's left; and the 1st and 3d French Divisions were shown to be so deployed, and so placed, that, in the order of attack assigued to them by the sketch, they would confront almost the whole face of the enemy's position, leaving only one or two battalions to be dealt with in front by the English troops.* So, to find some occupation for the English, the sketch represent- ed our army as filing away obliquely, in order to turn the enemy's right flank. Of course this plan rested entirely upon tlie assumption that tlie enemy's front would be fully occupied (as represented in the sketch) by the French attack.
Lord Eaglan's experience or instinct told him that no such plan as this could go for much until the assailing forces should come to measure their line with that of the enemy. So, without either combating or accepting the suggestion addressed to him, he simply assured the ^Marshal that he might rely upon the vigorous co-operation of the
•See the fac-simile of this plan, taken fioni the 'Pieces ' OSicielles,' published by the French Government. — £nd of Note to \st Edition.
My justification for saying (in the corner of the plan) that it was 'untntbj stated to have been accepted by Lord Raglan,' will be found in succeeding pages, and in particular at pp. 259, 276, 277.— Note to ith Edition.
26 r.ATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP. Britisli army. The French plan seems to have
. made little impression on Lord Eaglan's mind.
lie foresaw, perhaps, that the ingenuity of the evening would be brought to notliingness l)y the teachings of the morrow. stAnmiKVs Whilst the French Marshal -was striving, in
deiueaiiour. , . i • ^ ,• ^
ins vehement way, to convey an idea ot tlie vigour with which he would conduct the attack, his appointed adviser, Colonel Trocliu, whose mission it was to moderate the fire of his chief, thought it right to interpose with a question of a practical kind — a question as to the time and place for relieving the French soldiers of their packs. Instantly, if so one may speak, St Arnaud reared, for Trochu had touched him with the curb, and in the presence, too, of Lord Eaglan. He angrily suppressed the question of the packs as one of mere detail. Yet, on the afternoon of the morrow, that question of the packs was destined to recur, and to govern the movements of the whole French army.
Before the jNIarshal and Lord Raglan parted, it was agreed that Bosquet with his Division should advance at five o'clock in the morning, and that, two hours later, the rest of the Allied forces should begin their march upon the enemy's position. Result of This determination as to the time for marcliing
eiice. was almost the only fruit which St Arnaud drew
from the interview He had thought to engage his colleague in the plan contrived for the guid- ance of the English at the French headquarters ; but when he came to be in the presence of the
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 27
English General, ho unconsciously yiekled, as chap. other men commonly did, to the spell of his ,
personal ascendancy ; and although he showed the sketch, and may have uttered, perhaps, a few hurried words to explain its meaning, he did not effectually bring himself to proffer advice to Lord Piaglan. Either lie altogether omitted the intended counsel, or else he so slurred it over as not to win for it any grave notice from even the most careful of listeners.
When the conference ended, Lord Eaglan came out with his guests to the door of the hut. M. St Arnaud mounted his horse, and was elate ; hut he was elate, not with the knowledge of having achieved a purpose, but rather, it would seem, from the sense of that singular comfort which anxious men always derived from the mere power of Lord Eaglan's presence. Perhaps, when the Marshal reached his quarters, he began to see that, after all, there was a gulf between him and the English General, and that, notwithstanding his energy and boldness, he had been unaccount- ably hindered from passing it.
IV.
It had been determined that the troops should March of
the Alliefi
cet under arms without bugle or drum.
Silently, therefore, on the morning of the 20th of September 1854, the men of the Allied armies rose from their bivouac, and made ready for the march which was to bring them into the presence
28 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP of the enemy. It was so early as lialf-past five • that Bosquet, with the 2d French Division and the Turkish battalions, began his march along the coast; and at seven o'clock the main body of the French army was under arms and ready to march. But the position taken up by the Eng- lish for the defence of the Allied armies on the Bulganak had imposed upon Lord Raglan the necessity of showing a fi'ont towards the east ; and for the Divisions so employed a long and toilsome evolution was needed in order to bring them into Cst'MCi de- the general order of march.* At that time too, march of'* there was a broad interval between our extreme army"^"'' right and Prince Napoleon's Division. Moreover, the line of the coast which the armies were to follow trended away towards the south-west, forming an obtuse angle with the course of the stream (the Bulganak) on which the Allies had bivouacked ; and in the movement requisite for adjusting the front of the Allied forces to the direction of the shore, the English, marching upon the exterior arc, had to undergo more labour than those who moved near the pivot on which the variation of front was effected. "f"
This was not all. The baggage-train accom-
* Those divisions had been posted nearly at right angles to the front line, and the segment in which the troops would have to wheel in order to get into the line of march would be nearly 90 degrees.
t Several military reports and documents explain this, but the plan prepared by the French Government shows with ad- mirable clearness the nature of the evolution which the English army had to perform. See the plan, No. 4, ' Invasion of the ' Crimea,' vol. ii. of Cabinet fldition.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 29
panying our forces, tliougli small in comparison chap. with the encumbrances usually attending an army " in the field, was large as compared with that of the French ; and Loi'd Kaglan (whose favourite anxiety was concerning his reserve ammunition) refused to allow the convoy to be stripped of pro- tection. The oblique movement of the troops to- wards their right was tending to leave the convoy uncovered ; and in order that it should be again enfolded, as in the previous day's order of march, it was necessary to move it far towards our right. Lord liaglan insisted that this should be done ; so on the morning of the long-expected battle, and with the enemy in front, St Arnaud and the whole French army, and the English army too, chafed bitterly at the delay they liad to endure whilst strings of bullock-carts were slowly dragged west- ward into the true line of march. Besides, the enemy's cavalry gave the English no leave to examine the ground towards which they were marching ; and whilst the Ei'ench, being next to the sea, could make straight for the cliff already reconnoitred from the ships, the English army advanced without knowledge of that part of the position which it was to confront, and was twice compelled to make laborious changes in the direc- tion of its march. Therefore, lor much of the delay which occurred there were good reasons ; but not for all. Sir George Brown liad been di- rected on the night of the 10th to advance on the morrow at seven o'clock, and he imagined — it h eti-ange if he, of all men, with his great knowledge
30 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
c H A P. of such things, was wrong upon a point of military
. '. usage — he imagined that the order would be re- peated in the morn-ng, and heAvaited accordingly. Also the Englisli troops moved slowly. Time was growing to be of high worth, and from causes which justified a good deal, though not quite all, of their delay, the English at this time were behindhand. In order that the operations of the day might be adjusted to the time which the English army required, orders were sent forward suspending for a while the advance of Bosquet's column ; and at nine o'clock the main body of the French army came to a halt, and cooked their coffee. Whilst they rested, our troops, by moving obliquely to- wards their right, were slowly overcoming the distance which divided them from tlie French left, and were at the same time working their way through the angle which measured their diverg- ence from the line of march.
Of those composing an armed force there arc few who understand the hindrances which block its progress; and naturally the French were vexed by the delay which seemed to be caused by the slowness of the English army. They, however, conformed with great care to the tardiness of our advance, and even allowed our army to gain upon them ; for when the Allies reached the ground which sloped down towards the Alma, the heads of our leading columns were abreast of the French skirmishei'S.*
• Lord Rnglan was amongst tliose who observed this fact, and he stated it in a letter which is before me.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 31
Meanwhile tlie Allied steamers had been seek- CHAP.
ing opportunities for bringing their guns to bear, *
and at twenty minutes past ten they opened fire.*
One or two of their missiles, though at a very long range, reached some of those liussian bat- talions which stood posted in rear of the Telegraph.
At half-past eleven o'clock the English right had got into direct contact with the Trench left, and our Light and 2d Divisions were marching in the same alignment as the 1st and 3d Divisions of our French Allies.
Twice again there were protracted halts. The The last last of these took place at a distance of about a Aiiics before
mile and a half from the banks of the Alma From the spot where the forces were halted the ground sloped gently down to the river's side ;
* Private MS. by Mr riomaine, the Judge-Advocate. I may here say generally, to avoid repeated notes, that, whenever in my account of this battle I speak of an event as happening at a time stated with exactness, I do so on the authority of Romaine. He was a man so gifted with long sight, as well as with power of estimating numbers, and, though a civilian, was so thorouglily apt for military business, that Lord Eaglan used at a later time to call liim ' the eye of the army.' During the action he rode an old hunter, steady enough to allow him to write without quitting his saddle : so, whenever he observed a change in the progress of the action, he took out his watch and pocket-book and made at the minute the memoranda on which I rely. 1 am, therefore, very certain that the spaces of time intervening be- tween any two events spoken of in this precise way were ex- actly those which I give ; but I liavo reason to think that the watches of men in tlie dilferent caiups had been difrereutly set.
Uie bailie.
32 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CIIAP. apcl tliougli some men lay prostrate under the
. burning sun, with little thought except of fatigue,
there were others who keenly scanned the ground before' them, well knowing that now at last the long-expected conflict would begin. They could make out the course of the river from the dark belt of gardens and vineyards which marked its banks ; and men with good eyes could descry a slight seam running across a rising-ground beyond the river, and could see, too, some dark squares or oblongs, encroaching like small patches of cul- ture upon the broad downs. The seam was the Great liedoubt ; the square-looking marks that stained the green sides of the hills vvere au army in order of battle.
That 20th of September on the Alma was like some remembered day of June in England, for the sun was unclouded, and the soft breeze of the morning had lulled to a breath at noontide, and was creeping faintly along the hills. It was then tliat in the Allied armies there occurred a singular pause of sound — a pause so general as to have been observed and remembered by many in re- mote parts of the ground, and so marked that its interruption by the mere neighing of an angry horse seized the attention of thousands ; and although this strange silence was the mere result of weariness and chance, it seemed to carry a meaning ; for it was now that, after near forty years of peace, the great nations of Europe were once more meeting for battle.
Even after the sailing of the expedition, the
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 33
troops had been followed by reports that the war, chap. after all, would be stayed ; and the long, frequent '
halts, and the quiet of the armies on the sunny slope, seemed to harmonise with the idea of dis- belief in the coming of the long-promised fight But in the midst of this repose Sir Colin Camp- bell said to one of his officers, * This will be a good ' time for the men to get loose half their cart- ' ridges ; ' * and when the command travelled on along the ranks of the Highlanders, it lit up the faces of the men one after another, assuring them that now at length, and after long expectance, they indeed would go into action. They began obeying the order, and with beaming joy, for they came of a warlike race ; "j'et not without emotion of a graver kind — they were young soldiers, new to battle.
VI.
Lord Eaglan now crossed the front of Prince Meeting Napoleon's Division in order to meet Marshal St st Amauii Arnaud, whose guidon was seen coming towards iiagiau our lines.-)- The two commanders rode forward
* The cartridges are delivered to each man iu a packet, and, to avoid loss of time in preseueo of the enemy, a sufficient number should be ' shaken loose ' before the troops are brought into action.
t They had met before at about half-past nine, but the Rus- sian cavalry had not then quitted the heights, and they were obliged to postpone their reconnaissance.
When tlio Marshal got near, he was cheered by the English soldiery. Pleased with the compliment, he lifted his hat, and said (speaking in English and with only a slight accent) — ' Hurrah for Old England ! '
VOL. in. 0
34 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, together, inclining towards tlieir left. No one
^' was with them. They rode on till they came to
one of those mounds or tumuli, of which there were many on the steppe. From that spot they scrutinised the enemy's position with their field- glasses.
At this interview no change was made in that portion of the plan which determined that the French should turn the enemy's left ; but the part to be taken by the English was still in question, and St Arnaud threw out or revived the idea of a flank movement by the English on the enemy's right.* Lord Kaglan, however, now gazed upon the real ground which the French counsellors of the night before had striven to scan in their im- aginations, and, having an eye for country, he must have begun to see the truth. He must have begun to see that the French, hugging the sea- shore, and pouring two-fifths of their whole force against the undefended part of the opposite heights, would not only fail to confront the whole Russian army in the way promised by the sketch, but would in reality confront only a small portion of it, leaving to the English the duty of facing the enemy along two-thirds of their whole front. Of a certainty he did not entertain for a moment the idea of making a flank attack, but it was not according to his nature to explain to men their errors, and it seems he spoke so little that St Arnaud did not yet know what the English General would do;* but presently, Sir George • fnferreil from what follows.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 36
Brown rode up and joined tlie two chiefs. Then CHAP.
the Marshal, closing his telescope, turned to 1_
Lord Eaglan and asked him ' whether he would ' turn the position or attack it in front ? ' Lord liaglan's answer was to the effect, that, ' with ' such a body of cavalry as the enemy had ' in the plain, he would not attempt to turn the ' position.' *
Whilst the chiefs were still side by side, it being now one o'clock, the advance sounded along the lines, and the French and the English armies moved forward close abreast. The Marshal then rode off towards his centre.
VIL
The orders for the advance were sent forward Bosquet's to Bosquet ; and, as soon as they reached him, he threw out skirmishers and moved forward in two columns. His right column was the brigade com- He uividos manded by General Bouat ; the left column was Auteniarre's brigade. IMoving with its regiments in column at section distance, each brigade was followed by its share of the artillery belonging to the Division ; and Bouat's brigade was followed by the whole of the Turkish Division except two battalions. Towards Bosquet's left, but far in his rear, there moved forward the 1st Division under
* This — heard and recorded in writing by Sir George Brown — disposes of the notion which seems to liave been really en- tertained by many of the French — the notion that Lord Raglan stood engaged to turn the enemy's right.
36 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP. Canrobert, and the od Division under Prince Napo • leon. These two divisions advanced in the same alignment. The 4th Division, under General J^'orey, marched in rear of the 1st and 3d Divi- sions, and two Turkish battalions escorted the baggage. Disjiositiou The formation of Canrobcrt's and Prince Napo- boayot' Icon's Divisions was upon two lines. The first
Uie French i-ip ,,... • r ^ ^ ^ i
army. brigade of each division was in Iront and deployed
into a line of columns, whilst the second brigade of each division followed the first brigade, and was massed with the regiments in column at section distance.
The 4th French Division marched in the same order as the 1st and 3d Divisions, except that its leading brigade was not deployed. The artillery of each division was enfolded between its two brigades,
oftheEiig- On the immediate left of the French, Sir De
lisli army. . .
Lacy Evans advanced with his 2d Division ; and being close alongside of Prince Napoleon's troops, he caused his own men to adopt a similar order of march. He Avas followed by Sir Pdchard Eng- land with our 3d Division in column. The bat- teries belonging to each of these divisions inarched on its right or inner flank.
Immediately on Sir De Lacy's left, the Light Division, preceded by Colonel Lawrence with a wing of the 2d Rille battalion in skirmishing order, moved forward under Sir George Brown.* The
* In former Editions I was led into the mistake of substitut- ing the name of Major Norcott for that of Colonel Lawrence, bj
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 37
Division was in dou1)le. column of" compimies from ciiAP, tlie centre, and had the front and left flank covered ^' by riflemen in extended order. It was supported by the 1st Division undertime Duke of Cambridge, and that in turn was followed by the 4th Division* under Sir George Cathcart. Sir George Cathcart, however, in accordance with a suggestion made by himself, was authorised to take ground to liis left, and place liis force in ^clielon to the 1st ]Jivi- sion. The head of his column was al)renst of the rear companies of the 1st Division.
Tlie three great infantry columns thus com- posing the left wing of our army were covered
what I must call the erroneous wording of Sir George Brown's Report to Lord Raglan. I say 'erroneous,' because, though Sir George Brown docs not, in terms, deny that the right wing of tlie 2d battalion of Rifles was fighting in front of his Division, he suppresses all mention of its achievements, and this in a despatch which gives a prominent place to the operations of the left wing under Major Norcott. In excuse for the error into which I was led by tn;sting too implicitly to Sir George Brown's Report, I may say that Lord Raglan also trusted to it, and was obviously misled by it into the adoption of the same mistake ; for although we now know that Lawrence and the men of the right T^-ing were among the foremost of those who stormed the redoubt, Lord Raglan— seeing no mention of this in Sir George Brown's Report, and observing that Sir George specially spoke of jMajor Norcott's wing as taking part with the 23d Regiment in the capture of the redoubt — was induced to speak of the aid given by Jlajor Norcott and the left wing of the Rifles, without speaking at all of the right wing, which was also taking a fore- most part in the storming of the redoubt, under the orders of Colonel Lawrence.
* Minus the 63d and some companies of the J 6th, left under the command of General Ton-ens at the place of disembarkation. The force actually with Sir George Cathcart during the action consisted of the 20th, 21st, and 57tli Regiments, the 1st battal- ion of Rifles, and Townsend's battery.
*32 ?S0
38 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, in front, left flank, and rear, by riflemen in ex-
[ tended order, and by tlie cavalry. The battery
belonging to each division marched on its right or inner flank.
Bat Colonel Lawrence with his riflemen soon got on so far in advance as to provoke a fire from the Eussian skirmishers then swarming in the vineyards below, and some rifle-balls sliot from that quarter came droyjping into the ground near the column formed by the Light Division. Almost at the same moment, the artillerymen on the Russian heights began to try their range ; and although the air was so clear that our men could see and watch the flight of the cannon-balls, it seemed prudent for our leading divisions to go into line. Those divisions, therefore, were halted, and their deployment immediately began. Tiie leading In deploying, Sir I)e Lacy Evans, being pressed the KngHsh upou by PHnce Napoleon's Division on his right, i'Mt'o\i'iie'' "^ was compelled to take ground to his left, and to encroach upon a part of the space which Sir George Brown had expected to occupy with his Division. Tiie Light The deployment of the Light Division was on its ngiit eff'ected by each regiment with beautiful pre- cision,* but, unhappily, the Division was not on its right ground.
Sir George Brown was near-sighted, and had
* The deplnj'ment was upon the two centre compaiiips of tlie division. "Wliilst the movement was proceeding, one man, a sergeant, was killed by a rifle-ball. This was probably the first death in our lines.
groiitiil.
BATTLE OF THE Al.MA. 39
not accustomed himself to repair the defect, as cHAP
some coniniauders have done, by a constant and .*. .
well-practised use of glasses; and, on the other hand, tlie very fire and energy of his nature, and his almost violent sense of duty, prevented him from getting into the liabit of trusting to the eyes of other men. For liours in the early morning the Division had been wearied by liaving to incline towards its right. At half-past eleven the effort was reversed, and the Division then laboured to take ground to its left ; but in that last direction it had not taken ground enough. Lord Kaglan, with his quick eye, had seen tho fault, and sent an order* to have it corrected. Not content with this, he soon after rode up to the Division, and, failing to see Sir George Brown at the moment, told Codiington that the Division nmst take more ground to the left. Then, un- happily, when he had uttered the very words which would have thrown the British army into its true array, and averted much evil. Lord Eaglan was checked by his ruling foible. He had already sent the order to the divisional general, and he could not bear to pain or embarrass him by press- ing the execution of it upon one of his brigadiers; so he recalled his wholesome words, f The Divi- sion failed to take ground enough to the left ; and when the deployment was complete. Sir George Brown had the grief of seeing his right
• Colonel Lysoiis carried it.
■^ I derive my knowledge from an officer who heard Lord Raglan's words.
40 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, regiment (the 7tli, tlie Royal Fusiliers) overlapped ^' by tlie left — nay, even by the centre — of Penne- fatlicr's brigade.* The fault was not retrieved, and we sliall see it embarrassing the dispositions that liad to be made for advancing in order of battle.
The artillery attached to our two leading divisions was now also drawn up in line, and Sir George Brown reckoned that he alone showed a front extending to nearly a mile.
At the same time, the Duke of Cambridge, at Sir George Brown's request, altered the forma- tion of his Division by distributing it into a line of contiguous quarter-distance columns. The march Tliese cliangcs having been completed, the English army resumed its march ; and the lead- ing divisions coming more closely within range, and being a little galled by the enemy's fire, Sir George Brown halted, and tried the experiment of wheeling into open column. Afterwards, how- ever, he returned to the line-formation, and in that order continued his advance. i*
VIII.
So now the whole Allied armies, hiding nothing
* When the deiiloyinent took place, tlie 7th, the Eoyal Fusiliers, were in rear of the 95th Regiment ; and they after- wards, as will he seen, marched through it.
t My knowledge respecting the movements and evolutions of our infantiy divisions is derived mainly from original ]\ISS. in my possession, written by Sir George Bi-own, the Duke o/ Cambridge, Sir De Lacy Evans, and Sir George Cathcart
continued.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 41
of llieir splendour and their strength, descended CHAP.
slowly into the valley; and the ground on the '—.
right hank of the river is so even and so gentle in its slope, and on the left hank so commanding, that every man of the invaders conld he seen from the opposite heights.
The Eussian officers had heen accustomed all spedacie
presenteil tn
their days to military inspections and vast reviews, tiicRussuins but they now saw before them that very thing vanceofthc for the confronting of which their lives had been one long rehearsal. They saw a European army coming down in order of battle — an army arrayed in no spirit of mimicry and not at all meant to aid their endless study of tactics, but honestly marching against them, with a mind to carry their heights and take their lives. And gazing with keen and critical eyes upon this array of strangers, whose homes were in lands far away, they looked upon a phenomenon A^-hich raised their curiosity and their wonder, and which promised, too, to throw some new light on a notion they had lately been forming.
The whole anxiety of Prince Mentschikoff had been for his right. If he could hold the main Pass, and scare the Allies from all endeavour to turn his right flank, he believed himself safe ; and it had been clear long ago that his conflict in this part of the field would be with the English. It was therefore the more useful to try to spread amongst the Uussian troops an idea that the English, all-powerful at sea, were thoroughly worthless as soldiers.
42 BA.TTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP. The working of this little cheat had been • liitherto aided by circumstance. With the force which'ti.e Wilder Mentschikoff there were two battalions of foMiers h.vi l'i»ssian seamen — men belonging to those valiant tl?''p"toruin crews of the Black Sea fleet which were destined uliVlfrmy^ to maintain the glory of the Russian arms in the bitterest hours of trial, when the land-forces seemed to desert them — but partly from their want of precision in manoeuvring, partly from their sailor-like whims, and partly, no doubt, from the mere fact of their being a small and peculiar minority, they had become a standing subject of merriment to the rest of the troops. The Russian soldiery, therefore, were prepared to receive tales assuring them that the bodies of red-coats now discernible in the distance were, all of them, battalions of sailors, against whom they might well have their laugh as they had at their own naval comrades. This idea had fastened so well upon the mind of the Russian army, tliat before the battle began, it was shared by some of the more illiterate of the officers, and even, it was said, in one instance by a general of division. Surprise at ^ut tlic siglit uow watclicd with keen eyes from ii!eEMgHs°i the enemy's heights was one which seemed to have some bearing upon the rumour that the English were powerless in a land engagement. The French and the Turks were in the deep, croM'ded masses which every soldier of the Czar had been accustomed to look upon as the forma- tions needed for battle ; but, to the astonishment
anay.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 43
of the Ptussian officers, tlie leading divisions of the chap. men in red were massed in no sort of column, and ^' were clearly seen coming on in a slender line — a line only two deep, yet extending far from cast to west. They could not believe that with so fine a thread as that the English General was really in- tending to confront their massive columns.* Yet the English troops had no idea that their forma- tion was so singular as to be strange in the eyes of military Europe. Wars long past had taught them that they were gifted with the power of fighting in this order, and it was as a matter of course that, upon coming within range, they had gone at once into line.
Meanwhile, the war-steamers — eight French Firo from and one English — had pushed forward along the ring"'' shore in single file, moving somewhat in advance of the land - forces ; and now, at twenty - five minutes past one o'clock, the leading vessels opened fire against the four guns at the village of Ulukul Aides, and again tried the skill of their gunners upon the distant masses of infantry ^hich occupied the Telegraph Height and the low flat ledge at its base. This last part of the cannonade from the ships was followed by a change of no small moment in the Eussian fi-ont of battle.
Convinced that his chief had been guilty of a followed by grievous error in placing the Taroutine and the movenSu' militia battalions on this low narrow ledge, troops con- General Kiriakoff, who commanded in this part Freuch. of the field, had tried by indirect means to pro- * Chodajiiewicz.
44 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, cure a cliange of plan, but had ncit ventured ' to say anything on the subject to Prince Mentschikoff himself. It is plain, however, that Kiriakoffs opinion, getting abroad, was adopted by the officers of these two corps ; for first, the militia battalions, and then the battalions of the Taroutine corps, without orders, and without hav- ing been assailed or touched (except perhaps by a chance shot or two at very long range from the shipping), began a retrograde movement, and slow- ly ascended the steep hill till they gained a more commanding position at no great distance from the Telegraph. No effort was made to check this seemingly spontaneous movement.*
IX.
naif-i.ast At half-past one o'clock a round-shot from the
'jiic o'clock. . , . , . . , I
omiioiiade oppositc heights Came ripping the ground near against the Loi'd Raglau, and it marked the opening of the
lOii-lish line. n ' f O
battle between the contending land-forces ; for thenceforth, the enemy's fire was continuous. He directed a steady cannonade against the English line. At first no one fell ; but presently an artilleryman riding in front of his gun bent forward his head, handled the reins with a con- vulsive grasp, and then, uttering a loud inarti- culate sound, fell dead. The general peace of
* General Kiriakoffs statement, confirmed bj' Eomaine, wlio observed and noted the movement. Tlie General tlioiir;ht the change of position rc([nisite ; hut he admits that a retrograde movement of this kind, just before the commencement of the battle, was a grave eviL
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 45
Europe had continued so long, that to many chap. men the si-dit was a new one ; and of the '
young soldiers who stood near, some imagined that their comrade had fallen down in a sudden fit; for they hardly yet hncw that for the most part, in modern warfare, death comes as though sent by blind chance, no one knows from whence or from whom.
Since the enemy's artillery fire had now become AUai of our brisk, our leading infantry divisions were halted, siousor-
1 1 1 • 1 n n (Icred to lie
and the men ordered to lie down, boon alter- down, wards, it was found that the 1st Division had also The First come within range, and it was then forthwith depioyt-a thrown into line. In preparing for this man- oeuvre, the Duke of Cambridge took care that ground should not be wanting. Both on his right and on his left he took more ground than had been occupied by the division which marched in his front. Whilst the Light Division in his front was jammed in and entangled with the 2d Division, the Duke had the happiness of seeing his Guards and Highlanders well extended, and competent to act along the whole length of that superb line. The effect of this deployment was, that the ex- treme right of the Duke's line became a force operating in support of the 2d Division, and that a part of his Highland Brigade, reaching much further eastward than the extreme left of the Light Division, became in that part of the field the true front of the British line. AVhen this manoeuvre v,;is completed, tlie men of the 1st Division hiv down.
46 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
C H A P. Observing the extent of ground occupied by the ' first Division, Lord Ifaglan at once saw that the Ei'i.'Unui'*"^ 3d Division would not have room to manoeuvre sup'iwtuie i'l tlii^ same alignment with the Duke of Cam- GuarJs. bridge. He therefore ordered Sir Eichard Eng- land to support the Guards. It was this, or some other order sent nearly at the same time, which, for some reason, good or fanciful. Lord Eaglan chose to have carried quietly. The directions had been given, and the aide-de-camp was whirl- ing round his charger, in order to take a swift flight with the message, when Lord Eaglan stopped him, and said, ' Go quietly; don't gallop.' He knew he was, so to speak, in the presence of Eussian commanders, and seemed to like that whenever the enemy pointed a field-glass towards the English headquarters he should look upon a scene of tranquillity and leisure.
Our batteries tried their range, but without effect, and they ceased to fire, reserving their strength for the time when they would come to close quarters.
The batteries on the Telegraph Height did not yet open fire upon the French colunnis.
Lord Eaglan conceived that the operation deter- mined upon by the French ought to take full effect before he engaged the English army in an assaidt upon the enemy's heights ; and perhaps, if the whole body of the Allies had been one people under the command of one general, their advance would have been effected in Echelon, with the left held back for some time, whilst the
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 47
effort ou the riglit was in progress ; but the pride chap. of nations must sometimes be suffered to deflect "
the course of armies ; and although there was no military value in any of the ground north of the vineyards, Lord Ifaglan, it seems, did not like to withhold his infantry whilst the French were executing their forward movement. Since our soldiers lay facing downwards upon the smooth slope which looked against the enemy's batteries, they were seen, every man of them, from head to foot, by the Kussian artillerymen, and they drew upon themselves a studious fire from apparently about thirty guns.
Thus the first trial our men underwent in the Firennde? action was a trial ot passive, enduring courage, "len wiuist They had to lie down, with no duty to perform, except the duty of being motionless ; and they made it their pastime to watch the play of the engines worked for their destruction — to watch the jet of smoke — the flash — the short, moment- ous interval — and then, happily and most often, the twang through the air above, and the welcome sound of the shot at length imbedded in the earth. But sometimes, without knowing whence it came, a man would suddenly know the feel of a rushing blast and a mighty shock, and would find himself besjiattered with the brains of the com- rade who had just been speaking to him, "When this happened, two of the comrades of the man killed would get up and gently lift the quiver- ing body, carry it a few paces in roar of the line, then quietly return to their rank's, and again lie
48 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, down.* This sort of trial is well borne by our
! troops. They are so framed by nature, that, if only
they know clearly what they liave to do, or to leave undone, tliey are pleased and animated, nay, even soothed, by a little danger. For, besides that they love strife, they love the arbitrament of chance ; and a game where death is the forfeit has a strange, gloomy charm for them. Among the guns ranged on the opposite heights to take his life a man would single out his favourite, and make it feminine for the sake of endearment. There was hardly perhaps a gun in the Great Eedoubt which failed to be called by some cor- rupt variation of 'Mary' or 'Elizabeth.' It was plain that our infantry could be in a kindly humour whilst lying down under fire. They did not perhaps like the duty so well as an animat- ing charge with the bayonet; but if they were to be judged from their demeanour, they pre ferred it to a church parade. They were ic their most gracious temper. Often, when an officer rode past them, they would give him the fruit of their steady and protracted view, and advise him to move a little on one side or the other to avoid a coming shot. And this the men would do, though they themselves, how- ever well their quickened sight might warn them of the coming shot, lay riveted to the earth by duty.
* Casualties of this sort were going on here and there along our line, but the exact incident described in t'le text wa^ observed in the 30th Rogiment.
BATTLK OF TIIK ALMA. 49
The recumbent postiu'c of our infantry threw in- c H A P.
to strong prominence the figure of every mounted l_
man who rode along their lines ; but the group of horsemen composing or following the Headquarter Staff was so marked by the white flowing plumes of the ofhcers, that at a distance of a mile and a half it was a conspicuous object to the naked eye; and a Eussian artilleryman at the Causeway bat- teries could make out, with a common field-glass, that of the two or three officers generally riding abreast at the head of the plumed cavalcade, there was one, in a dark blue frock, whose right arm hung ending in an empty sleeve. In trutii, Lord cannonade Raglan, at this time, was so often standing still, against L<.r.' or else was riding along the line of our prostrate iiis^statr." infantry at so leisurely a pace, that he and the group about him could not fail to become a mark for the Russian artillery. The enemy did not, as it seemed, begin this effort malignantly ; and at first, perhaps, he had no further thouglit than that of subjecting the English Head- quarters to an ordinary cannonade, and forcing them to choose a more retired ground for their surveys.
Still, as might be expected, the Eussian artil- lerymen could not easily brook the conclusion that, v/hilst the English General chose to remain under tlieir eyes and within range, it was beyond the power of their skill to bend him from his path, or even, as it seemed, to break the thread
VOL. III. J)
50 BATTLE OF THE ALJIA.
UHAP. of his conversation; so, at length growing ear-
L nest, they opened fire upon the group from a
great number of guns — but in vain, for none of the Staff at this time were struck. Failing with round-shot, the enemy tried shells — shells witli the fuses so cut as to burst them in the air a lit- tle above the white plumes. This method was tried so industriously and with so much skill, that a few feet over the heads of Lord Eaglan and those around him there was kept up for a long time an almost constant bursting of shells. Sometimes the missiles came singly, and some- times in so thick a flight that several would be exploding nearly at the same moment, or briskly one after the other, right and left, and all around. The fragments of the shells, when they burst, tore their shrill way down from above, harshly sawing the air ; and when the novice heard the rush of the shattered missile along his right ear, and then along his left, and imagined that he felt the wind of another fragment of shell come rasping the cloth on his shoulders almost at the same mo- ment, it seemed to him hardly possible that the iron shower would leave one man of the group untouched. But the truth is, that a fragment of shell rending the air with its jagged edges may sound much nearer than it is. None of the Staff were wounded at this time.
Some of the suite were half vexed and half angry ; for they knew tlie value of their chief's life, and they conceived that he was affronting great risk without due motive, and from mere
BATTLH OF THE ALMA. 51
inattention to danger. The storm of missiles gener- chap. ally fell most thickly when Lord Eaglan happened '
to be riding near the great road ; for the encniiy, having got the range at that point, always lab- oured to make the bursting of his shells coincide with the moment ^^hen our Headquarters were passing. Tiii.s soon came to be understood, and thencefortli, Avhen the Headquarter group were tioiniz to cross the Causeway, thev rode at it briskly, as at a leap, and spanned it witli one or two strides, thus leaving tlie prepared storm of shells to burst a little behind them. This effort of the ItLissian artillery against Lord IJaglan and the group surrounding him lasted a long time, and was carried on upon a scale better propor- tioned to the destruction of a whole division than to the mere object of warning off a score of horse- men. If the fire thus expended had been brought to bear on Pennefather's brigade, it might have maimed the English line in a vital part of the (ield.
XL
The time was now come when the Allies could TheAiiies
eouM now
measure their front with the enemy s position, mpasure It will be remembered that the plan* proposed witiitiiatof
'■ '^ '■ tlie enemy:
the night before by Marshal St Arnaud rested upon the assumption that tlie whole of the enemy's forces except two or three battalions would be confronted by the French army, and that, therefore, the only opportunity for important * See the fac-siniile.
52
BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
C H A 1 I
service whicli the English army could find would _ be that of making a great flank-move/nent against the enemy's right; but, there being by this time a certainty that no more than a moderate portion
the bearing of the Russiau army would be met by the French,
this admea- • , n ti ■ • -,■
suremeut it lollowed tliat by Simply providing a line oi battle with which to confront face to face the rest
had upon tlie French phin.
of the enemy's forces, Lord liaglan would secure i'or his troops an ample field of duty ; and now that the invading armies had come within cannon- shot range, it began to be seen that the entire front presented by the 1st and 3d French Divi- sions, and by our 2d and Light Divisions, would be only just commensurate with the length of the position which the Russian commander was occupying.
Russian Army.
English Arniv.
Tlie French Arm v.
Tlie ground wliich each of the lead- ing divisions had to assail.
Of course, therefore, if Lord Eaglan had not already rejected the French plan of a flank at- tack by our forces, it would have now fallen to the ground. It had never made any impression on his mind.*
* I infer this from the fact tliat those with whom Lord Rag- \a\\ was thoronglily coulidential in such matters never heard liim speak of it. Lord Eaghm, as we saw, distinctly and fin- ally rejected the plan at the close of his interview with St Arnaud. It became a plan simply preposterous as soon as it was apparent that St Arnaud would not confront any part o! the Russian army except theii" left wing ; for to mate two
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 53
The Allies were now so close to the enemy's chap.
position that the General of each of the five lead- ^'
ing divisions could form a judgment as to the particular sphere of action which awaited him. To Bosquet the advance against the West Cliff had long ago been assigned. Canrobert faced towards the White Homestead and those spurs of the Telegraph Height which lie towards the west. Prince Napoleon confronted the centre and the eastern steeps of the T(;k'graph Height. Sir De Lacy Evans with the 2d JJivision faced the vil- lage of Bourliouk; and it seemed at this time that his left would not reach further up the river's bank than the bridge, for Sir George Brown had been reckoning that his first or right briuade would be charged with the duty of attacking the enemy's position across the great I'oad, and that it would be his left, or BuUer's brigade, which would assail the Great Eedoubt.
The Generals of the five leading Divisions were thus directing their forces, and already the swarms of .skirmishers thrown forward by the French, and the thinner chains of riflemen in advance of our divisions, were drawing close to the vineyards, and beginning their combats with the enemy'.s
flidik-iiiovpniciits, one against tlie enemy's lel't and llic other against his right, and to do this without liaving any force wherewith to confront the enemy's centre, woukl have been a ]ihan requiring no comment to show its absurdity. The FrencJi accounts, whcllicr official or qunM official, liave always persisted in saying that Lord Ragli^n had engaged, and afterwards failed to make, a movement on the enemy's riglit flank. This is the cnly reason why the matter re{][uires anything like careful elucidation.
54 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, sliarpshooters ; but then, and with a suddenness ^' so strange as to suggest the idea of some pyro- TiicviUase techuic contrivance, the whole village of Bour- M'ton'fireby liouk, exccpt the straggling houses which skirted it towards the east, became wrapped in tall flames.* No man could live in that confla- gration ; and the result was, that in one minute a third of the ground on which the English army had meant to operate was, as it were, blotted out of the field. If this firing of the village took place under the orders of the Paissian commander it was the most sagacious of all the steps he took that day ; for his gravest source of care was the want of troops sufficing for the whole extent of tlie position at wliich he grasped, and therefore an operation which took away a large part of the battlefield was of great advantage to him. The effect Our infantry were immediately thrown into mcasme'iLi trouble. The Light Division, as we saw, did the English not take ground enough on the left, and the fir- ing of the village now cut short our front on the right. Sir De Lacy Evans, thus robbed of space, was obliged to keep his second brigade in rear of the first, and even then he continued to overlap the right of the Light Division.
The smoke from the burning village was de- pressed and gently turned towards the bridge by
* General de Todleben says that the materials for burning the village had been previously collected ; and besides the great number of haystacks, and the peculiar nature of the hay, were causes accounting for the extreme swiftness of the confla- gration. The hay of that country is full of stiff prickly stems, which resist compression, and so leave ample room for air.
BATTLE OF Till-: ALMA. 56
the faint breeze which came from tlic sea. There, chap.
for hours, in a long fallen pillar of cloud, it lay
singularly firm and compact, obscuring the view of those who were near it, but not at all staining the air in any other part of the field,
XII.
The operations of the great column entrusted General to General Bosquet now began to take effect. °^^^^ Bosquet Avas a man in the prime of life. Ten years of struggle and frequent enterprise in Al- geria had carried him from the rank of a lieu- tenant to the rank of a general officer ; * and he was charged on this day, not only with the com- mand of his own — the 2d — Division, but witli the command of the troops which formed the Turkish Contingent. The whole column under his orders numbered about 14,000 men. The Arabs and Kabyles of Algeria, tliough men of a fierce and brave nature, and prone to petty strife, are so wanting in the power of making war with effect, that, as far as concerns the art of fighting, they can scarcely be said to have given much schooling to the bold and skilful soldiery of France ; but the deserts, the broad solitudes, and the great moun- tain-ranges of Xorthern Africa, have inured the French army to some of those military toils which are next in worth to the business of the actual combat ; and for Bosquet, the hero of
• A brigadier; and now, at the time of the Crimean war, he was a general of division.
66 ISATTLK f)r TTIR ALMA.
CHAP, many a struggle in tlio passes of the INIiddle ^' and the Lesser Atlas, it was no new problem to have to cross a stream and carry a bod}' of troops to the summit of a hill with a steep-looking face. In the morning, he had ridden forward escorted by a few Spahis, to reconnoitre the ground with his own eyes; and thus, and by the aid of the careful surveys effected by the naval men, he was able to assure himself, not only that the river could be passed at its bar, but that troops there crossing it would be likely to find the means of getting round and ascending to the summit of the cliff from the south-west. Examining also the face of the cliff further inland, he saw that the broken ground opposite to the village of Almata- mack could be easily ascended by foot-soldiers ; and he also, no doubt, perceived that the road leading up from the village (unless it should prove to have been effectually cut or guarded by the enemy) would give him a passage for his His plan of artillery. Upon these observations Bosquet based
operatioi\3.
his plan. He resolved to march in person with Autemarre's brigade upon the village of Almata- • mack, there to cross the river, and afterwards endeavour to ascend the plateau at the point where the road from Almatamack goes up be- tween the West Cliff and the Telegraph Height -, but he ordered General Bouat, with his brigade and with the Turkish Contingent, to incline far away towards his right, to try to pass the river at its bar, and then to find the best means he could for getting his troops uj) the cliff.
IJATTLE OF -niK ALMA. 57
The two bodies of troops imder ]josquet's com- chap mand began their diverging movement at the ^' same time ; and before two o'clock the swarms of ^^-lyanreof
' Auteinarre
sMrmishers which covered the front of the col- ""et'"Jn°"*" umns were pnshing their way through the village i"^''*''"- of Almatamack, and the vineyards on eitlier side of it. A few moments more and thov were firiiifr with a briskness and vivacity which warmed the blood of the many tlionsaiuls of hearers then new to war. One of our officers, kindling a little with the excitement thus roused, and impatient, per- haps, that the Fi'encli should be in action before our people, could not help drawing J.ord IJaglan's attention to the firing on our right. But the stir of French skirmishers through thick ground was no new music to Lord Fitzroy Somerset ; rather, perhaps, it recalled him for a moment to old times in Estrcmadura and Castile, when, at the side of the great Wellesley, he learned the brisk ways of Napoleon's infantry. So, when the young officer said, ' Tlie French, my lord, are warmly engaged,' Lord Raglan answered. 'Are they? I cannot * catch any return-fire.' His practised ear had told him what we now know to be the truth. No troops were opposed to the advance of Bosquet's columns in this part of the field ; but it is the custom of French skirmishers, when they get into thick ground near an enemy, to be continually firing. They do this partly to show the chiefs behind them what progress they are making, and partly, it would seem, in order to give life and spirit to the field of battle.
58 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP. When General Bonat reached tlie bank of the ^' river, he found that the bar of sand at its mouth uli'dTtaci^ed ^^t^e it possible for his men to keep good their Bouat""'^'"^ footing against the waves flowing in from the sea ; and in process of time, witli all his infantry, including tlie Turkish battalions, he succeeded in gaining the left bank of the river. He could not> however, carry across his artillery, and he there- fore sent it back witli orders to follow the march of Autemarre's brigade.
Wlien he reached the left bank of the river, Bouat found an opening in the cliff before him, whicli promised to give liim means of ascent. Into this opening he threw some skirmishers, and these, encountering no enemy, were followed by the main body of the brigade, and by tlie Turkish battalions. Pursuing the course thus opened to him, Bouat slowly crept forward with his col- umn, and wound his way up and round towards the summit of the cliff. But it was only by marching upon a very narrow front that he was able to effect this movement ; and it was not until a late period of the action that he was able to show himself in force upon the plateau. Even then he was without artillery. The troops under his com- mand had not an opportunity of engaging in any combat with the enemy because they marched upon that part of tlie heights M-hich the Eussian General had determined to leave unoccupied. Further Meanwhile Bosquet, marching in person with
Autemarre's Autcmarre's brigade, traversed the village of Alma-
Ijrigade. i p , i , .
tamack, forded the river at ten minutes past two
BATTLH OF THE ALMA. 59
o'clock, and immediately be^^au to ascend tlic road CHAP.
leading up to the plateau. The road, he found, _1_
was uninjured, and guarded by no troops. His artillery l)cgan the ascent ; and nieanwliile tlie keen and active Zouaves, impatient of the winding road, climbed the heights by .shorter and steeper patlis, and so swiftly, that our sailors, looking from the ships (men accustomed to perpendicular racing), were loud in their praise of the briskness with whicli the Frenchmen rushed up and 'manned' the cliff. As yet, liowever, Bosquet had encountered no enemy.
It has been seen that the position taken up by Guns Prince Mentschikoff fell short of the sea-shore by agai.rsti.im
- . , , from Uliika
a distance of more than two miles, and tliat he auics. was not in military occupation of the cliff, now ascended by I'osquet with Autemarre's brigade ; but also it will be remembered that, at the village in rear of the cliff, called Ulukul Akles, there had been posted some days before one of the ' Minsk ' battalions of infantry, with four pieces of light artillery, and that the detachment had there re- mained. These four guns were now brought out of the village, and after a time were placed in battery at a spot near the village of Ulukul Tiouets, and within range of the point where the Zouaves were beginning to crown the summit of the cliff. The ' :Minsk ' battalion at this time could not be discerned by the French ; but, on the cliff overlooking the beach, there were seen a few squadrons of horse.
As soon as a whole battalion of Zouaves liad
60
BATTLE OF TIIK ALICIA.
CHAP. I.
Bosquet, after a inomeiitary cliGck, cs- t,'il>lislics Iiimsplf on tlic cliff.
.Measures l:iken by Kiriakoff upon ob- .scrving Bos- quet'.s tuni- iug uiovc- iiicnt.
gained tlic summit, tliey were drawn up and formed on tlie plateau. No shot was as 3'et fired by the enemy ; and General Bosquet, with his staff, ascended a tumulus or mound on tlie top of the cliff", in order to reconnoitre the ground.
IMcanwhile, his artillery was coming u}), and the first two of Ids guns had just reached tlie summit when one of the carriages In-oke down. This accident embarrassed the rest of the column, and whilst the hindrance lasted, tlie enemy opened fire from his four guns.* Coinciding as it did with the breaking down of the gun-carriage, this fire produced for the moment an ill effect u])on the head of the French column, and one of its battalions fell l)ack nnder the shelter of tlie ac- clivity. But lliis check did not last. Tlie road blocked by the broken-down gun-carriage was quickly cleared, the guns were moved up I'apidly, and swarms of skirmishers pressed up in all directions. Then the troops which were already on the summit moved forward, and lodged tiiem- selves upon a part of the plateau a little in ad- vance of the steep by whieli they had ascended, "f*
As soon as he began to hear guns in tlie direc- tion of tlie West Cliff, Kiriakoff took from his reserves two of his ' jMoscow ' battalions, and ])Osted them, the one low down and the other
* Half of the T^o. 4 hatteiy of the ITth brigade of tlie Pius- sian artillery.
+ Sir Edward Oolebrooke saw this operation from the deck of one of our ships of war, and describes it very well in his memorial. He was a skilful and very accurate observer of military movements.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 61
higher up, on that part of the hill which looked chap
down upon the Wliite Homestead. He also J
brought up his artillery to the slopes of the Tele- graph Height, placing some of the guns in bat- tery with front towards the sea, so as to command, though at a long range, the part of the plateau which Bosquet crossed by the Hadji load. Kiria- koff did not take upon himself to make any other dispositions for dealing with the turning move- ment which threatened his left.
Amoii<rst the French who were ^fvininff the Horsemen
... on the ulill
summit 01 tlie plateau, no one seems to have divined the reason why a little body of Kussian horsemen should have made its appearance on the cliff" overlooking the sea, nor why, without attempting hostile action, it had tenaciously clung to the ground. Those troopers were the attend- ants of a man in great trouble. They were the escort of Prince Mentschikoff.
XIII.
The enemy's survey of the allied armies had Tiie effect of been so carelessly made, and had been so little tunlln^' '^ directed towards the sea-shore, that Bosquet, it upon tiio
, . , „ iiiinJ of
seems, had already "ot near to the river before PnneeMcut his movement was perceived, rrince Mentschi- koff, with Gortschakoff and Kvetzinski at his side, had been standing on the Kourgane Hill watching the advance of the English army, and giving bold orders for its reception ; but presently he was told that a French division was advancing
62 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, towards the unoccupied cliff on his extreme left. • At first, lie was so shocked by the dislocation which his ideas would have to undergo if his left flank were indeed to be turned, that he had no refuge for his confusion except in mere disbelief, and he angrily refused to give faith to the unwel- come tidings.* For days, he had been on the ground which he himself had chosen for the great struggle ; but he was so certain that he had effectually learnt its character by glancing at its (general features, that he had not, it seems, had the industry to ride over it, nor even to find out the roads by which the villagers were accustomed to ascend the heights with their waggons.
He seems to have imagined it to be impossible that ground so steep as the cliff had appeared to be could be ascended by troops at any point west- ward of the Telegraph Height; but when at length he was compelled to know that the French and the Turks were marching in force towards the mouth of the river, his mind underwent so great a revulsion, that, having hitherto taken no thought for his left, he now seemed to have no care for any other part of the position. In his place, a general, calm, skilful, and conscious of knowing the ground, might have seen the turning movement of the French and the Turks with un- speakable joy ; but instead of tranquilly regard- ing the whole field of battle under the new aspect which was given to it by this manoeuvre, he only laboured to see how best lie could imitate tlie
* Chodasiewicz.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 63
mistake of his adversary — how best he could sliift ciI A P.
his strength to the distant unoccupied clifl" which ._!.._
was threatened by Bosquet's advance. The na- ture of the ground enabled him to make lateral movements in his line without much fear of dis- turbance from the Allies ; and as soon as he saw his med- that the French were detaching two-fifths of their dealing army in order to turn his flank, lie wildly deter- ms fl.tr.k
. „ . march.
mined to engage a portion of his scanty force m a march from his right hand to his left — in a march which would take him far to the westward of his chosen ground. For this purpose he snatched two batteries from his great Eeserve and also two from his right, gave orders that he was to be followed by the four ' Moscow ' battalions which were the reserve of his left wing, and by the three ' Minsk ' battalions which formed part of his 'Great Reserve,' and then with four squa- drons of hussars rode off towards the sea.*
It was certain that a long time would elapse Ments.i.i-
° '- kolf on the
before the troops engaged in this vain journey cutr. could be expected to get into action with Bosquet; and, meanwhile, the power of the whole force en- ca<Ted in the flank movement was neutralised. But that was not all. Prince Mentschikoff's mind was so strangely subverted by the sensation of having his left turned, that, although a long
* The Latteries which Prince Jlentsehikoif thus drew from his Great Reserve were, the 10-guii light battery, No. 5, and the 8-gun troop of Horse-artillery, No. 12 ; whilst the two he took from liis right were the two 8-gau Don Cossack Latteries, one of wliich was a Lattery of position, the other a light battery.
64 RATTLK OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, time must needs pass before he could be iu force ' oil the West Cliff, he yet could not endure to be personally absent from the ground to which he now fastened his thoughts. So when, with his Staff and the horsemen of his escort, he had got to the ground overlooking the sea, near the village of Ulukul Tiouets, and had seen the first groups of the Zouaves peering up on the crest of the hill, he still remained where he was. "Whilst he sat in his saddle, the appearance of his escort drew fire from the shii)ping, and four of his suite were struck down ; but the Prince would not move. It is likely that the fire assuaged the pain of his thoughts. Hisbaiieries At tliis time, it would seem, he gave either no
at length ■, p i • t i • i • i
coming up, orders, or none oi a kind supplying real guidance
there begins ... - _ . . , ,
a cannonade lor liis gencrals. Lingering upon the ground
between his ., ,, ,, ii- in j_ii
and Bos- without troops at hand, he impotently watched
quel's artil- ,. i , > ^ • ^ tt- t i i
U:ry. the progress ot Autemarres brigade. His liglit
batteries soon came up ; but neitlier these nor the squadrons of Hussars which formed his escort were the best of implements for pushing back General Bosquet into the steep mountain-road by which he had ascended; and in the hands of Prince Mentschikoff they were simply powerless. Howev(;r, his guns, when they came up, were placed iu battery, and Bosquet's guns being now on the plateau, there began a cannonade at long range between the twelve guns of the Prench and the whole of the light artillery Avhich Prince Mentschikoff had hurried into this part of the field. At the same time the French artillery drew,
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 65
some shots from the distant guns which Kiriukoff chap.
had placed looking seaward on the Telegraph L^
Height ; and the annals of the French artillery record with pride that the twelve pieces which Bosquet brought up with him engaged and over- uosquet powered no less thau forty of the enemy's guns, hi'mseif. Nor is this statement altogether without some- tliing like a basis of trutli, for the Russians had now thirty-six pieces of artillery on the West Cliff, or tlio Telegrapli lieiglit ; * and though most of them at this time were so placed that their gunners could attempt some shots at a more or less long range against Bosquet's guns, the French artillerymen not only held their ground without having a gun disabled, but soon pushed forward their batteries to a more commanding part of the plateau.
By this time, the seven battalions of infantry which Prince Mentschikoff had been moving flank -wise were very near to the spot where their General had been eagerly awaiting them; but when at last, after agonies of impatience, he was about to have these troops in hand, the Prince seems to have come to the conclusion that, after all, he could do nothing in the part of the field to which he had dragged them. He was brought, perhaps, to this belief by seeing that the French and the Turks, who had been crossing the river at its mouth, were now beginning to show their strength towaids the westernmost part
* Tliey had that number even u[)on tlie supposition that the heavy 8-gun battery of the Don Cossacks had not yet come up. VOL. UL E
66
BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP. I.
Mentschi- koff counter- aiarching.
Position of Bosquet on tlie cliff.
of the cliff; for he may not have known that this force, being without artillery, could be easily pre- vented from advancing against his batteries on the open plateau. At all events, Prince Ments- chikoff now thought it necessary to reverse his flank -movement, and to travel back towards his centre with all the forces which he had brouglit from thence to his left.
But when the Prince began this last counter- movement, lie was already beginning to fall under the dominion of events in another part of the field.
Bosquet now stood undisturbed on the part of tiie plateau which he had reached. But he was not without grounds for deep anxiety. It did not fall to his lot on that day to be engaged in any conflict except with the enemy's artillery ; but, from the moment when lie began to establish himself on the plateau until towards the close of the action, he was in a dangerously isolated posi- tion, for he had no troops around him except Autemarre's brigade; and, until the action was near its end, he got no effective support either from Bouat on his right or from Canrobert on his left.
XIV.
As soon as Marshal St Arnaud perceived that Bosquet would be able to gain the summit of the cliff, he tried to give him the support towards his left which his position, when he got established on the cliff, would deeply need; and he deter- mined that the time was come for the immediate
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 67
advance of Lis 1st and 3d Divisions. Addressing chap. General Canrobert and Prince Napoleon, and giv- ' ing them the signal for the attack, he said, I am ordtrTihe told, these words : ' With men such as you I have crn'robeif ' no orders to give. I have but to point to the Na},oi""n* 'enemy!'* Hitherto these two French divi- sions had been nearly in the same alignment as the leading divisions of the English army ; but now that they were ordered forward, leav- ing the English army still halted, the true char- acter of the movement to be undertaken by the Allies was for the first time developed. Their The oni.r array was to be what tacticians call 'an order ot theAiiic-s ' battle in three echelons by the right, the first ' dchelon making a turning movement.' +
Russian Army.
Knglish Army.
This disposition for the attack was not the result Lord Rat-- of any agreement made in words between Marshal Suon'of St Arnaud and Lord Raglan. It resulted almost i.eVaYto
take.
• I have this from an officer wlio assures me tliat lie heard the words.
t * Un ordre de bataille h, trois Echelons par la droite, le pre- ' mier echelon attaquant par le flanc' These are the words in which a staff officer present in the action, and very high in the French service, has described to me the advance of the Allies. Bee the diagram, a much better guide than mere words.
68 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
naturally, if so one may speak, from Bosquet's turiiing movenieut, from the extent of the front which the enemy was now seen to present, and from the character of the ground. Just as the Marshal had kept back his 1st and 3d Divisions till he saw that Bosquet could gain the height, so Lord Eaglan, according to his conception at this time, had to see whether Canrobert and Prince Napoleon could establish themselves upon the Telegraph Height, before he endangered the con- tinuity of the order of battle by allowing the English army to advance.
During the first forty minutes of the cannonade
directed against the English infantry, there had
been no corresponding fire upon the left of the
Artiiieiy Frencli ; but artillery missiles discharged from
twi'finUie the Telegraph Heights, and passing over the
Russian and , . nii n^ i- ii •^■ • ^
the French hcads 01 the iaroutuie and the nnlitia bat- talions, now began to molest the divisions which were led by Canrobert and Prince Napoleon.
On the other hand, the artillery belonging to the Divisions of Canrobert and Prince Napoleon came down to a convenient ground above the edge of the vineyards, and opened fire upon the columns of the 'militia' battalions, now posted much farther up than before on the opposite height. And with effect ; for although the range did not admit of great slaughter, some men were struck, and the rest, though they did not yet move, began to be displeased with the grouud on which they stood.'*
* Chodasiewicz.
batteries.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 69
The swarms of skirmishers which the French cUAP.
threw forward went briskly into the cover, forded . :
the river, and then made tliemselves at home in the broken ground at the foot of the Telegraph Height. When tlie soldier is upon service of this kind, his natural character, neutralised in general by organisation, is often seen to reassert itself. One man, prying eagerly forward, would labour to get shots at liussian sharpshooters still linger- ing near the river; another would sit down, take out his little store of food and drink, and be glad to engage with any one who passed him in something like cynical talk concerning the pastime of war. Pnit, upon the whole, French skirmishers push on with great boldness and skill.
When the foremost ranks of Caurobert's massed camobafa
, advance
battalions had entered tlie vineyards, each man across lue
. . river.
got through as best he could, and rapidly crossed the river ; and though, during part of the advance, the troops were under the fire of the guns on the Telegraph Height, yet tlie nature of the acclivity before them was of such a kind that the further his trooj.s
.,, , , Pii li •ire sheltered
thev advanced (provided the heads oi the bat- from fire i.y
the stecii-
talions did not show themselves on the plateau nessofthe
liill-side.
above the broken ground), the better they were covered from fire. And, except some lingering skirmishers, they had no infantry opposed to them at this time ; for the two ' Moscow ' bat- talions which Kiriakoff had sent down towards the ford of the White Homestead were now, it seems, made to take part in the marches and counter-marches which Mentscliikoff was direct-
70 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, ing in person, and there were then no otiier ' Russian columns in tliis part of the field.* So, when the head of Canrobert's Division gained the broken ground on the Russian side of the river, it was for the moment sheltered ; but if it had then ascended above the broken ground so as to peer up over the crest and face the open plateau at the top, it would not only have come under tlie fire of artillery, but would liave before it the four battalions of militiamen, supported by the four Taroutine battalions.
For an army advancing to the attack, a rim of sheltered ground on the verge of the enemy's position is of infinite use, because it enables the assailants to make without hurry their final arrangements for the assault ; but to troops which are not propelled by the decisive order of some resolute commander, such shelter as tlmt is some- times a snare, because it tempts men to hang back. In such a situation the best troops will often abstain from going forward of their own accord ; for it seems, to officers and men, that if
* Tliere is some grouiul for supposing tliat the second 'Mos- 'cow' battalion was for a while forgotten, and that, not re- ceiving in due time the order to rejoin the other Lattalions of the corps, it was left alone in the ravine till it found itself opposed to Canrobert's whole division. If this is the case, and if there resulted anything which could be called a combat between tlie Russian battalion and the French Division, the statement that Canrobert was not met by any troops except slcirniishers would have to be qualified. The statement of Ciiodasiewicz on this point receives no support from Kiriakoff, and that is the reason why I have not adopted it. Chodasiewic2 did not belong to the 'Moscow' corps.
BATTLK OF THE ALMA. 71
they arc to quit good shelter and t^o out into the ciiap. storm, they ought, at the least, to know that '
the movement is one really intended, and is |,'*,g%'^o^the needful to the purpose of the battle. The duty ITuTiT' of pressing forward to terminate the isolation of nl'vilion. Bosquet rested primarily with the General of the 1st Division.
General Canrobert was a man of whom great General hopes were entertained. According to every test which could be applied by school and college examinations, he promised to be an accomplished general. To the military studies of his youth he had added the experience of many campaigns in Africa ; and even in the French army, where brave men abound, his personal valour had be- come a subject of remark. He was so deeply trusted by his Emperor, that he had become the bearer of a then secret paper which was to put him at the head of the French army in the event of St Arnaud's death. He had the misfortune to have upon his hands the blood of the Parisians slain by his brigade on the 4th of December ; but it was said, to his honour, that he, more than all the other generals employed at that time, had loathed the work of having to abet the midnight seizure of his country's foremost generals. His spirit, they say, had been broken by the pestilence which some few weeks before had come upon his Division in the country of the Danube ; but the extremity of the grief to which he then gave way had so much to justify it in the appalling nature of the calamity which slew his troops, that it
72 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, was not a conclusive proof of liis being wanting ' in military composure. The most successful of respondents to school and college questions now had to undergo a new test. Commanding a fine French division, he had the head of his column close under a height occupied by the enemy, and this at a time when the isolated condition of a French brigade on his right seemed to make it a business of great moment for him to be able to bring support to his comrades.
But at the point where Canrobert faced the height he found it impracticable to drag up artillery, and he was obliged to send his guns all the way down to the village of Almatamack, in order that tliey might tliere ford the river and ascend to the top of the plateau by tlie road
His which Bosquet had taken. This operation could
dilemma. . i i /-. i ,
not but take a long time ; and what Canrobert was now called upon to determine was, whether he would wait until his artillery had completed its circuitous and difficult journey or at once carry forward his infantry to the summit of the plateau and engage the battalions there posted. He determined to wait. The maxims of the French army discourage the idea of bringing infantry into action upon open ground ^^■itllout the support of avtillery ; and Canrobert did not, it seems, conceive that the predicament in wliich Bosquet stood was a circumstance which dispensed him from the observance of a general rule. So, whilst he was thus waiting for his artillery, he did not deem it right to push forward his battal-
BATTLi: OF TIIK ALMA. 73
ions on the open plateau, hut he hvouglit the liead chap. of his Division to a point high up on the steep '
broken side of the liill, and extended it, in single and double battalion columns, on either side of tlie track by which he had ascended. He spread him- Tiiemurse
liu takes.
self more towards his left than towards his right, and did not move any of his battalions in such a way as to be able to give a hand to Bosquet.
Prince Napoleon's Division hung back in the Pnnce valley, and the bulk of it at this time was still on Division. the north bank of the river.
Although the head of Canrobert's Division, Firesus-
,. , 11-1 T-n- • ^ t.linctl 1»V
benig under tlie heights on the liussian side oi the rear-'
, *" . . ^ - , , ward ]inr-
the river, was einovmg good shelter, the masses tionsof
' . , ' theFreiu'i
of troops which stood more towards the rear, in- columns, eluding some of Canrobert's battalions and the great bulk of Prince Napoleon's Division, were exposed to the fire of the guns on the Telegraph Height. They suffered : and a feeliiiff of dis- Discourati; couragement began to spread.
Marshal St Arnaud had understood the gravity of the danger which would result from any delay in the advance of his centre, but to meet it he used an ill-chosen safeguard. The way to send help to Bosquet was to give Canrobert due war- rant to move up at ones upon the plateau, whether with or without his artillery.* "What the ]\Iar-
* If the objoctioi) to ailvancing on the plateau witliout artil- lery was, according to Freneii ideas, insuperable, an eflort, one would think, should have been made to push forward Prince Napoleon's Division. Prince Napoleon had in his front two roads leading up to the Telegraph, and one of these, at the least, was practicable (and was afterwards used) for artillery.
74
BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
C II A P. I.
St Arnaiicl pushes for- ward his reserves.
The ill effect, of tl'.is lii^suie ui>oii the French troops.
Their com- jilaint that tliey were being 'iiias- ' sacred.'
Anxiety on account of Bosquet.
Btate of tlie battle ht this time
shal did, however, was to order up his reserves, sending one brigade of his 4th Division to follow the march of Bosquet, and the otlier to support Canrobert. This last measure was actually a source of weakness rather tlian of strength ; for, as far as numbers were concerned, Canrobert and Prince ISTapoleou were already in more than ample strength. With two superb divisions, numbering some 15,000 men, and having Bosquet and Bouat on their right with many thousands more, they ^\"ere advancing upon a very narrow front; and the bringing up of fresh troops augmented the masses who came under the fire of the guns with- out at all propelHng the leading divisions. So the evil lasted and increased. Inaction in the midst of a battle is hateful to the brave, impetu- ous Frenchman, and inaction under fire is intoler- able to him. The troops towards the rear of the columns, not having the close presence of the enemy to animate them, and being without that shelter from the Russian guns which was enjoyed by the leading battalions, became discontented and uneasy. It was then that there sprang up among the French troops the ill-omened complaint that they were being ' massacred.'
All this while, Bosquet was on the summit of the cliff with his one brigade ; and his isolation, as we shall presently see, was becoming a source of great anxiety.
Minute after minute aides-de-camp were coming to Lord Raglan with these gloomy tidings ; and, iu truth, the action at this time was going ou ill
BATTLE OF TIIH ALMA. 75
for tlie Allies. Tlie duty of ci'owuing the West CIIAP.
Clifi'had been fulfilled with great spirit and de-
spatch by a small body of men ; but the step had not been followed np. Bouat, filing slowly round near the sea with some nine thousand men, but without guns, was for the time annulled. Bos- quet, with one brigade, stood halted upon the heights which he had climbed ; and though, lia])pily, he had not been assailed by infantry, his advanced and isolated position had become a source of weakness to the Allies. Of the two French divisions charged with the duty of attack- ing the front and western flank of the Telegraph Hill, the one had its foremost battalions high up the steep and on the verge of the open ground at its top, whilst the other M'as all do^^•n in the valley ; but (although in different ways, and for different reasons) these divisions were both hang- ing back, and no French force had hitherto at- tacked any part of the ground held by the enemy's formed battalions. Meanwhile the bat- teries still swept the smooth approach to the table-land wdiere the Telegraph stood, and not only kept it free of all assailants, but, pouring tlieir fire over the heads of their own soldiery, were able to throw plunging shots into the midst of Prince Napoleon's Division.
All this while, the English army had been kept under the fire of the Paissian artillery ; and al- though the men had been ordered to lie down, the ground, sloping towards the river, yielded no shelter, and many ha-d been killed and wounded.
76 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP. At first, our batteries replied ; but after a while ' it bad been ascertained that the advantage the enemy had in his commanding ground was too great to be overcome, and the English artillery had ceased to fire. Lord Eaglan asked why this was : * I observe,' said he, ' the enemy's six-pound-
* ers amongst us ; why cannot we send our nine-
* pounders amongst them?' But he was told that our fire had proved to be ineffectual, and that it was therefore discontinued. He seemed struck. Perhaps the answer which he had re- ceived became one of the grounds on which, a few minutes later, he resolved to change tlie face of the battle.
XV.
opiioituni- For some time, the course of the action had toMents- bccu offering to the Eussian General an oppor- tunity of striking a great blow ; and, circum- stanced as he M'as, it would have been easier for him to gain a signal victory before three o'clock, than to stand on the defensive and hold his ground till sunset. The English forces, confront- ing as they did a position of great natural strength, and having their left on ground as open as a race-course, would have been hampered in every attempt to storm the Great Redoubt if their flank had been assiduously threatened, and now and then charged, by the enemy's powerful cavalry. Therefore, if Mentschikoff, checking the English forces by a vigorous use of his horse- men, had undertaken at this time such an advance
jrliikoff.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 77
against Canrobert's Division as was afterwards en a P.
• 1 successfully executed by Kiriakoff, he would have L._
fouud the French battalions quite soft to his touch
by reason of their want of artillery ; * and Can-
robert's retreat from the verge of the plateau
would have occurred at a time when half the
Fi'ench army was so far from the true scene of
conflict as to be unable to give the least help.
Except by reckoning broadly upon the quality of
the French and the British troops, or else upon
the smiles of fortune, it is hard to see how the
Allies could then have escaped a disaster.
But men move so blindly in the complex busi- ness of war, that often, very often, it is the enemy himself who is the best repairer of their faults.
It was so that day. During the precious hour in which the liussian forces might have wrought a way to great glory, their cavalry were suffered to remain in idleness, and the battalions which formed the instrument afterwards used for strik- ing the blow were marching in vain from east to west and from west to east. The torpor and the false moves of the enemy countervailed the short- conn"ngs of the Allies.
No combat of any moment was going on at this Tiie battle time. It is true that Colonel Lawrence with the langufshed. right, and Major Norcott with the left wing of the 2d battalion of the liifle Brigade, had gone into the vineyards in front "f of our Light Division.
* I should not have ventured upon tliis sentence if it weie not that I am warranted in doing so by wliat actually occurred a little later. See pud.
f During the march, as was shown in a former note, M^jor
78 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP. But everywhere else, the battle tlagged. The ' men of our infantry divisions, thongh under artil- lery fire, still lay passive upon the ground. Our cavalry awaited orders ; our artillery declined to fire without being able to strike ; the Russian and the French still exchanged their fire at long range. No French battalion advanced above the broken ground, though, covering their front and the left flank of their trailing columns, swarms of skirmishers were alive. Of these some were firing to show where they were, some duelling with the Russian riflemen who yet remained in the valley ; others ascended the knolls and vexed any Russians they saw with long, careful shots ; others, again, sat down and contentedly took their rest.
This languishing of the battle seemed to pro- mise ill for the Allies. They had undertaken to assault the enemy's left, and to that enterprise they stood committed, for they had drawn away from the real field of battle to the West Cliff some fourteen thousand men. Yet since the mo- ment when Bosquet began to ascend the cliff, more than forty minutes had elapsed, and nothing had yet been done to win a result from his move- ment, nor even to give him that support which he very grievously wanted. Both from Bouat on his right and from Canrobert on his left he was divided by a wide tract of ground.
Hitherto, then, the operations planned and
Norcott had been on the flank of the Division ; but when the battle opened, he began to operate in front of BuUer's brigade. — Note to ith Edition.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 79
undertaken by the French had not only done CHAP.
nothing towards carrying the position, but had ^
even brought tlie Allies into danger.
The causes of tlie miscarriage were, — the physi- causes cal obstructions which hindered both Buuat and ocias'ion^ Canrobert from bringing up their guns wiih them, of u.e "" and the stiffness of the objection which prevents operatiom French Generals from engaging their infantry on open ground without the support of artillery. According to the intended plan of operations, Bosquet, after gaining the cliff with his whole column of some 14,000 men, was to bring round his right shoulder in order to fall upon the flank of the Ptussians ; and, simultaneously with his appearance on the plateau, a vigorous and resol- ute onslaught was to be made by the rest of the French army npon the front of the enemy's left wing. But Bosquet, as we saw, though he was personally present on the part of the plateau overhanging Almatamack, had only one brigade there ; and whether he looked to Bouat on his right, or to Canrobert on his left, he looked in either case to a general who, though he had masses of infantry, was without artillery, and he therefore looked in vain. In such circumstances the utmost that Bosquet could be expected to do was to hold his ground, — and this he did.
XVI.
For an hour and a half the Allies had lain under fire without even becjinuinff to assail the
80 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, enemy's formed battalions. The only ground ' gained was that occupied by Bosquet ; but, Bos- quet's achievement not having been followed up, his very success now threatened to bring disaster upon the Allies. When a Prench soldier is one of a body placed in a false position, he knows it, and comments on the fact ; and the very force and vivacity of his nature make it difficult to keep him long upon ground to which he feels a A (lesi.oiid- scientific objection. A French aide-de-camp came
iiil; account, .
of uosquL'fs ill haste to Lord Eaguin, and represented tliat un-
condition .
is iiruugiit less something could be done to support or relieve
to L(jrd ^ -•- ^
Hngiaii. Bosquet's column it would be 'compromised.'*
* Exactly the same pressure had just been applied by the French Marshal to Sir Dc Lacy Evans. In his published letter of the 28th of June 1855, Evans writes : ' On the arrival of the ' 2d Division in front of the village of Bourliouk, which, having ' been prepared for conflagration by the Russians, became ' suddenly for some hundred yards an impenetrable blaze, ' JIajor Claremont came to me in great haste, to say from the ' ilarshal, that a part of the French arm}', having ascended the ' heights on the south of the river, became threatened by large ' bodies of Russians, and might become compromif-ed unless ' the attention of the enemy were immediately drawn away by ' pressing them in our front. I made instant dispositions to ' conform to this wish, sending at the same time, as was my ' duty, an officer of my Staft' (Colonel Herbert) to Lord Eaglan, ' who was then a short distance in our rear, for his Lordship's ' approval, which was instantly granted.' From the recurrence of the word 'compromised,' and from the coincidence in point of time, one is led to infer that the message given in the text and the message conveyed to Lord Raglan through General Evans may have been one and the same. Tliere is nothing that I know of to interfere witli this conclusion, if it be sup- posed that Major Claremont was accompanied ])y a French aide-de-camp, who rode first to General Evans, and from him to Lord Raglan. — Note to 4:th Edition.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 81
Gifted liimself witli tlio conunand of graceful CIIAP.
diction, Lord IJaglan was iKjt witiiout fastidious ;
prejudices against particular forms of expression, and it chanced that he bore a singular hatred against the French word which we translate into ' compromised.' So lie archly resolved to have the meaning of the word fully expanded into plain French, and he asked the aide-de-camp what would be the actual effect upon the brigade of its being ' compromised.'
The answer was, * It will retreat.' *
Was it time for the English General to take the battle into his own hands?
So long as Bosquet, with Autemarre's brigade, stood isolated upon the cliff, and Canrobert's and Prince Napoleon's Divisions remained hanging back in the vineyards and the broken ground below the Telegraph height, an advance of our ibrces would plainly distort the Allied line in a hazardous way ; and Lord Eaglan liad watched for the moment when the development of the expected French attack on tlie Telegraph Height would war- rant him in suffering our infantry to go forward.
But he had hitherto watched in vain ; and, not Loni Rag- knowing how long the causes of the French de- to pred-
1 . 1 . I'itate the
lay might continue to operate, he resolved to advance of
1 /• • 1-111 "'^ Kiiglish
depart from the scheme of action which had army. hitherto governed him, and to precipitate the advance of the English forces. It is true that while Bosquet stood halted on the cliff, whilst Canrobcrt abstained from assailing the Telegraph
* ' 13attra cu retraite.' VOL. in. F
82
BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP. I.
Grounds tending to cause, or to justify, the resolve.
Height, and wliilst Prince Napoleon's Division was still low down in the valley, the advance of the English forces against the Causeway and the Kourgan6 Hill would ruin the symmetry of the plan which the French had contrived ; and if Bosquet should be obliged to retreat at a time when the English were hotly engaged in an attack upon the enemy's heights, the whole array of the Allies would be brought into perih But the timely incurring of dangers is proper to the busi- ness of war ; and though the enemy had hitherto been torpid and indulgent, the cause of the Allies had fallen into such a plight, that a remedy which involved heavy risks might nevertheless be the right one. And, so far as concerned liis under- standing with the French, Lord IJaglan was freed from all care ; for he had been already assured that Marshal St Arnaud anxiously desired him to advance ; and one aide-de-camp, as we have seen, had told him plainly that nothing less than a diversion by the English forces would prevent General Bosquet from retreating.
A man may weigh reasons against reasons, but sometimes, after all, it is the power of the imagina- tion, or else some manly passion, which comes to strike the balance and lead him on to action. The motive of which Lord Baglan felt the most conscious was the simple and natural longing to cease from being passive. He could no longer endure to see our soldiery lying down without resistance under the enemy's fire.* • This is the motive for accelerating the advance of the
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 83
He had been riding slowly upon the ground chap. between the Great Causeway and the left of the '
French army ; but he now stopped his horse, and order for the cavalcade which had trailed in his wake of the ehk-
, ,, , . , lishinfiinliA
whilst he moved then gathered more closely around him. There were altogether some twenty horsemen ; and although with several of tliem Lord Eaglan from time to time talked gaily, yet, so far as concerned the duty of taking tliought how best to conduct the action, he was like a man riding in mere solitude ; for it was not his custom to seek counsel, and the men around him so held their chief in honour that none of them would have liked to assail him with question or advice. Still, any one there could see that, be- sides Lord liaglan himself, there was one man of the Headquarter Staff whose mind was engaged in the business of the hour. We saw that General Airey had already begun to wield great power in the P]nglisli army. With the power was its bur- then. Whilst most of the other men on the Headquarter Staff seemed to be merely spectators or messengers, there was care, vexing care, on the lean, eager, imperious features of the Quarter- master-General. He was not simply impatient of the delay ; he judged it to be a great evil.
It was to him that Lord Eaglan now spoke some five words. Whatever it was that was said, it lit the face of the hearer, and turned his look of care into sunshine. The horsemen in the sur-
Britisli troops wliich Lord Raglan avowed to nip on the evening of tho action.
84 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, rounding group rose taller in their saddles, and
1 handled their reins like men whose limbs are
braced by the joy of passing from expectancy to action. Every man, whether he had heard the words or not, saw in the gladness of his neighbour's face that the moment long awaited was come.
Our infantry was to advance. The order flew; for it was Nolan — the impetuous Nolan — who carried it to the 2d Division.* A few moments later and the order had reached the Light Divi- sion. The whole of the foremost English line from the 47th liegiment on our right to the extreme
* My authority for this statement is the journal of poor Nolan now lying before me. There, after stating tliat 'a ' general advance was ordered,' he says : 'To the 2d Division I ' carried the order myself, and in riding forward with the ad- ' vance brigade had my horse shot under me by a round-shot.' On the other hand. General Evans, I think, conceives that he got his warrant to advance when Colonel Herbert returned to him with the message that Lord Raglan granted his request to be allowed to accede to the prayer of the French Marshal. And again, Colonel Lysons (who was Assistant Adjutant-General of the 2d Division) states that he carried the order, and he adds this spirited record of the emotion which impressed the fact upon his memory : ' I could not be mistaken on this point ; I ' so well remember the excitement I felt as I galloped back to ' the 2d Division, and then went on to the light of the Light ' Division, passing tlie order along the line ; and I shall never ' forget the excited look of delight from each face as I repeated 'the words, "Tlie line will advance!"' It is evident that both Nolan's and Colonel Lysons's statements arc correct ; and I conceive that the inijiression which each of them entertained, as well as the impression entertained by General Evans, may be reconciled by supposing that the return of Colonel Herbert to Evans's side preceded the arrival of the formal orders, and that (either intentionally, or else from some mistake) the carriage of tlie formal order was entvustrd to two StalT officers. — Note to ith Edition.
15ATTLE OF THK ALMA. 85
left of the Light Division, rose alert from the chap. ground, dressed well their ranks, and then, hav- '
ing a front of two miles with a depth of only two men, marched grandly down the slope.*
XVII.
Sir De Lacy Evans, commanding the 2d Divi- Evans
1 1 1 p 1 • 1 • 1 detaches
sion, had before him the blazing village. In that Adams
' . . witli two
conflagration no man could live ; and in order to battalions,
° , , ' and with
make good his advance on either side of the flames, tl"^r'**:"'
^ his Divisu.n
he had split his force by detaching General Adams fi^'-i'-f ■•^^,
■>■ JO towards IL;
to his right with two regiments-f- and Turner's ^"'^o® battery. With that force Adams, driving before him some Eussian skirmishers, marched down towards the ford which divided the French and English armies. Evans himself, with four bat- talions| and Franklin's battery of field-artillery, § had to assail the defences which Prince Mentschi- koflf had accumulated for the dominion of the Pass and tlie great road. Soon, however, Evans was a good deal strengthened in the artillery arm ; for an opportunity of rendering service in this part of the held was observed and seized by Captain Anderson with a battery belonging to the Light
* Computing from the right of the -iTth Regiment, the Eng- lish front was a little short of two miles ; but, computing it from the ground on which Adams was advancing, the front was more tlian two miles in extent.
t The 41st and 49th.
J The 1st brigade, under Pennefather, ;ind the 47th Regi- ment, belonging to Adams's brig;ide.
§ Fitzmijyer commanded both this and Turner's battery.
86 BA.TTLE OF TllK ALMA.
CHAP. Division and by Colouel Dacres with a battery ^" belonging to the 1st Division. By the time that tliG infantry had got down to near the enclosures, eighteen English guns had begun to reply to the fire whicli the enemy was pouring upon Penne- father's brigade. TheconHict But EvQu.s's taslv was a hard one. Having on
in wliich ,.., . ,, ,, , ■ ^ ^ •
lie became his right au impassable conilagration, and being cramped towards his left by our Light Division, he was forced to move along the unsheltered line of the Great Causeway upon a narrow and crowded front, and this under a converging fire of artillery; for with the sixteen guns of the Causeway bat- teries, with the eight other guns planted near, and the heavy guns of position discharging their shot and shell flankwise from the left shoulder of the Great Eedoubt, the enemy swept the main road and the bridge, and searched the fords both above and below it. And whilst the enemy's batteries thus dealt with the more open approaches to the bridge, his infantry defended the ground which could not be searched by round-shot, for, posted in the covert on either side of the Causeway, there were the four Borodino battalions ; * and, besides, the companies of sappers, and of the 6th Eilles, Avere operating in the vineyards below, and at tlie bridge, whilst, moreover, there was a great portion
* There is some obscurity as to the operations of the Boro- dino corjis. They were so placed as to become severed from the actual control of their divisional general, and they were covered, it seems, by the conflagration ; but all accounts agi'ce in stat- ing that the Borodino corps was in tlie Pass, and close to the great road.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 87
of the sixteen battalions posted on the slopes of chap.
the Kourgane Hill, which was near enough to be '. —
available for the defence of the Causeway as well as the Great Redoubt. Moreover, the enemy's reserves were so disposed as to be in close and easy communication with this part of the field. The Eussian skirmishers at this time were swarm- ing in the thick oround which belts the river.
Confronting these defences, Evans strove to work his way forward ; but although the walls and enclosures on the skirts of the village here and there formed islands of shelter, the rest of the ground which had to be traversed was so bare, that every man of the force passing over it came under the eyes of the Paissian gunners ; and their fire being therefore effective, Pennefather's brigade, though always moving forward a little, could only gain ground by degrees.
At times, when the balls were falling thickly, the men sheltered themselves as well as they could behind such little cover as the ground afforded ; and when there came a lull, they sprang forward and made for some shelter a little more in advance. There were some buildings which afforded good cover against grape and musketry ; and some of the men, having gained this shelter by a swift rush across the open ground under very heavy fire, were slow to move out again into a storm of grape, canister, and musket-balls. At a later time, the enemy shattered the walls of these buildings with round shot, and some of our men were crushed or suffocated by the ruins ; but those
88 BATTJ.K OF TIIH ALMA.
CHAP, who died that poor death were nieu hanging ' back.
This kind of struggle did not of course allow the troops to adhere to their order of formation ; but whenever any number of men got together upon ground which enabled them to extend, they quickly fell into line, and this they did notwith- standing that the groups thus instinctively hasten- incr into their English formation were sometimes men of different regiments. Several times the men were ordered to lie down.
From some unexplained cause, it happened that the Piussian Sappers wlio had been posted near the bridge, moved off without having destroyed it.
The 47th Eegiment, pushing in between the river and the burning village, and afterwards ford- ing the stream a good way below the bridge, was better sheltered from the fire of the Causeway batteries than the regiments of Pennefather's brigade.
Colonel Hoey of the 30th persistently worked his men through the gardens and enclosures till at length he was able to cross the river and estab- lish his regiment under cover of the steep bank on the Ptussian side of the stream. Thence, for some time, he maintained a steady fire against the gunners of the Causeway batteries.
The 95th, like the other regiments of the brigade, stole forward from one sheltering spot to another; and at one time three of its companies became divided from the rest of the corps, and united themselves in line with the 55th ; but the whole
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 89
regiment liad been again got togetlier, wlien, the CHAP.
Light Division coming on, it appeared tliat its right '
regiment was overlapped by the 95th. Lacy Yea did notclioose to stop; and, the 95th being halted at the time, he with his Eoyal Fusiliers passed through it. But the ' Derbies ' could not endure to be thus left behind, and soon the regiment rushed forward, bearing so strongly towards the left that the fortunes of the corps theucefortli became con- nected with the exploits of Codrington's brigade.
The 55th Eegiment, whilst advancing in line over open ground, came under so crushing a fire that it staggered ; and, though the line did not fall back, it was broken. But Colonel Warren soon rallied his troops, and carried them forward. Afterwards, when he reached a spot which yielded shelter to a man lying flat on the ground, he ordered his men to lie down ; but he himself kept his saddle and remained steadfast in the centre of his regiment until the moment returned when acain he could lead it forward.
The kind of struggle in which Evans was en- gaged could not be long maintained without in- volving heavy loss. Evans liimself received a severe contusion, and almost all his Staff were struck ; for Percy Herbert, his Assistant Quarter- master-General, was dangerously hit ; and Captain Thompson, Ensign St Clair, and Captain A. M. M'Donald were severely wounded. Of the officers of the 30th, 55th, and 47th regiments, Major Eose, Captain Schaw, and Lieutenant Luxmore were killed. Colonel Warren was wounded, and so
90 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, were Pakenliam, Dickson, Conolly, Whimper,
■ Walker, Coats, Bissett, Armstrong, Lieutenants
Warren, Wollocombe, Philips, and Maycock. Pennefather's brigade alone lost in killed and wounded nearly one-fourth of its strength.
So long as the Causeway batteries swept the mouth of the pass, Evans, with his three shattered battalions,"!- could do no more than maintain an obstinate and bloody combat iu this part of the field, and gain grouiul by slow degrees. He was not yet able to push forward beyond the left bank of the river, and assail the enemy in the heart of his position across the great road.
XVIII.
Advance of Qu Evaus's left, but entangled with some of his iHvi^iSa. regiments. Sir George Brown moved forward with the Light Division. He had before him the Great Redoubt, armed with its twelve guns of heavy calibre ; and this stronghold was flanked on its right by the eight guns of the Lesser Ptedoubt, and on its left by the eight-gun battery connecting this part of the defences with the artillery and the riirtaskii infantry which guarded the Pass. Upon the higher slopes of the Kourgane Hill, and so posted as to look down into the Great Eedoubt, there was yet another battery of field-artillery, J
* This, as well as all other statements which I nial<e of casual- ties in the Eiip,'lish army, is taken from the official returns. + The 30th, {iSth, and 47th Ilegiments. As to the 95th, see
J/OKt.
X This was the strengtii of the artillery on or closely adjoin-
i;iil liofore It
BATILI': OF THE Al.MA. 91
EiglitGeii battalions of infantry* were still chap.
jtosted upon the slopes of the Kourgane Hill. Of this force, the four Kazan battalions formed stood in front near the shoulders of the Great Tiedoiibt, and were supported by the four battalions of the Vladimir corps. On the right — proper right — of these troops, but somewhat refused, there were two of the Sousdal battalions, whilst more in ad- vance, and so placed as to form the extreme right of the Russian infantry line, there were the two remaining battalions of the same corps. Besides the masses thus pushed forward. General Kvetz- inski held in hand the four battalions of the Oug- litz corps as an immediate reserve, and posted them upon the higher slopes of the Kourgan^ Hill. On the right rear of these forces (after having come in from their skirmishing) tliere stood the two battalions of sailors. On the ex- treme right, and massed in colunnis at intervals upon the eastern and south-eastern slopes of the Kourgan^ Hill, there were twelve squadrons of regular cavalry, and eleven sotnias of Cossacks.f These bodies of horsemen were so placed that, whilst they covered the enemy's right and right rear, the Russian commander could, so to speak,
ing tlie Kourgane Hill after the withdrawal of the two Don Cossack batteries. — See Appendix No. I.
* The four Kazan (or Archduke Michael's) battalions, the four Vladimir battalions, the four Sousdal battalions, and the four Ouglitz battalions, with also the two battalions of sailors.
+ These bodies constituted the whole of tlie Russian cavalry except the four squadrons which Prince Mentschikoff took with hira when he rode towards the sea, and having numbered 3600 at the first they now reckoned 2700.
J.
92 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, swing tlioin round, and liurl tlicni again.si the iliink " of an enemy as.sailing his position in front.
Again tlie troops which defended the Causeway could aid the defence of the Kourganfe Hill ; and, moreover, the four Volhynia battalions, which con- stituted what was now left of Prince Mentschi- koff's 'Great JJeserve,' were so placed that they might he promptly brought forward in support to the troops confronting our people.
It rested with the four Kazan battalions to make the lirst attack upon the Englisli troops. This was to be done whilst our soldiery, after struggling through the fords, were gaining the top of the bank. The enemy's massive columns were to throw our men back into the channel of the river before they could find time to form.*
The slope which led up from the top of the bank to the parapet of the Great Redoid^t was almost as even as the glacis of a fortress ; and, except to one who knew beforehand how unaccountably life and limb arc spared in a storm of artillery-fire, it seemed hard to understand that upon that smooth ground men would be able to live for many mo- ments under round-shot, grape, and canister from the twelve heavy guns they confronted.
* After speaking of the disposition of the Russian infantry on the banks of the river, Prince Gortschakoff writes : ' These ' arrangements had been taken with a view to the unavoidable ' disorders amongst the enemy's lines when crossing the river, ' anil in order to throw the Allies backwaid by a violent shock. ' Orders had been issued to that effect by Prince Mentschikoff, ' and severally reported to the commanding generals under me, ' and by me.'
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 93
Being on the extreme left of the Allied forces, cilAi\
Sir G. Brown had to stand prepared for an attack .__^
of cavalry on his flank. On our side of the river, home down to the edge of the vineyards, the broad and gently undulating downs, thickly clothed with elastic herbage, were all tliat horse- men could wish for ; and even on the left bank, the ground in this part of the field was practicable for the evolutions of cavalry. Hardly ever in war did 2700 troopers sit still in their saddles under stronger provocation to enterprise, for they were upon fair ground ; and, unless they submitted to be forbidden by the body of only eight hundred English horse, which stood in their pnth, for- tune offered to let them ride down on the Hank of a line of infantry, and strike it whilst in the act of advancing to attack a field citadel.* So, although in point of fact it occurred, the con- tingency of the enemy's withholding his cavalry arm, instead of bringing it down upon the unshel- tered flank of his assailants, was hardly one that beforehand oui' people could have deemed at all probable, still less expected with confidence.
Rightly, therefore — though the apprehension was not afterwards justified by the event — the Light Division was carried into action with an idea that cavalry charges were to be expected on the flank ;-f- and the duty of preparing against
* The English cavuhy altogether had a strength of 1000 ; but Lord George Paget's regiment was in anotlier part of the field.
+ Before the action, there was a good deal of conversation aniong.st officers in the Light Division with respect to the way in wliicli the expected charges of the liussian cavuliy shouH b«
rtSSiiilants.
94 BATTLE OF TUB ALMA.
CHAP, enterprises of this sort pressed specially upon
_._l! General ]3uller, because he conimandod the left
brigade.
To storm a position thus held in strength by forces of all arms, and to answer at the same time for the safety of the whole of the Allied army against a flank attack, was a task of great mo- ment ; but, on the other hand, Sir George Brown was not without means for preparing a well- Mcaus for Ordered assault — for the enemy was making no well nideied attempt to liold the vineyards in strength ; and
assault were ,. ., oi iiii
npeii to the ou the Kussiau Side of the river, the bank, al- though steep, and from eight to fifteen feet in height, was yet so broken that a skirmisher seek- ing to bring his eye and his rifle to a level with the summit, would easily find a ledge for his foot. Here, then, was exactly the kind of cover which the assailants needed ; for if this steep bank could be seized and lined for a few minutes by their skirmishers, it would enable their main body to recover its formation after passing through the enclosures and fording the river. But in order to lay hold of the advantage thus offered by the nature of the ground, it was of necessity to take care that the advance of the Light Division should be amply covered by skirmishers. This was not done. The Eifles under Lawrence and Norcott had long before scoured the vineyards ; but they
met ; and it was then — then, perhaps, for the first time — that men broached the idea of dispensing with the 'hollow square,' and receiving tlie enemy's horse in line. At all events it was tlicn, and amongst officers of the Royal Fusiliers, that I my.sel/ first heard the change mooted.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 95
had inclined away towards their left, and, fording chap. the river higher up, had left Codringtou's brigade '
without any skirmishers to cover its advance.* The Division
- not covereJ
No other light-mfantry men were thrown lorward by suir-
" luishers.
in their stead, and the whole body went stark on with bare front, driving full at the enemy's stronghold.^
XIX.
Sir George Brown's right brigade, consisting of Tiie tenor
^ <=> <^ *-" of Sir G.
the Eoyal Fusiliers, the 33d and 23d Eegimentsj Brown's
•^ ' ox orders for
tlie advance
* The right wing -the wing under Lawrence — was the wing which had had to advance in front of Codrington's brigade. Lawrence found himself so baflled by the smoke of the burning village, that he inclined away to his left, leaving Codrington's front uncovered, and got at last to the front of the 19th Kegi- ment.
+ Sir George Brown's omission to cause skirmishers to be thrown out from the regiments of Codrington's and Buller's brigades seems to have been caused by his imagining that the necessity of the step would be effectually superseded by the operations of the Rifle battalion. The event proved his error ; but one would have thought that it might have been perceived beforehand ; for, however well an independent body of rifle- men may be led, and however important a share it may be likely to have in governing the result of a battle, there is no safe ground for anticipating that its operations will supply the place of skirmishers thrown out from the formed battalions. Indeed, it may be said that the more able and enterprising the leader of an independent body of light infantry men may be, the less his force will be likely to fulfil the peculiar duty of companies thrown out from the formed battalions, and kept in close relation with them by the link of that obedience -which a captain owes to his colonel.
X When I speak of several regiments in the same limb of the sentence, I generally follow the order in which they would be ranged, going from right to left. In a brigade consisting cf three regiments — say, e.g., of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Foot — the
96 BATTf-E OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, was under General Codrington. The left brigade,
.,_1^ consisting of the lOtli, tlie 88tli, and 77tli TJogi-
nients, was commanded by General ]3ullci'. Tlie orders which General Codrington received from Sir George were simply to advance with his brigade, and not to stop until he had crossed the river. A like order, it is believed, was given to General Buller. The division still moved in line ; and, after losing a few men from the fire of the enemy's artillery, it reached the boundary of tlie vineyards and gardens which Ijelt the course of the river. Tlie advance The euclosurcs by this time had been almost vmeyfi'is;"' entirely cleared of Russian skirmishers by our Rifles under Lawrence and Norcott, but could be searched by artillery fire. In their eagerness for the conflict, our regiments strove to advance quickly ; but it was a laborious task to traverse the gardens and vineyards, and many of those who had hitherto kept their knapsacks here laid them down. In a few minutes, the whole of the Light Division of infantry, drawing along with it, in its impetuous course, the 95th Regiment, had forced a way into the vineyards. There, our young soldiers found themselves, as they imag- ined, in a thick storm of shot and cannon-l)alls ; but it seems that missiles of war fly crashing so audibly through foliage that they sound more dangerous than they are.
1st would be posted at the right, the 3d in the cenUe, and the 2d on the left. So if one wished to speak of those three regi- ments in the order in which they would stand when ranged in the same battalion, one would take them from right to left, and in this order — viz., 1st Foot, 3d Foot, 2d Foot.
IJATTLE OF THE ALMA. 97
The loss at this time was not great. Our men chap. were in the belief that speed was required of '
them ; and having before them no chain of skir- mishers to feel the way and control the pace of the Division, they struggled forward with eager haste. In passing from one of the enclosures to another, part of the line came to the top of a vertical bank, revetted witli stone, and forming a kind of 'sunk fence.' Standing there, the men observed that a violent gust of shot was beating in against the stone work at their feet ; and it seemed to them that, the moment they sprang from the top of the fence to the lower vineyard, their legs would be shattered by a thousand mis- siles. For a moment they paused, as though for some guidance ; but the guidance was such as is given by — 'Forward, first company!' 'Second ' company, show them the way ! ' The first who leaped down stood unscathed in the vineyard be- low ; the rest followed. Dangers shrink before the advance of resolute men. There was not much loss in that lower vineyard. The troops pressed on.
Amongst the vineyards there were, here and there, farm-cottages and homesteads ; and since the obstructions which the men were encounter- ing had destroyed their formation, it became pos- sible for such as loved their safety more than their honour to linger in the shelter afforded by these buildings. Some few, they say, lingered.
The Division hurried forward with just sucli an.iovpr trace of its original Ime-iormation as could re-
VOL. III. G
98 BATTLK OF TIIK ALMA.
CHAP, iiiain to it after rapidly passing tlirougli difficuit , enclosures. The river, though flowing in a swift
current, was fordable by a strong man in most places, but it was of very unequal depth. Gen- eral Codrington was seen riding quickly across at a point where the stream hardly flowed above his horse's fetlocks, and yet, almost close to hiui, the taller charger of another officer went down and had to swim. The soldiers rapidly waded across. Some few perished in the stream, and it was never known whether they fell from shot or from not being able to keep their footing in the cur- rent.
That part of Pennefather's brigade which was ovcrlaj^ped by the Eoyal Fusiliers '^' had become entangled with the Light Division ; and at the moment of Codrington's advance, Hume of the 95th seized a colour, and, dashing across the river, carried with him the left wing of the regiment; but the men bore so much towards their left, that by the time they gained the foot of the bank on the Eussian side of the river, they had become blended, not (as might be supposed) with the right, but with the left regiment of Cod- rington's brigade. They were destined to share the glory and the carnage which awaited the 23d Fusiliers.
At length the whole Light Division, together
with the additional force under Hume which had
strayed into its company, was upon the Eussian
side of the river ; but as yet, the troops only stood
• i.e., after tlic Fusiliers had marclicd through tlie 95th.
BATTLE OV TUK ALMA. 09
upon the narrow strip of dry gruinui at tlic water's cil AT. edge, and such of them as were in the centre, or . .
towards the right, were penned back by tlie rocky bank which rose steep and liigh over their heads. The soldiery were a crowd — a crowd shaped and twisted by the winding of the river's bank, yet with some remains of military coherence ; for although the enclosures and the fording of the liver could not but destroy all formation, the men of every company had kept together as well as they were able.
But a general who had omitted to line the bank coiirinKtmrs
, . . ■, . 1 Ti , , brigade finds
with his own skirmishers might well expect to see the top ..i
° , , . tlie left
it fringed with the enemy s rifles ; and the strong r.ank wwa
° "^ , ^ T 1 Willi Russian
wall which nature had offered to the English as a skirmishuis. cover for the formation of their battalions was now, of course, held by the enemy's skirmishers. These light troops were in greatest force along the bank which faced the centre and the right of the Light Division. They came to the edge of the bank, tired down into the crowd of the red-coats, and then drew back for a pace or two that they might load in peace and be ready to fire again. Tliey could kill and wound men in the crowd below without laying themselves open to fire.
Towards the left of tlie Light Division the bank course was less abrupt, and also more free from the Gen.T.ii enemy's skirmishers.* There, after passing the river, General Buller, who commanded the 2d brigade, was able to form it at his leisure. He
* Becatisc our rifles, as we saw, liad inclined to their left, and were operating in this part of the field.
100 BATTLK or TIIH ALMA.
CHAP, ordered the 77tli riCginieiit to lie down under the cover afforded by the configuration of the ground, and upon a slope somewhat sheltered from the fire of the enemy's artillery he placed the 88th Eegi- ment.* With these two regiments he remained long halted, not partaking in the subsequent advance of Codrington's brigade. His reason was, that a large body of cavalry and infantry appearing on the plain to threaten his left,i- he thought it right to keep two regiments in hand until he should find himself supported by the near approach of the Highland brigade. He conceived that ho ought to beware of outstripping the 1st Division by too great an interval ; and, in truth, the duty
* As to his 19lh Regiment, Si:cpost.
+ Tlie absence of Prince Mentscliikoff in a distant part of tlie field was probal)ly the cause of the enemj-'s want of enterprise in not pressing with any degree of vigour upon the open flank of the English army. The only approach to any actual move- ment against tlie flank of the Light Division at the time of its advance from the river was one perceived and checked by Major Norcott. Norcott, having crossed the stream, had thrown for- ward his two right companies to a ridge in advance of the l)ank, and witli his two remaining companies was occupying the pre- cincts of a farmstead which offered him a point of appui for his left flank. Whilst he was thus posted, he saw some sixty or seventy Cossacks coming down from the south-east bj' a road which led to the farm, and close following these he perceived the head of a column of infantry. Norcott immediately with- drew his two right companies from the ridge, and prepared to make a stand at the farm. To aid him in this undertaking, he requested Captain Colville (who had come into this part of the field with one of Colonel Lawrence's companies) to draw U]i his men in line across the road leading down to the farm. Seeing these preparations for their reception, the horsemen, and the column of infantry which liad been following them, turned about and withdrew. — Note to ith Edition.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 101
which attached \ipon General Buller at this mo- chap. meiit was one of a grave kind ; for if the enemy '
should seize the moment 'o^ Sir" George B"i'o\vn's uie'liSy^ assault upon the Great Eedoubt as his time for u"onL,';i making a resolute attack wltlr horse,- -l^ob+y a>id artillery upon the flank of our advancing troops, the safety of the whole Allied army would be challenged, and would be found to rest greatly upon such dispositions as General Buller might have made for covering our left.
Sir George Brown's order to Buller empowered him to advance until he was over the stream ; but, that duty having been executed, the brigadier now found himself on the bank of a river, without, so far as I know, having any fresh orders to guide him, yet charged by circumstance with the duty of covering the flank of the whole Allied army at the moment of an assault upon the enemy's strong- hold. The business was a vital one; and the caution which Buller used at this time was re- quired by the occasion.* For to push forward the two regiments which formed the extreme left of the whole Allied front, and to march them against the enemy's stronghold in a line, out- flanked by the enemy's horse, and even, it would seem, by a portion of his foot, would have been to lay open, not Buller's brigade merely, but tlie whole Allied army, to the risk of a Ihmk attack
* The way in wliicli the 88tli and the 77tli rie<,ainents were haadletl at a hiter period of tlie action was not the necessary result of the dispositions made at this time, and is a fit subject for distinct comments.
102 BATTLE OF Tin: Al.MA.
CHAP, iuvulving great disasters. In these circumstances ' it was Buller's duty to take up such a position as wouJd.ei'iable 'him 'Uy cover the advance of Cod- rington's brigade,' and lo sustain the shock of a flank 'a'ttdck'. 'It was to that end tliat he kept in hand the 88th aiid 7Ytli Tteoiments.
XX.
Thcigtii Tliough forming part of fjuller's brigade, tlie
19th Regiment was suffered ere long to associate
itself witli General Codrington's advance ; and
thereupon, with Lawrence's wing of the liitles
and the wing of the 95th under Hume, the force
taking part in tliis movement became swoHen
to a body of troops which, witliout sul)stantial
inaccuracy, may be counted as iive battalions.*
state (if These live battalions were extended in a broken
battalions chain at the foot of the bank on the liussian side
erowaed 01 tlic nver, and were lullnig — especially towards
irit bank cf the right — under the close lire ot the skirmishers
who crowned the top. In this strait some of our
officers instinctively tried to clear tlie front by
getting the men to mount part way up the bank,
and bring their rifles to a level with the summit.
But among the foremost the General commanding
Kir George the Dlvisioii had forded the river. Sir George
Brown was an officer whose career had begun, and
begun with glory, in the great days under Well-
Browu.
* Because comi)risiii]^ four battalions and two wings of other battalions. The force was about to be yet furtlier augmented by the accession of the right wing of the !)5th.
BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 103
ington ; but wliil.st he was still in his early man- cilAP.
hood, wars had ceased, and thenceforth, for near ;
forty years, he had bronght his strong energies to bear upon the kind of military bnsiness which used to be practised ))y the English in peace-time. A long immersion in the Adjutant-General's de- partment had led him to go even beyond other men in laying stress upon the value of discipline ; but the practice of this sort of industry had not at all helped to school him for the command of a division in war-time; for in labouring after that mechanic perfection which, after all, is only one of many means towards an end, the end itself had been much forgotten by those who controlled our military system, and the business of war (as, for instance, the art of carrying a brigade in line through enclosures and thick grounds) had been little or never practised in England.* To a mili- tary system which omits to anticipate and to deal with the common obstacles to be expected in a battle-field, war is a rough disturber ; and unless the industry of the barrack-yard is supported by other and better resources, it is liable to be turned to nothingness by even a gentle contact with reality. A belt of garden - ground, a Avinding though fordable stream, and an enemy hitherto inert, had sufficed to make Sir George Brown de- spair of being able to present his troops to the enemy in a state of formation. Great dislocation
* Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Seinde, used to press the importance of practising trooiis iu this way, but without success.
104 BATTLE OF THE ALMA.
CHAP, of military order was, of course, the necessary ^' result of having to pass through enclosures and to ford a winding stream ; so what the main body needed to have before it when it approached the left bank of the river was a swarm of skir- mishers clearing its immediate front, and prepared to cover it during the process of forming anew. This cover, however, was wanting. Sir George Brown declared that to attempt any formation after the passage of the river would be impossible, and that he had ' determined to trust to the spirit ' and individual courage of the troops.' Thus, on ground giving rare opportunity for the deliberate preparation of an attack, and imder no great stress of battle, the Light Division— the ' Light ' Division ' whose very name carried with it a great inheritance of glory — was suffered to lapse into a mere throng of brave men. In this plight the five battalions had to advance under the guns of a powerful battery supported by heavy columns of foot.
But an officer honoured with the command of British troops can always hope that, when his skill fails him, his men may still retrieve the day by sheer fighting ; and to a commander frustrated in his evolutions, the prospect of a rude conflict with the enemy may offer the best kind of solace, and perhaps even a happy issue out of trouble. Of such comfort as was to be got from close fighting, there seemed to be fair promise in the Great Redoubt; and there. Sir George Brown resolved to seek it. Eager to
BATTLE OF Till': ALMA. 105
have, at the least, a forward place in the anued cuap. throng, he suffered agony lest the Lank, very ' .
steep at the spot where he faced it, should he inaccessible to a mounted officer ; but he soon found a place where a break in the stiffness of the acclivity left room for the two or three ledges which a horseman must find before he can reach the top. Then he quickly gained the open ground above. The Eussian skirmishers were there. Schooled in habits of deep reverence for military rank, these men may have been startled, perhaps, by the sudden apparition of the hat which bespoke a general officer, and, what was worse, a general officer in a state